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1. Imperfect information process-
ing in economics
1 Introduction
Economic agents generally operate in uncertain environments and, prior to
making decisions, invest time and resources to collect useful information.
Consumers compare the prices charged by dierent firms before purchas-
ing a product. Politicians gather information from dierent sources before
implementing a policy. Doctors conduct several tests on patients before sub-
scribing a treatment. Since having access to valuable information requires
time, eort, and often money, a problem typically addressed by economists
is how much information a decision-maker should collect before being su!-
ciently convinced about one state of the world. Implicit in economic models
that aim to identify the optimal amount of information to be gathered is the
idea that, once information is available, there are no costs involved in inter-
preting and transmitting it. However there are plausible reasons to believe
that the activity of information processing is far from being perfect.
Looking at the quantitative dimension of information, a larger amount
of information usually implies that more resources are needed in order to
interpret it. In this respect, with the rise of the Internet, the cost of gen-
erating and transmitting information has fallen so dramatically that the
scarce resource is not anymore information itself, but the attention needed
to understand it. For example, the cost of sending an electronic manuscript
to a journal is much lower than the opportunity cost of the time it takes
to a referee to read and understand the paper. Modelling explicitly such
opportunity costs may shed light on phenomena such as market congestion
and information overload.
From a qualitative point of view, information may have a high degree
of complexity which makes it not equally accessible to all economic agents.
For instance, specialization of labor is nowadays so high that communica-
tion problems between agents with dierent competencies are very likely to
arise. Suppose a car manufacturer has to choose one from many potential
prototype projects in order to launch a new car model. If the selection
criteria must pay attention to both technical (performance) and esthetical
(design) considerations, it becomes crucial for the quality of the decision,
whether a report compiled by the Engineering Department can be eectively
understood by the Marketing&Sales Department, and vice versa. It seems
then important to analyze models that relate the performance of collective
decision making to the communication flow within the organization.
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Finally, the idea that the human brain has a limited information process-
ing capability is widely accepted in psychology. In this respect, the need for
economic models in which the decision-makers’ cognitive limitations are ex-
plicitly taken into account was already pointed out in the pioneering work of
Simon (1955) on bounded rationality. However only recently the notion of
bounded rationality has influenced mainstream economics and the state of
the art in this field of research is far from being established. Consequently,
more theoretical contributions to this branch of the literature are needed.
In what follows I will survey some recent works in which imperfect in-
formation processing is related to, respectively, the functioning of markets,
collective decision making, and individual decision-making. I will discuss the
main findings for each subject considered, and conclude by introducing the
contribution that the present thesis provides in each of the aforementioned
issues.
2 Markets and imperfect information processing
Within each market interaction a certain amount of information flows from
some agents to others. Firms attract the attention of consumers by target-
ing them with advertisements that include information about their products,
news about price discounts and special oers. Economists compete for pub-
lications by submitting to journals manuscripts that need to be processed by
referees. In the job market the information included in application letters
is sent from potential employees to the employer. In all these situations im-
perfect information processing typically refers to the inability of the agents
in charge of screening information to eectively process all information re-
ceived. This is a fairly realistic assumption as the cost of transmitting
information has decreased so drastically, that the relatively scarce resource
has become the human attention needed to process information.
In psychology, the idea that there exists limits on the information process-
ing capability of the human brain is a well established fact. In his seminal
paper, Miller (1965) pointed out that it is the span of absolute judgment
and the span of immediate memory that impose severe limitations on the
amount of information we are able to simultaneously process and remember.
Libowsky (1975) is concerned with the psychophysiological consequences of
experiencing overload on a daily basis, and argues that this phenomenon is
a collateral consequence of both man-made transformation of the physical
environment, and the mass production of symbols and messages facilitated
by the growth of information technology. Yet, in economics very little at-
tention has been paid to formalize the concept of information overload. One
reason for this is the traditional argument by which information is regarded
as a freely disposable good: excessive information can always be disregarded,
therefore the mere fact that someone receives more information than he can
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process does not mean that he receives too much information. However there
are empirical findings suggesting the opposite. In the experimental market-
ing literature, Jacoby et al. (1974) find that the accuracy which consumers
make a right purchase is a bell-shaped function of the amount of information
at disposal: too little as well as too much information results in a poor deci-
sion, implying that, in principle, there exists an optimal intermediate level
of information to process. Surprisingly their experiments show that, despite
consumers that were provided with more information made poorer decisions,
they also felt more satisfied and less confused. Such finding suggests that
consumers may not able to shield themselves from being overloaded when
too much information is made readily available. Similar empirical evidence
is provided by Malhotra (1982), and Keller and Staelin (1987).
Even if we retain the idea that individuals are able to accurately perceive
their objective information processing limits, ine!ciencies may still arise as
a consequence of the fact that human attention is an unpriced resource. For
example, a recent laboratory experiment by Kraut et. al. (2002) finds that
charging for an e-mail may improve the eectiveness of communication.
To my knowledge, the only theoretical treatment of information over-
load in economics is Van Zandt (2004). The aforementioned paper addresses
information overload issues for a network of targeted communication: sev-
eral firms (senders) send advertisement messages to an arbitrary subset of
consumers (receivers). There exists an informational asymmetry between
senders, who know the content of their messages but are not fully aware
about the interests of potential receivers, and receivers, who know their own
interests but ignore the content of a message unless they process it. Limited
attention is modelled by assuming that receivers can process only a fixed
amount of messages. If they receive more messages than they can process,
they randomly select a number of them without knowing their content. The
main result of the paper is that information overload is a consequence of
the strategic interaction among senders. Since the attention of receivers is
an unpriced resource, each sender’s message crowds out messages of other
senders, and an increase in the amount of information results in a decrease
in the average value of the information. Since the focus in Van Zandt (2004)
is on targeted communication networks, the leading interpretation of the
model is as advertising and a theoretical treatment of information overload
in dierent contexts is left to future research.
A market structure that seems to me particularly relevant to address
information overload issues is that of monopsony market. Consider for in-
stance the following example: the receiver is a university posting one job
opening on the Internet with exogenously fixed terms, and senders are ap-
plicants that decide whether to send their CV’s. The limited time span in
which such hiring decisions are typically taken, as well as the limited budget
that universities have to evaluate all available job applicants, suggest that
information overload problems in these contexts may arise. This motivates
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chapter 2 of the present thesis.
In chapter 2 I develop a model in which heterogenous senders (job ap-
plicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Pro-
ductivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes
imprecise informative signals about workers’ productivity (applications) in
order to screen among applicants. Limited attention is modeled by assum-
ing that the information processing technology is imperfect: the accuracy
of each signal in predicting the unknown productivity decreases with the
total number of applications processed. With this setup the crucial decision
variable for the receiver is to decide the actual number of applications to
process.
My first finding is that, for any information processing technology level,
information overload emerges when the cost of sending an application is low
relatively to the existing technology level. Information overload is defined
here as an equilibrium in which some of the applications sent are disregarded
by the receiver. The receiver’s ability to process an optimal amount of in-
formation may suggest the idea that receiving information that exceeds the
processing capacity does not mean receiving too much information. How-
ever, I find that a lower sending cost is always associated to a larger amount
of information disregarded in equilibrium and a lower average quality of the
information. This result is supported by the empirical findings of Kraut et
al. (2002) and confirms the analytical results of Van Zandt (2004).
The second issue I address in Chapter 2 is the eect of market size on
information overload. Surprisingly, I find that, if the size of the market (that
is, the number of senders) increases, the amount of information neglected in
equilibrium stays constant and the average quality of information increases.
This result is driven by the self-selection mechanism that typically operates
in screening markets: the increase in competition discourages low-productive
senders from applying and, therefore, a larger market translates only in
higher average productivity of applicants.
Finally, I investigate the eect of relaxing the assumption that infor-
mation is freely disposable, as it allows me to capture situations in which
neglecting information is not possible. Such impossibility may be due to le-
gal constraints or to specific policy orientations (for instance is common for
universities to give all candidates the opportunity to present a job market
paper). With this setup, information overload refers to the dierence be-
tween the total number of applications sent and the number of applications
that would be optimal to process. I find that the ine!ciencies of informa-
tion overload are more severe in a market where information is not freely
disposable. Besides the fact that excessive information now directly harms
the receiver who (contrary to the case in which information is freely dispos-
able) cannot shield himself form being overloaded, I am also able to show
that the inability of disregarding information results in a larger amount of
information being sent as well as a lower average quality of such information.
4
3 Collective decision-making and imperfect infor-
mation processing
The conventional economic paradigm views economic organizations as single
decision-making entities. For instance, the behavior of a profit maximizing
firm is typically modeled by assuming that a manager chooses the output
level optimally. Yet, the decision-making process of a firm is in reality very
complex and it involves many people. Consequently, in the last couple of
decades, the research agenda has identified the need of modelling explicitly
collective decision making as a necessary step in order to capture insights of
how organizations work. The relevance of economic theories of organizations
is implicitly justified by the fact that the activity of information processing
is imperfect.
First, the limited capabilities of individuals to process information within
a limited amount of time suggests that groups of individuals may be able
to make better decisions than any single individual. Second, if individu-
als make systematic errors in interpreting the information they posses, the
specific organizational structure in which they are embedded may aect the
outcome of the final decision. Since the basic feature of an organization
is that of aggregating decisions taken by each one of its members sepa-
rately, dierent organizational structures will generally aggregate individual
errors dierently. Finally, the information handled by firms is a complex
multidimensional entity. For instance, a decision about the investment op-
portunities in a specific country requires considerations of very dierent na-
ture like, political stability, general economic figures, national fiscal regime,
industry concentration etc. This is one reason why organizations decentral-
ize the information processing activity by allocating the task of processing
qualitatively dierent pieces of information to people with dierent compe-
tencies. The specialization of labor is nowadays so high that communication
problems between agents with dierent backgrounds are very likely to arise.
Consequently, the performance of collective decision making may be reduced
due to imperfect communication flow within an organization.
Collective decision making is usually modelled by assuming that the
organization is an information processing network in which each node repre-
sents an agent belonging to the organization. The majority of authors take
the work of Marschak and Radner (1972) as a point of departure: agents are
team members, that is, they have identical preferences and therefore agency
problems do not arise1. Broadly speaking, contributions to this literature
can be divided into two branches.
The first branch includes models in which the organization is neutral
in the sense that the decision eventually reached by the organization is not
1 In contrast, Lambert (1986) analyzes incentives problems in organization by taking a
principal-agent approach. Incentives problems are partially addressed also in Koh (1992b).
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aected by its internal structure. Neutrality arises whenever it is assumed
that communication and aggregation do not aect the informational value
that can be extracted from a batch of information. In all these models im-
perfect information processing refers to the fact that each agent has limited
attention and, therefore, can process only a limited amount of information
items within a time unit. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) are concerned with
the design of an e!cient organizational structure when there is a trade-o
between returns to specialization and cost of communication. On one hand,
more specialization implies that agents have a lower unit time of process-
ing a specific type of information. On the other hand, the more specialized
agents are, the more communication is necessary to coordinate agents’ activ-
ities. Radner (1992, 1993) initiated the research of decentralized information
processing where organizations are viewed as a hierarchical structures that
perform parallel associative computations. A similar approach is taken by
Meagher and Van Zandt (1998), Radner and Van Zandt (1992, 2001), and
Van Zandt (1998, 1999). Within this framework, the predominant focus of
the analysis is to determine the e!cient information processing system, that
is, the one which performs the given task in the shortest possible time and
by using the smallest possible number of agents.
A second branch of the literature (to which chapter 3 of the present thesis
also belongs) includes models where, in contrast, the specific organizational
structure aects the outcome of the decision-making process. The seminal
work in this area is due to Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986). Their standpoint is
human fallibility: individuals make systematic (honest) errors when making
decisions and, therefore, the performance of a specific organization depends
on the way in which it aggregates the errors made by each one of its agents
separately. The focus is on the organization’s decision about accepting or
rejecting a certain project. Projects of ex-ante unknown quality are assumed
to come in streams, and the organization evaluates them sequentially in or-
der to distinguish those that are worth implementing from those that are not.
The analysis is restricted to the comparison of two stylized organizational
structures, a hierarchy and a polyarchy. In a hierarchy a project is accepted
if and only if it has the approval of all its members, while for a project to be
accepted in a polyarchy, the approval of a single member is su!cient. Since
a hierarchy minimizes the errors of rejecting good projects (Type-I errors),
while a polyarchy minimizes the errors of accepting bad projects (Type-II
errors), the former organization performs better in a hostile environment2,
while the latter is more eective in a friendly environment. The human
fallibility approach introduced by Sah and Stiglitz has inspired numerous
authors that addressed other important organizational issues.
One such an issue is whether or not there exist organizational structures
2An environment is hostile (friendly) if the expected payo from accepting a project
at random is negative (positive).
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that are more e!cient than a pure hierarchy or a pure polyarchy. Ioan-
nides (1987) shows that the screening performance can be increased if the
organization adopts a complex hybrid form composed by both hierarchies
and polyarchies. In contrast, Koh (1992a) notices that if, in addition to the
fixed cost of hiring screeners, one also takes into account the variable costs
of evaluation, then a pure hierarchy or a pure polyarchy may be more e!-
cient than hybrid forms. Moreover, Koh (1993) suggests that, where there
exists a first-mover advantage, small and decentralized organizations like
polyarchies may be preferred as the advantage of a quicker decision osets
the loss in screening accuracy.
Other authors have studied the relation between organizational forms
and market structure. Bull and Ordover (1987) find that the optimal size
of a polyarchy depends on the degree of competition in the product market
and, moreover, that a competitive market leads to long-run e!ciencies that
do not arise in more concentrated markets. Hendrikse (1992) shows that
both hierarchies and polyarchies may emerge in equilibrium, and that more
competition is associated with more centralized hierarchical structures.
Human fallibility, as it is modeled by Sah and Stiglitz, does not leave
room for individual rationality as agents are characterized by an exogenous
pair of probabilities (screening functions) with which they accept good and
bad projects. In this respect, Koh (1992b) generalizes the setup of Sah and
Stiglitz by modelling agents as homogenous rational screeners who cannot
fully communicate the information they have. Each agent observes an im-
precise informative signal about a projects’ quality, and chooses the optimal
cuto point, say uW> such that he recommends the project if the correspond-
ing signal is greater than uW and rejects it otherwise. Such optimal cuto
points depend on the specific structure of the organization as well as on the
position that the agent has in the organization. Koh (1992b) shows that op-
timal acceptance regions are smaller (larger) at lower level of the hierarchy
(polyarchy), compared with higher levels. Visser (2000) takes a step fur-
ther by allowing rational agents to have heterogenous screening accuracies,
and finds that the ordering of agents does not aect the performance of the
organization.
All models that take human fallibility as a standpoint share the assump-
tion that projects come in streams, the organization screens them sequen-
tially, and eventually undertakes all projects perceived as profitable. How-
ever there are situations in which it is more realistic to assume that the task
performed by an organization is to select a single alternative from a feasible
set of alternatives that are simultaneously available. Think, for instance of
the problem faced by a university that has a vacancy to oer. The university
will typically post the job oer on the Internet (e.g., on Inomics or the AEA
website) and, after screening a number of applicants, it will hire the most
promising candidate.
The consideration above motivates the third and fourth chapter of the
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present thesis, where I take the human fallibility approach as point of de-
parture to analyze the collective decision-making process of an organization
whose goal is to select the best alternative from a given set. The analysis is
restricted to a hierarchy as it is the most eective organizational structure in
performing such task. Each alternative is assumed to be either good or bad,
and human fallibility is captured by the fact that each agent observes, for
each alternative, a noisy signal in the form of good news or bad news about
the alternative’s type. With this setup a hierarchy with two levels represent
a two-stage selection procedure where the first agent preselects a subsample
of alternatives to be passed to the second stage, and the second agent makes
the final selection by choosing one of the preselected alternatives. I abstract
from both fixed and variable costs (e.g. the cost of hiring screeners and the
cost of evaluating alternatives) as it allows me to analyze the organizational
performance only in terms of the screening accuracy.
In Chapter 3 I analyze the eects that two dierent information process-
ing limitations (limited attention and lack of communication) have on the
optimal selection strategy by keeping the ordering of agents exogenous. Be-
sides lack of communication and limited attention, I do not impose any
other constraints on individual rationality and assume that agents are team
members whose goal is to maximize the probability that the organization
selects a good candidate. If information processing limitations were absent
the decision-making process (besides the imprecision due to human falli-
bility) would be perfect: the first agent should pass all alternatives to the
second stage, and the second agent eventually selects the alternatives that
has generated the most favorable pair of signals. I first analyze the collective
decision-making process when communication between agents is not possi-
ble. Later, I will allow for the possibility of full communication, but I will
assume that agents have limited attention: the signals’ accuracy decreases
in the number of alternatives to be evaluated. Moreover, I allow for agents
to be heterogenous in their screening accuracies.
My first finding in chapter 3 is that, when communication is not possible
and the more accurate agent is placed at the first decision node, the optimal
selection strategy prescribes to pass to the second stage only alternatives
that have generated good news. This is the case because, when the more
accurate screener acts first, there are no incentives to pass to the second
stage alternatives that produced bad signals: independently of the signal
realizations in stage 2, they will never produce a likelihood value larger
than that of alternatives that produced a good signal in stage 1. When, in
contrast, the most accurate screening takes place in the second stage, the
optimal selection strategy generally prescribes to pass to the second stage
(in addition to all alternatives that have generated good news) also some of
the alternatives that have generated bad news. This is the case as passing
bad news to the second stage implies a trade-o between two eects. The
first is a negative mixing eect: mixing good and bad news in a single pool
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makes it impossible to distinguish between them in stage 2 and, therefore
decreases the probability of selecting the best alternative. The second is a
positive sample size eect: selecting more alternatives in stage one increases
the chance of observing at least one good news in stage two. My second
finding is that, when I allow for the possibility of internal communication
but I impose limited attention, it is generally optimal for the first agent not
to pass too many alternatives to the next stage. Passing a large sample of
alternatives to stage 2 results in overloading the second agent by excessively
reducing his screening accuracy. Consequently, the optimal selection rule
takes the form of a bound on the total number of alternatives (both good
and bad news) to be passed to the next selection round.
In chapter 4 I focus only on lack of communication but I endogenize
the ordering of agents. I find that, by letting the more accurate agent
screen first, the organization overcomes the imperfections due to lack of
communication and is as e!cient as a hierarchy in which information flows
are perfect. Even though this result suggests that, by an optimal ordering
of agents, perfect decision-making can always be achieved, it is important to
notice that variable costs of screening have not been taken into account. As
it is natural to assume that the cost of processing information increases with
the accuracy with which information is processed, it might be the case that
having higher screening accuracy at later stages is optimal for the simple
reason that at higher stages less information is processed. Consequently,
the indirect (e.g. non monetary) costs that might emerge due to a lack of
internal communication can always be explained in terms of the trade-o
between mixing eect and sample size eect highlighted in chapter 3.
4 Individual decision-making and imperfect infor-
mation processing
The idea that the traditional economic paradigm of rationality imposes ex-
cessively demanding computational abilities to the human brain was first
pointed out by Simon (1955). The original critique of Simon has been sup-
ported by abudant empirical evidence from the psychological literature that
shows how human choice procedures dier from that of homo economicus.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981,1986) show the existence of framing eects:
choices are aected by the way in which logically equivalent alternatives are
presented. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and Tversky (1969,1977) provide
evidence suggesting that, when making decisions, humans have the ten-
dency to simplify choice problems rather than analyzing the consequences
of choosing each alternative in an exhaustive quantitative manner. Further-
more, experiments by Huber Payne and Puto (1982) and Tversky and Shafir
(1992) demonstrate that choices are often based on reasons that are depen-
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dent on the specific choice problem. Luce and Raia’s (1957) dinner is a
striking example of this phenomenon. An individual chooses chicken from a
menu oering steak and chicken. However the same individual chooses steak
when the menu includes steak chicken and frog’s legs. The reason explaining
this seemingly irrational choice behavior is that the presence of frog’s legs
in the menu conveys information about the quality of the other two items.
Framing eects, tendency to simplify problems and the presence of choice
set-dependent reasons, they all lead to choice functions that generally violate
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Axiom (IIA) and, therefore, im-
ply a behavior which is not consistent with the rationality paradigm3. The
tension between the behavior predicted by traditional economics and the
behavior observed in experiments, gave rise to several attempts (often very
dierent in their nature) to model bounded rationality4.
One approach is to impose some constraints on the information process-
ing capacity of the decision-maker. Anderlini (1991), Spear (1989) and An-
derlini and Felli (1992) assume that an agent can use only a recursive be-
havior rule. Rubinstein (1986), Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) and Kalai and
Stanford (1988) analyze repeated games under the assumption that more
complex strategies are more costly to use. In this setup players are rational
but take into account complexity costs when choosing the strategy to im-
plement5. Rosenthal (1989), Chen et. al. (1997), and Rubinstein (1998),
initiated a study of bounded rationality within the framework of game the-
ory.
Another approach is to assume that the environment in which agents
operate is prohibitively complex. For example, Easley and Rustichini (1999,
2005) model the choice behavior of an individual who does not have states
of the world as part of his description of the decision problem. Instead the
agents know the set of feasible actions, he formulates preferences over these
actions, and chooses accordingly to these preferences. The analysis focuses
on determining a systematic (expected payo-maximizing) procedure which
describes how the decision-maker modifies his preferences on the basis of
experience.
Other authors have undertaken the challenging task of refining the tra-
ditional concept of rationality (referred to as substantive rationality) into a
rational behavior (procedural rationality) that is compatible with the pat-
terns persistently observed in experimental evidence. One research agenda
3To this respect, Sen (1993) argues that ”there is no way of determining whether
a choice function is consistent or not without referring to something external to choice
behavior”.
4For a survey of this literature see Rubinstein (1988a).
5These papers belong to the literature on games and automata: Players are restricted
to using finite state automata to implement their strategies. An automaton consists of a
set of internal states (one of which is the initial states), a transition function (that specifies
how the automata change in response to the opponents’ actions) and an output function
(which gives an action as a function of the state).
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is to model formally choice procedures supported by empirical evidence,
and to investigate whether or not such procedures are compatible with
the rationality paradigm. In case they are, the task becomes to identify
restrictions on the preference space that are compatible with those pro-
cedures. For instance, Rubinstein (1988b) formalizes procedural decision-
making taking into account the role of similarities in human reasoning which
was emphasized by Tversky (1969, 1977). Dierently, Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1995,1997), model the behavior of a decision-maker who displays case-
based reasoning: decisions are based on the consequences derived form past
actions taken in similar situations.
The focus of more recent contributions is that of finding plausible ways to
rationalize bounded rational choices. Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002)
argue that choices are not the result of a single rationale, but that of multi-
ple rationales, each one being applied to a subset of choice problems. Their
approach allows in principle to rationalize all choices and the focus becomes
to count the minimum number of rationales necessary to explain a given
choice. Dierently, Manzini and Mariotti (2005) define a sequentially ra-
tionalizable choice function as a choice which can be retrieved by applying
sequentially a fixed set of rationales to remove inferior alternatives. This ap-
proach views choice as a sequential elimination heuristics and translates in
economic terminology procedures that have already been proposed by psy-
chologists. For instance, it is clear the analogy with Tversky (1972a,1972b)
model of ”Elimination by Aspects” (EBA): each alternative is represented
by a set of aspects, and the choice is made by a sequential elimination of
alternatives that do not posses an aspect.
Even though the economic literature has proposed and analyzed several
choice procedures, there is, to my knowledge, no work that analyzes in a
systematic way the problem of a utility-maximizing decision-maker who has
to choose the best out of several feasible procedures. This motivates chapter
5 of this thesis, where I analyze the choice function of a decision-maker who
is unable to evaluate his objective function. I take a procedural approach to
decision-making and model it as a selection procedure of Choice by Elimi-
nation (CBE) (Tversky (1972a,1972b)). This approach assumes that each
alternative is viewed as a sequence of aspects that the alternative may or
may not posses. In my model each aspect has the interpretation of being a
good news about the quality of the corresponding alternative. The decision-
maker’s inability to evaluate the objective function is captured by the fact
that the dierent aspects (news) of each alternative cannot be aggregated
into a single performance measure (i.e., likelihood). With this setup the
decision-maker’s problem is that of choosing the procedure (e.g., a rule that
prescribes, upon observing a set of news — each one corresponding to a single
alternative — which alternatives should be eliminated along the way) that
maximizes the probability of choosing the best alternative. It is important
to stress that the decision-making problem I consider can be interpreted as
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one with imperfect information processing. With this interpretation, the
model can be described as follows. There is a sequence of stages and, in
each stage, information is freely revealed to the decision-maker in the form
of a set of signals, where each signal imprecisely reveals the type of an alter-
native. The decision maker’s inability to evaluate an objective function is
then equivalent to assuming that the decision problem is one with imperfect
recall: the set of information is partitioned in dierent subsets (each one
representing the set of signals observed in each stage) that cannot be simul-
taneously used in order to single out one alternative. I am able to show that
the procedure that maximizes the probability of choosing the best alterna-
tive is unique and I call it ’Single Worst Elimination’ (SWE) as it prescribes
to eliminate sequentially only one alternative, and only when such alterna-
tive is the singleton bad news. Surprisingly I find that the choice function
induced by such procedure is transitive but violates the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preferences.
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2. Markets with information over-
load
1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the functioning of a market in which the agent in
charge of processing information has limitations in doing so. Information has
through the chapter a quantitative interpretation, implying that, a larger
amount of information requires more resources in order to be interpreted.
The rise of the Internet had a massive impact on the way economic agents
produce, transmit, acquire and process information. Nowadays an employer
can post a job opening with fixed terms on a specific web page and potential
employees can simply react with a ”click” by sending an electronic file that
includes, for instance, a CV, or a letter of recommendation. To make things
more concrete, think of the role that the web pages of the AEA or Inomics
play in the academic labor market. Similarly think of how the possibility
of sending a paper in electronic format has eected the market of scientific
publications. At least two characteristics distinguish theses types of mar-
kets from more traditional ones. The first one is the potentially unlimited
number of applicants (i.e., all potential candidates that have access to the
Internet). The second is the relatively low cost at which information can be
transmitted (i.e., the cost of sending a file via e-mail). For markets in which
there is such an abundance of information it is fairly realistic to think that
the scarce resource has become the human attention needed to process and
understand such information. For example, the cost of sending an electronic
manuscript is much lower than the opportunity cost of the time it takes a
referee to read and understand the paper. These considerations motivate the
present chapter where I investigate a monopsonistic labor market in which
the monopsonist has limited attention to process the whole information he
receives.
I develop a model in which heterogenous senders (job applicants) com-
pete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is pri-
vate information to the senders, and the receiver processes imprecise infor-
mative signals about workers’ productivity (applications) in order to screen
among applicants. I abstract from analyzing wage mechanisms because they
have already been studied in screening models without information process-
ing limitations1, and because this is not essential for my analysis. The
informational asymmetry is captured by the fact each sender has private
1See for instance the recent work by Janssen (2002) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2005).
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information about his own productivity but is not fully informed about how
his application will be perceived by the receiver, whereas the receiver, by
processing an application, can only observe a noisy signal about the unknown
productivity of the corresponding applicant. Limited attention is modeled
by assuming that the information processing technology is imperfect: the
accuracy of each signal in predicting the unknown productivity decreases
with the total number of applications processed.
My first finding is that, when cost of sending application is low rela-
tively to the existing technology level, some information is disregerded by
the receiver in equilibrium. Moreover, the lower the sending cost, the larger
is the amount of information disregarded. The receiver’s ability to process
an optimal amount of information may suggest the idea that receiving in-
formation that exceeds the processing capacity does not necessarily mean
receiving too much information. However information overload is present in
my settings as I am also able to show that the larger is the amount of in-
formation disregarded in equilibrium, the lower is the average quality of the
overall information received. This result is confirms the analytical results of
Van Zandt (2004).
Van Zandt (2004) addresses information overload issues for a network
of targeted communication: several firms (senders) send advertisement mes-
sages to an arbitrary subset of consumers (receivers). Limited attention
is modelled by assuming that receivers can process only a fixed amount of
messages: if they receive more messages than they can process, they ran-
domly select a number of them without knowing their content. The main
result of Van Zandt (2004) is that information overload is a consequence of
the strategic interaction among senders. Since the attention of receivers is
an unpriced resource, each sender’s message crowds out messages of other
senders and an increase in the amount of information results in a decrease
in its average value.
Besides the analogy between my result and that of Van Zandt, the mech-
anism shaping it are very dierent. In Van Zandt (2004) senders are com-
peting only for the attention of the receiver, and the sending cost is a ra-
tioning device of receivers’ attention: a higher cost induces senders to screen
more eectively the receivers to target. Dierently, the senders of my model
compete in two dimensions. First, there is a competition for attention be-
cause a necessary condition for a sender to be oered the vacancy is that
his application is taken into account in the first place. Second, all senders
whose applications have been processed compete in terms of their perceived
productivity because the vacancy is eventually oered to the sender whose
application has been perceived by the receiver as being the best one. Con-
sequently, the cost of sending application works in my model as a screening
device which induces only the more productive senders to apply. Further,
contrary to Van Zandt (2004), where disregarding information is a behavior
exogenously imposed by assuming a hard bound on the number of messages
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that can be processed, in my setup, the receiver can choose explicitly now
much information to use. This allows me to model more accurately the re-
ceiver’s decision of how much attention to invest in processing information.
The optimal amount of information to process is determined by comparing
the marginal benefit of a larger sample size (which is the chance of observing
a better application) to its opportunity cost (which is the marginal decrease
in the capability of ranking applicants according to their true abilities). The
nature of such optimal behavior is also supported by findings in the exper-
imental marketing literature. Jacoby et al. (1974) find that the accuracy
which consumers make a right purchase is a bell-shaped function of the
amount of information at disposal: too little as well as too much informa-
tion results in a poor decision, implying that, in principle, there exists an
optimal intermediate level of information to process.
Finally, I share with Van Zandt (2004) the idea that signals are unstruc-
tured: (a) the receiver cannot distinguish between signals when choosing
which ones to process, and (b) each signal is either processed in its entirety
or not at all. This assumption precludes the possibility of sequential screen-
ing based on partial processing of signals. For instance, if CV’s were meant
as unstructured signals, a first screening of applicants could be based only
on the specific field in which each candidate works, a second screening could
be based on the number of publications, a third on the knowledge of foreign
languages, and so on. Such screening methods are important mechanisms to
deal with information overload, however certain situations imply necessarily
a simultaneous screening of information. A typical example is the parallel
infromation-processing that takes place in organizations, where agents have
a limited time to screen a predetermined batch of information.
The second issue I address is the eect of market size on information over-
load. Surprisingly, I find that, if the size of the market (that is, the number
of senders) increases, the amount of information neglected in equilibrium
stays constant and the average quality of information increases. This occurs
because of the self-selection mechanism that typically operates in screen-
ing markets: the increase in competition discourages low-productive senders
from applying and, therefore, a larger market translates only in higher av-
erage productivity of applicants.
Finally, I note that the assumptions that information is a freely dispos-
able good might be too restrictive. First, Jacoby et al. (1974), Malhotra
(1982), and Keller and Staelin (1987), provides empirical evidence that con-
sumers are not able to shield themselves from being overloaded when too
much information is made readily available2. Second, there are situations in
which legal constraints or specific policy orientations preclude the possibility
of neglecting information. For instance, it is common for referred journal
2For a methodological critique to this findings see, in contrast, Meyer and Johnson
(1989).
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to process all the manuscripts received. Therefore, in the last section of
the chapter I assume that the receiver must process the whole information
received. With this setup, information overload refers to the dierence be-
tween the total number of applications sent and the number of applications
that would be optimal to process. I find that the ine!ciencies of information
overload are now even more severe. There are two eects responsible for this
result. The first is trivial and is due to the fact that excessive information
directly harms the receiver who, contrary to the case in which information
is freely disposable, cannot shield himself form being overloaded. The other
eect originate from the senders’ side. I am able to show that, for any given
technology level, market size, and (su!ciently low) sending cost, inability of
disregarding information results in a larger amount information being sent as
well as lower quality of such information. This is so because the competition
between senders is weakened. First, senders do not compete anymore for
attention as they know that all applications sent will be processed. Second,
the screening technology of the receiver is used beyond its optimal process-
ing capacity and, thus, sorting out relatively bad candidates becomes more
di!cult.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 analyze the problems of the Receiver and that of the senders.
Section 5 provides the analysis. Section 6 investigates the relation between
market congestion and ine!ciency. Section 7 concludes the chapter and
section 8 includes the proofs.
2 The model
In this section I first describe the model and discuss the related economic
implications. I then provide and justify a more specific assumption on the
information processing technology.
There is a mass Q of heterogenous potential senders, where Q is a real
number 1  Q ?4 and a mass, normalized to one, of homogenous receivers.
Each receiver has a vacancy to oer to a sender. The mass of senders is
uniformly distributed on the [0> 1] segment. Each point on the segment
corresponds to the ability of a sender and is denoted by  5 [0> 1] = The
decision variable for a sender is whether to send a costly application or not.
The decision variables for a receiver are: how many applications to process,
and which application to select from the pool of those processed. I denote
by q  0 the mass of senders who actually apply, and by p the mass of
senders actually processed by the receivers. Clearly 0  p  q  Q . The
timing is as follows.
0. Each sender knows where he is located (he knows his own ability),
and decides whether or not to send an application. I denote the sender’s
choice variable by v, where v can take only two values: 0 (do not send) and
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1 (send). The cost of sending one application is the same for all senders and
is equal to F= I will call actual senders those senders who have applied.
1. A random matching function allocates the mass of actual senders
q> evenly to the unitary mass of receivers. Thus, each receiver receives a
fraction q, of applications.
2. Each receiver observes the fraction of applications at his disposal, q>
and decides how many of them to process, p= Therefore the strategy for a
receiver is denoted by p (q) =
3. Let  = { : v () = 1} be the set of actual senders, let I ( |  5 )
be the prior distribution of actual senders, and let [ be a subset of R
representing the set of possible signals about = The receiver simultaneously
processes p applications. When an application is processed it produces a
signal which is drawn from the distribution I (· | >p) 3. It is assumed that
signals draws are i.i.d., and the family of distributions {I (· | >p)} is such
that, for any {2 A {1 the posterior distribution J (· | {2>p) dominates the
posterior distribution J (· | {1>p) in the sense of strict first-order stochastic
dominance. The crucial assumption of the model is the idea that, when
infinitely many signals are processed, then each signal becomes completely
uninformative. This is captured by the following assumption: for any  5 
and { 5 [
lim
p<"
I ({ | >p) = I ( |  5 ) (D=1)
4. The set of signal outcomes, denoted by [ˆp  {{ˆ1> ==> {ˆp} > becomes
private information to each receiver who compares signal outcomes and se-
lects the one that maximizes his expected utility (that is, the highest signal
observed).
The payos are as follows. If sender  does not apply he gets utility
zero. If sender  applies then the utility he gets equals the value of the
vacancy (constant for all senders and denoted by Y> where Y A F) weighted
by the probability of being selected minus the cost of signalling. The prob-
ability that sender  assigns to the event of being selected will generally
depend on his own ability, the total number of applications sent, and the
number of applications actually processed and, hereafter, will be denoted by
 ( | q>p) =Therefore, if q senders apply, and p are processed, the payo
of sender  is
xv (> q>p) =
½
0 if v () = 0
 ( | q>p)Y  F if v () = 1 (1)
The payo that a receiver gets from selecting the sender whose signal out-
come is {ˆ equals the expected ability of that sender. The expected ability
of sender  is conditional on the value of the corresponding signal outcome,
{ˆ> and the total number of applications processed p. Thus, the ability of a
3 In the analysis section, however, I will focus on a more specific distribution.
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sender , as it is perceived by the receiver, is
xu ({ˆ>p) = Hp [ | {ˆ] (2)
The assumption of stage 1 is justified by the purpose of this chapter
which is not that of explaining the mechanism by which senders are assigned
to receivers. Since receivers are homogenous, a sender does not perceive a
receiver per-se more valuable than another. Therefore I intentionally avoid
to model the possibility for a sender to target a particular receiver. The
only crucial choice of a sender is that of sending an application or not,
where sending an application is indeed a choice of whether to enter the
market. When applications are sent, the size of the actual market, (the
mass of actual senders q), is endogenously determined and stage 1 provides
a stylized picture of the way in which the two sides of the market come to
meet each other. The unitary mass of receivers corresponds to a mass of
identical information processors, thus each receiver can be thought as the
average representative agent of the receivers’ population. From now on I will
use the term Receiver (with capital R) to mean the representative receiver.
Stage 1 also implies that q is not an integer, thus, it does not represent
the number of applications received but is a measure of the information
produced by the market. This is convenient for the analysis and, with abuse
of terminology I will call q simply the "number" of applications received.
An important feature of the model I propose is that information is re-
vealed to the Receiver by observing signals that are drawn simultaneously.
This assumption describes economic situations in which a decision maker de-
cides ex-ante how much to invest in the information processing phase and,
only after such decision is made, the informative outcome is revealed4.
The assumptions of stage 3 imply that signals are imperfectly informa-
tive: higher signal outcomes are more favorable than5 lower signal outcomes.
Moreover, assumption (D=1) implies that when infinitely many applications
are processed the infromativeness of each signal vanishes as each signal out-
come becomes equivalent and neutral6 to the decision maker. This assump-
tion is economically justified as one can easily think of situations in which
the agent in charge of processing information has limited resources in order
to accomplish this task. A direct consequence of such constraint is that,
if the Receiver processes infinitely many applications, he actually allocates
4To this respect, Moscarini and Smith (2001) show that, in a dynamic continuous time
world, one shot non sequential sampling is still optimal given discounting and a constant
marginal cost of information.
5The concept of ”favorableness” was first introduced by Milgrom (1981) = If X is the set
representing the possible values of the random parameter > and [ is the set of possible
signals about > then, a signal {2 is more favorable than a signal {1 i the posterior distri-
bution J ( | {2) dominates in the first-order stochastic sense the distribution J ( | {1) =
6Two signals {1 and {2 are equivalent if H ( | {1) = H ( | {2) = A signal { is neutral
if, for any prior distribution J (·) > J () = J ( | {) =
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zero resources to interpret each one of them and signals turn out to be
completely uninformative.
The cost of applying is assumed not to be related to the senders’ ability
since its interpretation is not that of an opportunity cost, but simply the
mere cost of transmitting information (i.e., filling in and sending one appli-
cation). On the other hand, in this model, the opportunity cost is captured
by the fact that more able senders have higher probability of being selected.
It is useful to clarify that both asymmetric information and imperfect
information processing technology are crucial to the model. On one hand,
when dealing with the problem of selecting the ”best” sender, the Receiver
can only make an inference on the senders’ ability by using a noisy signal
that imprecisely represents the true ability. On the other hand, when dealing
with the problem of inferring his chance of being selected, a sender can
only use the knowledge about his ability to predict what signal outcome his
application will produce. In the model there is a discrepancy between the
value of a signal outcome and the true ability value that the signal aims to
represent and, moreover, such discrepancy increases with the total number
of applications processed. Therefore the larger is the amount of information
processed by the market, the less is the e!ciency with which agents can use
their private information in order to make a decision.
Finally, the model can also represent a situation in which neglecting
applications is not an option. This can be done by restricting the strat-
egy space of the Receiver to be simply that of selecting one applications
form those received. These two scenarios, one in which applications can be
neglected, and one in which this is not possible, are compared in section 6.
2.1 The information processing technology
In this subsection I propose a more specific information processing technol-
ogy which has two desirable properties. Namely I will impose that the two
following requirements are met:
(l) The information processing technology implies a trade-o between the
quality and the quantity of information.
(ll) The information processing is not sensitive to the ability of actual senders.
Referring to property (l), by quality of information I mean the accu-
racy of each signal in predicting the unknown parameter. By quantity of
information I mean the total number of signal outcomes drawn simultane-
ously7. Then the first property requires that the signals’ accuracy is strictly
decreasing in the sample size; the economic interpretation is that, the less
7The same definition of quantity of information is provided in Moscarini and Smith
(2002) =
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resources are allocated to interpret each signal, the smaller is the accuracy
of each signal in predicting the unknown parameter.
Property (ll) ensures that the signals’ accuracy depends only on the total
number of signals drawn and not on the specific set of parameter that signals
aim to represent. This property plays an important role as the set of possi-
ble ability values of actual senders may be dierent for dierent equilibria.
Indeed, notice that if a sender with ability, say, ¯ applies also senders with
ability above ¯ apply. This allows for the existence of a partially separating
equilibrium in which the segment of actual senders is [> 1] > where  denotes
the ability of the sender who is indierent between sending or not sending
an application. Therefore the senders’ strategic behavior aects the set of
possible ability values, which, in case of a partially separating equilibrium,
is  = [> 1]. Consequently, the support of family of distributions from
which signal outcomes are drawn also depends on > and I will henceforth
denote it by {I (· | >p)} = Property (ll) ensures that the only eect that
 has on the distribution I (· | ·) is that of rescaling it according to the
ability support of actual senders, [> 1] =
In the following a more specific information processing technology, which
has both properties (l) and (ll) > is introduced.
(D=2) Let  = [> 1] be the set of possible ability values, where  5 [0> 1).
Then, in stage 3 signal outcomes are drawn from the family of distri-
butions {I (· | >p)} > where
I ({ | >p) = L[>1] ({) (1  (p))
μ
{ 
1 
¶
(3)
+L
[>1] ({) (p) + L(1>") ({)
and where  (·) is a twice dierentiable function such that  (1)  1 
1> 0 (·) ? 0, 00 (·) A 0 and limp<"  (p) = 0=
In the following pictures the distribution I (· | >p) and the correspond-
ing density function i (· | >p) are depicted for the case in which  = 0=
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I (· | >p) is a mixture distribution: the distribution of the signal con-
ditional on ability  is, with probability  (p) > a degenerate distribution
with all probability mass at { = > and, with probability 1  (p) > a uni-
form distribution on [> 1] = Thus,  (·) 5 (0> 1] is the revealing probability
and denotes the accuracy of each signal in predicting the unknown ability:
the higher the value of  (·) the higher the accuracy, and  (·)$ 0 captures
the situation in which signals become completely uninformative. Since  (·)
is decreasing in p> eventually approaching zero, the signals’ accuracy, van-
ishes with the number of signals that the Receiver processes. To see it, notice
that, if p $ 4> then  (p) $ 0 and i ({ | >p)  L[>1] ({) 113 for any
= In other words, as p$4, all signals become equivalent and neutral to
the decision maker. It is the monotonic behavior of  (·) which captures the
trade-o between the quality and the quantity of information. The fact that
the information processing is not sensitive to the ability of actual senders is
captured by the fact that the only eect of  on the distribution I (· | ·) is
that of rescaling it according to the ability support of actual senders, [> 1] =
The implications of such property will be discussed at the end of section
3 and section 4. In the remaining of the chapter it is assumed that the
information processing technology is the one defined by (D=2) =
3 The problem of the Receiver
Since the payo of the Receiver depends on the support of actual senders,
 = [> 1] > henceforth, it will be denoted by xu ({ˆ>p)  H [ | {ˆ>p>   ] =
The following lemma characterizes the functional form of the terminal payo
of the Receiver.
Lemma 2.1. The payo of the Receiver is
xu ({ˆ>p) =  (p) {ˆ+ (1  (p))
μ
+ 1
2
¶
(4)
The interpretation of (4) is straightforward. The information perspec-
tive of the Receiver is a mirror image of that of the sender, as he observes
{ but not > moreover,  (·) and 1  (·) represent respectively the proba-
bility that a signal is fully informative and the probability that a signal is
completely uninformative. Therefore, the Receiver perceives the ability of a
sender as being equal to the corresponding signal outcome, with probability
 (·) > and as being equal to the prior average ability of actual senders with
probability 1 (·) = Notice also that (4) > considered as a function of signal
{> is a straight line with slope  (p) = Thus, the more signals are processed,
the flatter is xu ({ˆ>p) ; this behavior captures the fact that the informative-
ness of each signal decreases as more signals are simultaneously processed.
Finally, the fact that limp<" xu ({ˆ>p) = (+ 1) @2 is the feedback on the
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Receiver’s side of the gradual degeneration of the signals’ informativeness.
In the following the optimal strategy of the Receiver is determined.
Proposition 2.1. The dominant strategy for the Receiver is {pW (q) > {ˆW} >
where {ˆW = max {{ˆ1> ==> {ˆp} and pW (q) = min {q> p¯}, with p¯ 5
(1>4). Moreover, p¯ is unique and is given by the following condi-
tion |0 (p¯)|
 (p¯)
=
2
(p¯2  1)
(5)
I will provide a sketch of the proof of proposition 2.1 followed by some
general remarks. The Receiver solves the following maximization problem
max
p>{ˆ
xu ({ˆ>p)
subject to :
½
p  q
{ˆ 5 [ˆp
He chooses the sample size p in stage 2 and selects one out of p signal out-
comes in stage 4. Consider first stage 4. Since xu ({ˆ>p) is strictly increasing
in {ˆ, no matters how many (finite) signals the Receiver processes, he always
selects the sender whose application produced the highest signal outcome.
This proves {ˆW = max {{ˆ1> ==> {ˆp} = Denote by {¯(p)  H{ [max {{1> =={p}]
the expected value of the maximum of p signals, and consider now stage
2, when the receiver chooses p in order to maximize the ex-ante expected
utility
H{ [xu ({
W>p)] = xu
¡
{¯(p)>p
¢
=  (p) {¯(p) + (1  (p))
μ
+ 1
2
¶
(6)
Notice first that, xu
¡
{¯(1)> 1
¢
= xu ((+ 1) @2> 1) = (+ 1) @2> that is,
processing only one signal implies selecting one sender randomly and, there-
fore, getting ex-ante payo equal to the prior expected ability of actual
senders. Moreover, xu
¡
{¯(p)>p
¢
approaches (+ 1) @2 as p $ 4; this is
the case because, when infinitely many signals are processed, each signal
becomes completely uninformative. This implies that the ideal number of
signals to process, namely p¯> is always finite. Moreover, the well-behavior of
function  (·) ensures that such number is unique and I will now provide the
intuition behind its characterization. The function xu
¡
{¯(p)>p
¢
captures
the trade-o between quality and quantity of information that the Receiver
faces when he has to choose p= The argument {¯(p) increases in p, that
is, the more signals are processed the higher is the chance of observing a
very high signal. This is the sample size eect which has, ceteris paribus, a
positive impact on the terminal payo. However, the Receiver can increase
the chance of observing a high signal only at the cost of reducing its quality.
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This is the detrimental eect of decreasing accuracy which is captured by the
fact that xu (·>p) becomes flatter the larger is p (see fig. 2(a)). Therefore
the ideal number of signals to process, p¯> is determined by the balancement
of the two eects. Condition (5), which characterizes p¯> has a clear cost
benefit interpretation since it is obtained by equating the marginal benefit
of processing one additional application to the marginal cost of doing so.
Notice from (6) that
PE (p) =  (p)
g
¡
{¯(p)
¢
gp
PF (p) =
¯¯
0 (p)
¯¯ μ
{¯(p) 
+ 1
2
¶
that is: the marginal benefit of processing one additional application is the
marginal increase of the expected value of the maximum signal, weighted
by the accuracy of the signal; the marginal cost of processing one additional
application is the (positive) dierence between the expected maximum sig-
nal and the prior average ability, weighted by the marginal decrease of the
signal’s accuracy. From the discussion above it follows that xu
¡
{¯(p)>p
¢
>
considered as a function of p> is bell-shaped and reaches its unique maxi-
mum at p¯ 5 (0>4) (see figure 2(b))=
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Notice that p¯ denotes the number of applications that the Receiver is, at
most, willing to process. This implies that, if the number of applications
received, q> is larger than p¯ the Receiver is overloaded, as qp¯ applications
are simply neglected as a result of the maximizing behavior.
Two aspects of proposition 2.1 are worth noticing. First, the optimal
behavior of the Receiver does not depend on : this is a direct consequence
of the fact that the information processing technology is not sensitive to
the ability of actual senders. Second, p¯ is fully determined by condition
(5) > which follows directly from assumption (D=2). However, it is important
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to stress that, in order to allow for the possibility of information overload,
assumption (D=1) is su!cient. To see it notice that as p becomes large the
Receiver views all signal as equivalent and neutral, and therefore each signal
yields expected utility equal to the prior average ability. Consequently also
under (D=1) the optimal number of signals to process is finite. Therefore the
only convenience of assumption (D=2) is that it allows to have a closed-form
solution to the maximization problem of the Receiver which does not depend
on  and which has a clear cost-benefit interpretation.
4 The problem of the sender
If  = [> 1], when q senders apply and p applications are processed, the
expected utility of an arbitrary sender  5 [> 1] is
xv (> q>p) =  ( | q>p)Y F
where  ( | q>p)   ( | q>p>   ) = Denote by f = F@Y the cost of
applying relative to the value of the vacancy, then sender  finds it optimal
to send if and only if  ( | q>p)  f= In order to obtain the vacancy,
sender  must go through a two-steps procedure. First, the application of
 must be taken into account by the Receiver, second, provided that this is
the case, the signal outcome of  must be larger than the outcomes of all
other applications processed. It is therefore useful to express  ( | q>p)
in the following way
 ( | q>p) =  (q>p)! (>p) (7)
where  (q>p) denotes the probability that one’s application is taken into
account in the first place when q senders apply and p applications are
actually processed, and ! (>p) is the probability that the signal outcome
of sender  is larger than the signal outcomes of the other p  1 senders
processed. Trivially,
 (q>p) =
½
1 if q  p
p@q if q A p (8)
while the nature of ! (>p) > is made clear by the following lemma
Lemma 2.2. If p  1 senders are processed by the Receiver, the probability
that the signal outcome of sender  5 [> 1] is the largest one is
! (>p) =  (p)
μ
  
1 
¶p31
+ (1  (p))
1
p
(9)
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Expression (9) has a clear analogy to expression (4) = The first term of
(9) says that, with probability  (·) > the signal is a true representation of
ability and, therefore the probability that sender  assigns to the event of
his signal being larger than that of the other p  1 senders is simply the
Pr (  1; ==;   p31) = The second term of (9) states that, with probability
1   (·) > each signal, independently of the underlying ability, is uniformly
distributed on [> 1] ; thus, each signal has equal chance of being larger than
the other. More importantly, from the expression of ! (>p) it is also clear
what is the eect of the decreasing signals’ accuracy on the senders’ side: as
p$4> ! (>p) converges in probability to 1@p> thus, for large samples,
the probability of having the largest signal outcome is purely determined
by chance. It is important to stress that this phenomenon also holds under
the weaker assumption (D=1) = If the Receiver allocates his finite resources
on infinitely many signals, all signals become equivalent. Consequently, the
Receiver is not able to discriminate between dierent signal outcomes and,
thus, he randomly selects one of them.
One last property of ! (>p) is worth noticing. Consider the transfor-
mation j (> ) = +(1) whose role is that of mapping any  5 [0> 1] to
a new support, [> 1] > by keeping the relative location of  fixed. For exam-
ple, consider the location of the sender with the lowest ability on [0> 1] > that
is  = 0; then plugging  = 0 into j (·> ) yields the location of the sender
with the lowest ability on the new support [> 1] > that is, j (0> ) = = Sim-
ilarly, consider the location of the median sender when the actual ability
support is [0> 1] > that is  = 1@2; then plugging  = 1@2 into j (·> ) yields
j
¡
1
2 > 
¢
= (+ 1) @2> which is the location of the median sender when the
actual ability support is [> 1] = Notice form (9) that it is always the case that
!=0 ( | p) = ! (j (> ) | p) = Such property is a direct implication of the
fact that the information processing technology is not sensitive to the ability
of applying senders and, basically, states that, for a givenp, the probability
that a sender assigns to the event of his signal outcome being larger than
that of an arbitrary opponent, depends only on his relative location on the
ability support and not on the particular support chosen.
5 Equilibrium analysis
In the first part of this section I will characterize the equilibria that emerge
for specific values of the primitives of the model. In the second part I will
provide a comparative static analysis. In order to be able to compare equi-
libria for dierent levels of the information processing technology I assume
a specific functional form of  (·) which depends also on a technology para-
meter n=
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Assumption (D=3)
 (p>n) =
n
n +p
> where n 5 (0>4) (10)
The parameter n denotes how good is the information processing tech-
nology, and higher values of n imply a better technology. The main con-
venience of (10) is that n can be interpreted as the amount of resources
available to process information, and dierent values of n allow to cap-
ture the entire range of possible information technology levels. For any
p> limn<0  (p>n) = 0> thus, if no resources are available, the information
processing technology is completely useless. On the contrary, limn<"  (p>n)$
1 for any p> thus, if infinitely many resources are at disposal, the technology
is perfect. Moreover, the function (10) is increasing in n> meaning that, the
more resources available, the more is the information that can be extracted
from a fixed number of signals drawn. Now  (·) depends also on n, thus,
the maximum number of applications that the Receiver is willing to process,
p¯> will also depend on n and, henceforth, will be denoted by p¯ (n) = Since a
better technology allows to extract more information from the same number
of signals it trivially follows that, p¯0 (n) A 0=
As already noticed, more able senders have a higher probability of being
selected. Then, since the cost of sending (normalized to the value of the
vacancy) f is constant there are two types of equilibria that can emerge:
a pooling equilibrium (SH) and a partially separating equilibrium (SVH) =
The following proposition characterizes the equilibria of the model.
Proposition 2.2. Let  (·) be given by (10). Let be Q A p¯ (n) and define
 (n)  1@ (n + p¯ (n)) and  (n>Q)  (p¯ (n) @Q) (n) = Then:
(S=2=2=d) If f 5 [0>  (n>Q))> a PE with neglected applications arises.
(S=2=2=e) If f 5 [ (n>Q) >  (n))> a unique PSE with neglected applications
arises.
(S=2=2=f) If f 5 [ (n) > 1@ (1 + n))> a unique PSE without neglected appli-
cations arises.
(S=2=2=g) If f 5 [1@ (1 + n) > 1] only one sender with expected ability 12@Q
applies.
First, the inequality Q A p¯ (n) ensures that the market size is large
enough for information overload to be a potential problem. If, on the con-
trary, it was Q  p¯ (n) then, even if the entire mass of senders, Q , applies,
the information processing technology would never be at full capacity and
an equilibrium with information overload would never emerge.
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The proposition has a clear graphical interpretation. Let  be the ability
threshold level of a SVH= For any SVH, that is, for any threshold level > it is
possible to calculate (see the proof of proposition 2.2) the probability that a
sender located at  assigns to the event of being selected in equilibrium. Such
probability depends on the primitive of the model Q and n and is denoted
by  (>Q> n) = The qualitative behavior of  (·>Q> n) , where Q A p¯ (n) >
is shown in figure 3
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Figure 3
The strict monotonicity of  (·> Q> n) is crucial as it implies that a
SVH for which the threshold level is  is determined by the condition
 (>Q> n) = f, while the SH is determined by the condition  (0> Q> n) A f=
Thus, the function  (·> Q> n) defines the cost regions for which qualita-
tively dierent equilibria emerge and, for any threshold level > the num-
ber of actual senders endogenously determined in equilibrium is given by
q = (1 )Q= Then, notice that ¯ is the threshold level for which the num-
ber of senders applying in equilibrium equals the maximum number of ap-
plications that the Receiver is willing to process; indeed, (1 ¯)Q = p¯ (n) =
Therefore,  (n)  1@ (n + p¯ (n)) is the probability that the sender located
at ¯ assigns to the event of being selected in a SVH for which the threshold
level is actually ¯. Indeed,
 (¯>Q> n) = !¯ (¯> p¯ (n))
=
1  (p¯ (n) > n)
p¯ (n)
=
1
n + p¯ (n)
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Similarly,  (n>Q)  (p¯ (n) @Q) (n) is the probability that the sender lo-
cated at  = 0 is selected in a pooling equilibrium as
 (0> Q> n) =
p¯ (n)
Q
!0 (0> p¯ (n))
=
p¯ (n)
Q
1  (p¯ (n) > n)
p¯ (n)
= (p¯ (n) @Q) (n)
Finally, since (1 1)Q = 1> 1 denotes the threshold level for which the
mass of actual senders in equilibrium is unitary. When this is the case
the random matching function ensures that each sender is assigned to one
receiver and, therefore, each sender knows that will be selected for sure.
This is the reason why, on the one hand  (>Q> n) = 1 for any   1 and,
on the other, the Receiver, by selecting the only applicant at his disposal,
gets expected utility (1 + 1) @2 = 1 2@Q=
The following corollary follows directly form proposition 2.2.
Corollary 2.1. For any n 5 (0>4) and Q A p¯ (n) > a market is overloaded
i f ?  (n) = Moreover 0 (n) ? 0 and limn<"  (n) = 0=
This corollary supports the intuition that market congestion emerges
whenever the cost of transmitting information is low, relatively to available
resources needed to interpret information. The better the technology, the
lower the cost must be, in order for information overload to emerge.
I now study how a marginal change in the market size, Q> and in the
technology level, n> aects the threshold level  and the number of senders
applying in equilibrium, q. To avoid trivialities the attention is restricted
to the SVH only. In a SH the sender located at zero is strictly better-o by
sending, thus a marginal change in the exogenous parameters will not aect
his behavior.
Proposition 2.3. Let  and q be the equilibrium threshold level and the
number of senders applying in a SVH. Then,
(S=2=3=d) C@Cn A 0 and Cq@Cn ? 0=
(S=2=3=e) C@CQ A 0 and Cq@CQ = 0=
The intuition behind (S=2=3=d) is not surprising: a better technology
allows the Receiver to rank applicants’ quality more precisely, which dis-
courages low-quality employees from applying. On the contrary, the result
of (S=2=3=e) is very interesting. It states that an increase in the market size
does not translate in a larger number of actual applicants but only in higher
applicants’ ability. This is possible because competition discourages low
ability employees from applying and thus, in equilibrium, only the better
workers, who have more chances to be hired, are willing to bear the cost
28
of sending an application. Therefore, when the market equilibrium implies
separation, the self selection mechanism of applicants competing for a posi-
tion is fully preserved. The following pictures show how the cost regions for
which dierent equilibria arise change in n and Q=
1
c
k
)1/(1 k
 kP
0 k
 Nk ,U
Medium cost area
Low cost area
Very low cost area
High cost area
Figure 4(a)
1
c
N
)1/(1 k
 kP
 kmN  
 Nk ,U
Medium cost area
Low cost area
Very low cost area
High cost area
Figure 4(b)
On one hand, when the technology improves all cost regions, except the
high-cost one, shrinks. Thus, for any sending cost f there exists a technology
level that allows the Receiver to screen the best sender. On the other hand,
a larger market size causes the very-low cost area to shrink and the low-cost
to get larger. Thus, even for extremely low (but positive) sending cost, there
exists a su!ciently large market size which ensures that the self selection
mechanism plays a role. The reason is that, even though f lies initially in
the very-low-cost area, which implies no separation, it will eventually lie in
the low-cost area and, then, separation will occur.
The self selection mechanism has two very important implications on the
functioning of the market. The first is that, from the Receiver point of view,
a larger market is always better because the senders applying in equilibrium
are of better quality. The second implication plays a role in determining the
amount of information that the market generates, and it is addressed in the
next section.
6 Market congestion and e!ciency
In this section the analysis focuses on markets that suer from information
congestion, that is, markets where the cost of transmitting information is
low relative to the information processing technology. Implicit here is the
idea that the cost at which information can be transmitted is not a strategic
variable, but is exogenously given by the environment. If, on the contrary,
the Receiver could use the cost as a screening device (e.g. the Receiver could
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determine the sending cost by imposing an application fee) it would put it
high enough to ensure that only the best sender finds worthwhile applying.
So far I have assume that the Receiver can neglect applications. Clearly
this assumption does not capture the reality of many monopsony markets8.
However, the model I propose can be easily accommodated to represent a
situation in which neglecting applications is not an option. This can be done
by restricting the strategy space of the Receiver to be simply that of selecting
one applications from those received. The resulting model is much simpler
as it implies that the Receiver maximizes expected utility xu ({ˆ> q) only with
respect to {ˆ> and that, the probability that a sender assigns to the event of
being selected depends only on the total number of actual senders, ! (> q) =
Therefore, in this section, I will define and compare the economic cost of
market congestion for two dierent scenarios: one in which applications can
be neglected, and one in which this is not possible.
The first question I address here is how the amount of information gen-
erated, q> depends on the market size, Q=
Proposition 2.4. Let be Q A p¯ (n) = For any n 5 (0>4) and f 5 (0>  (n))
the market is overloaded and:
(S=2=4=d) if the Receiver can neglect applications, the excessive amount of
information is
q (Q) =
½
Q if p¯ (n) ? Q  1f (1 n (n))
1
f (1 n (n)) if
1
f (1 n (n)) ? Q ?4
(11)
(S=2=4=e) if the Receiver cannot neglect applications, the excessive amount
of information is
q (Q) =
½
Q if p¯ (n) ? Q  1f (1 nf)
1
f (1 nf) if
1
f (1 nf) ? Q ?4
(12)
First of all, the proposition states that, irrespective of the fact that the
Receiver is allowed or not allowed to neglect applications, the information
generated is not strictly increasing in the market size. On the contrary, it is
bounded, and its maximum level depends on f and n= It is the self selection
mechanism that is responsible for this result. A positive cost on the supply
side identifies a hard bound on the amount of information produced by
the market: for Q su!ciently large, separation occurs, consequently the
maximum number of applicants in equilibrium is constant and depends only
on f and n= Notice also that the technology level identifies a hard bound
(that is p¯ (n)) on the maximum amount of information that the market is
8For instance, there are many situations in which the agent in charge of processing
applications is legally constraint to pay attention to all applicants. For example scientific
journals read all the submissions they receive.
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willing to absorb. When f ?  (n) > the former bound is larger than the
latter, thus, the market is structurally subject to information congestion,
the extent of which, is also bounded. Therefore the maximum magnitude
of information overload, is 1f (1 n (n)) p¯ (n) if the receiver can neglect
applications, and 1f (1 nf) p¯ (n) if, on the contrary, applications cannot
be neglected.
Since f ?  (n) > from (11) and (12) it follows that the extent of market
congestion is larger when the Receiver cannot neglect applications. Two
eects play a role in shaping this result. First, if some applications are
neglected in equilibrium, senders anticipate that there is a chance that their
application might not be taken into account in the first place. Second,
when applications are neglected, the signals’ accuracy is larger compared
to the case in which all excessive applications are processed, and this helps
the Receiver to sort out relatively bad candidates. Both eects have a
discouraging impact on senders and, therefore, a market in which neglecting
applicants is an option induces less people to apply.
I now investigate what are the economic costs of information conges-
tion. In an overloaded market in which some applications are neglected the
ine!ciency of information congestion arises only on the supply side. The
Receiver, by ignoring some information, protects himself from the decreas-
ing accuracy eect. However, since sending applications is costly, a market
equilibrium with information overload implies too high sending costs for the
society. Consider now an overloaded market in which all information gener-
ated must also be processed. Here, the side eects of information congestion
are more severe and aect both the demand and the supply side. On one
hand, the excessive number of applications processed decreases the utility
of the Receiver9. On the other hand, the ine!ciency is also present on the
senders side as too many senders bear the cost of applying. Moreover, in
a scenario in which applications cannot be neglected, the magnitude of the
overload is larger compared to the situation in which ignoring applicants is
an option. Therefore, here, the sending cost for the society are even higher.
The next lemma is needed to support what follows.
Lemma 2.2. Let be  (n) =  (p¯ (n) > n) = Then 0 (n) A 0=
I now consider the total sending costs for the society. If applications can
be neglected and the market is overloaded to its maximum extent, the total
9This is not true if the market size is very large. Indeed, the self-selection mechanism
implies that, if Q < "> the threshold level  approaches 1, and, thus, irrespectively on
the number of applications processed, the utility of the receiver also approaches 1.
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sending cost for the society is
WF (f> n) = f

1
f
(1 n (n))
¸
= (1 n (n)) =
μ
1
n
n + p¯ (n)
¶
= 1 (n) (13)
If, on the contrary, applications cannot be neglected, the sending cost for
the society is
WF (f> n) = f

1
f
(1 nf)
¸
= 1@f n (14)
From (13) and (14) it follows that a marginal increase in the technology level
always decreases the total sending cost. On one hand, a better technology
implies that the Receiver can assess applicants ability more precisely, thus
low ability applicants are discouraged from applying and the number of
actual senders in equilibrium decreases. On the other hand, it also increases
the maximum number of applications that the Receiver is willing to process.
Consequently the extent of the overload decreases and, with it, also the total
sending cost. Interestingly enough, in an equilibrium in which applications
in excess are neglected, the total sending cost does not depend on the cost of
sending one single application. The reason for this surprising result is that
the elasticity of the number of actual senders with respect to the cost of
sending one single application is always unitary: as the cost of sending one
application increases the number of applicants in equilibrium decreases in
the same proportion and therefore the total cost does not change. If, on the
other hand, neglecting applications is not an option, the total sending costs
are decreasing in the cost of sending one single application. Thus, in this
second scenario, the elasticity of the number of actual senders with respect
to the cost of sending one single application is negative and larger than one
in absolute value.
7 Conclusion
Evidence of everyday life shows that there are many situations in which peo-
ple receive too much information compared to what they are actually willing
to process. In this chapter I addressed the information overload issue in the
specific situation in which many applicants compete to obtain one position
and the employer screens among applications in order to select the best
applicant. With this set up information overload can be defined as an equi-
librium outcome in which some applications are neglected by the economic
agent in charge of screening applicants. It has been shown that a large mar-
ket is not directly responsible for market congestion. On the contrary, more
competition has a beneficial eect because the self-selection mechanism is
preserved. The results I obtained show that information overload occurs
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when the application cost is low relative to the information processing tech-
nology level. This supports the intuitive idea that information overload is
more likely to be present in environments in which the cost of transmitting
information is low, while there are few resources to interpret information. I
also noted that in some instances neglecting applications is not possible (e.g.
because of a legal constraint) and, therefore, I also considerd a scenario in
which all the information received must be processed. It turned out that
the possibility of neglecting excessive information, to some extent, decreases
the ine!ciency of market congestion.
The general set up of the model is very natural and borrows standard
concepts from the literature on economics of information. The crucial ingre-
dient of the model is the assumption that when infinitely many applications
are processed, then each application does not provide any information about
the ability of the corresponding applicant. The more specific information
processing technology that I used displays a clear trade-o between the qual-
ity and the quantity of information and is convenient for the possibility of
obtaining closed form solutions with straightforward economic interpreta-
tions. More specifically, it allowed to interpret neglecting applications as a
consequence of maximizing behavior where the marginal utility of a larger
sample size ( which is the higher chance of observing a very good applica-
tion) is compared to its opportunity cost (which is the marginal decrease
in the capability of ranking the applicants according to their true abilities).
Yet, I believe that the main results are robust and hold true for more general
information processing technologies.
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8 Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of lemma 2.1.
For notation simplicity, the subscript  of the distribution (3) will be
omitted. I first show that i ({) = L
[>1] ({)
1
13 = Since I (· | >p) has a
discrete jump at { = > the dierence I ( | >p)  lim{<3 I ({ | >p) =
 (p) is the probability mass assigned to the event { = > thus
i ({ | >p) = L{} ({) (p) +
g
g{
I ({ | >p)
=  (p) L{} ({) + (1  (p)) L{[>1]\{}} ({)
1
1 
Now
i ({ | p) =
Z +"
3"
i ({ | >p) i () g>
=
1
1 
Z +"
3"
i ({ | >p) g
=
1
1 
Ã
 (p)
R +"
3" L{} ({) g+
+(1  (p))
R +"
3" L{[>1]\{}} ({)
1
13g
!
=
 (p)
1 
Z +"
3"
L{} ({) g +
1  (p)
1 
Z 1

1
1 
g
=
 (p)
1 
Z +"
3"
L{} ({) g +
1  (p)
1 
Since L{} ({) = 1 when  = {> and since  is uniformly distributed on [> 1] >R +"
3" L{} ({) g =
R 1

1
13g = 1= It then follows that i ({ | p) = i ({) =
L
[>1] ({)
1
13 . Now, i ( | {>p) = i()i({|>p)i({) and, since i ({) = i () > we
have i ( | {>p) = i ({ | >p) and therefore
i ( | {>p) =  (p) L{{} () + (1  (p)) L{[>1]\{{}} ()
1
1 
It then trivially follows that
H [ | {>p] =  (p){+ (1  (p))
Z +"
3"
L{[>1]\{{}} ()

1 
g
=  (p){+ (1  (p))
Z 1


1 
g
=  (p){+ (1  (p))
μ
+ 1
2
¶
¥
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Proof of proposition 2.1.
I will use the following notation.
{(p)  max {{1> ===> {p}
{¯(p)  H{ [max {{1> ===> {p}]
First, the fact that {W = {(p) is trivial given that H [ | {>p] is strictly
increasing in {= Then, the reduced form payo in stage 2 is
H{
£
xu
¡
{(p)>p
¢¤
=  (p)H{ [max {{1> ===> {p}] + (1  (p))
μ
+ 1
2
¶
=  (p) {¯(p) + (1  (p))
μ
+ 1
2
¶
I now show that {¯(p) = +pp+1 = First,
I{(p) (}) = Pr ({1  }> ==> {p  }) = 
p
l=1 [I{l (})]
Then, since signal outcomes are i.i.d. with i ({) = L
[>1] ({)
1
13 > it follows
that I{(p) (}) =
³
}3
13d
´p
and i{(p) (}) =
p
13
³
}3
13d
´p31
. Thus
{¯(p) =
Z 1

i{(p) (}) }g} =
Z 1

p
1 
μ
}  
1 d
¶p31
}g}
=
+p
p+ 1
Then, the reduced form pay-o is
H{
£
xu
¡
{(p)>p
¢¤
= H
£
 | {¯(p)>p
¤
=  (p)
μ
+p
p+ 1
¶
+ (1  (p))
μ
+ 1
2
¶
=
μ
+ 1
2
¶
+  (p)
μ
+p
p+ 1

+ 1
2
¶
=
μ
+ 1
2
¶
+  (p)
(1 ) (p 1)
2 (p+ 1)
Notice that H{
£
xu
¡
{(1)> 1
¢¤
= limp<"H{
£
xu
¡
{(p)>p
¢¤
= (+ 1) @2> thus
p¯ 5 (1>4) = Let be  (p) =  (p) (13)(p31)2(p+1) > then
0 (p) =
μ
1 
2
¶μ
0 (p) (p 1)
(p+ 1)
+
 (p) 2
(p+ 1)2
¶
which yields the f.o.c.
|0 (p¯)|
 (p¯)
=
2
p¯2  1
(15)
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The LHS of (15) captures the marginal cost of a larger sample size, while
the RHS captures its marginal benefit. To show that p¯ is unique, notice
that, around p¯, condition (15) can be approximated as follows
|0 (p¯)|
 (p¯) + 0 (p¯) (p p¯)
=
2
p¯2  1
|0 (p¯)|
 (p¯)
=
2
(p¯2  1) + 2 (p p¯)
The ratio |0 (p)| @ (p) decreases in p at the rate of 1@p, therefore, for
any p A p¯, the RHS of (13) is always larger then the LHS of (13) and the
uniqueness of p¯ follows. ¥
Proof of lemma 2.2.
For notation simplicity, the subscript  of the distribution (3) will be
omitted. Let | be the signal of sender > and {{1> ==> {p31} the set of signals
of the others p  1 senders. Let be {(p31)  max {{1> ==> {p31} = Recall
from proof lemma 3.1 that the signal of an arbitrary sender is uniformly
distributed on [> 1] > that is,
I{ (}) =
}  
1 
In the proof I will make use of the distribution of signals conditional on
ability,
I{ (} | >p) = L[>1] ({) (1  (p))I{ (}) + L[>1] ({) (p) + L(1>") ({)
and the distribution of the maximum between p  1 signals coming from
arbitrary senders
I{(p31) (}) = [I{ (})]
p31
Then,
! ( | p)  Pr
¡
{(p31)  { | p>   
¢
= 1
Z +"
3"
I{ (} | >p) i{(p31) (}) g}
= 1
μ
(1  (p))
Z 1

I{ (}) i{(p31) (}) g} +  (p)
Z 1

i{(p31) (}) g}
¶
= 1
(1  (p)) (p 1)
(1 )p
Z 1

(}  )p31 g} 

 (p) (p 1)
(1 )p31
Z 1

(}  )p32 g}
= 1
Ã
(1  (p))
μ
p 1
p
¶
+  (p)
Ã
1
μ
  
1 
¶p31!!
=  (p)
μ
}  
1 
¶p31
+ (1  (p))
1
p
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¥Proof of proposition 2.2.
Let  be the threshold level of a PSE, let q = (1 )Q be the number
of senders applying in equilibrium. let  (>Q> n) be the probability that
the sender located at  assigns to the event of being selected in equilibrium.
Notice first that, in equilibrium, it must be q  1= If q ? 1> then the mass
of applying senders is smaller than the mass of receivers, and some receivers
do not receive any application. Therefore provided q ? 1, some senders
have an incentive to apply because they know they will be selected for sure.
Recalling that Q A p¯ (n) and noticing that, by definition,  (>Q> n) 
 ( | q>pW (q)) > it follows that
 (>Q> n) =
;
?
=
1 if 1 = q
! (> q) if 1 ? q  p¯ (n)
p(n)
q ! (> p¯ (n)) if p¯ (n) ? q ? Q
=
;
A?
A=
1 if  = Q31Q
1
n+(13)Q if
Q3p¯(n)
Q   ?
Q31
Q
p¯(n)
(13)Q
1
n+p¯(n) if 0   ?
Q3p¯(n)
p¯(n)
(16)
Since  (n)  1@ (n + p¯ (n)) and  (n>Q)  (p (n) @Q) (n) > the functional
form (16) proves the proposition. ¥
Proof of corollary 2.1.
The fact that a market is overloaded when f ?  (n) is trivial and follows
directly from (16) = I then show that 0 (n) ? 0=
 (n) = 1@ (n + p¯ (n))
p¯ (n) is given by the f.o.c. (15)
|0 (p¯> n)|
 (p¯> n)
=
2
p¯2  1
1
n + p¯
=
2
p¯2  1
=, p¯ (n) = 1 + (2(n + 1))1@2 (17)
therefore, 0 (n) and limn<"  (n) = 0= ¥
Proof of proposition 2.3.
Two cases are considered.
Case 1: q  p¯ (n) = The equilibrium condition is
1
n + (1 )Q
 f = 0 (18)
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and implicit dierentiations on (18) yield C@Cn = 1@Q A 0 and C@CQ =
(1 ) @Q A 0. It then follows that
Cq@Cn =  (C@Cn)Q = 1 ? 0
Cq@CQ = (1 )Q (C@CQ) = (1 )Q
μ
1 
Q
¶
= 0
Case 2: q A p¯ (n) = The equilibrium condition is
p¯ (n)
(1 )Q (n + p¯ (n))
 f = 0
p¯ (n) (n)
(1 )Q
 f = 0 (19)
Recalling (17), and applying implicit dierentiations on (19) > yields
C@Cn = 
(1 )Q
Qp¯ (n) (n)
£
p¯0 (n) (n) + p¯ (n)0 (n)
¤
=
(1 )Q
Qp¯ (n) (n)
"
2 + n + (2(n + 1))1@2
(2(n + 1))1@2
¡
1 + n + (2(n + 1))1@2
¢2
#
A 0
C@CQ =
1 
Q
A 0
It then follows
Cq@Cn =  (C@Cn)Q ? 0
Cq@CQ = (1 )Q (C@CQ) = (1 )Q
μ
1 
Q
¶
= 0
¥
Proof of proposition 2.4.
If the receiver can neglect applications, then  (>Q> n) is given by (16) =
Since f ?  (n) > and p¯ (n) A Q> if
0 ? f ?  (n>Q) 
p¯ (n)
Q (n + p¯ (n))
Q ?
p¯ (n)
f (n + p¯ (n))
=
1
f
μ
1
n
n +p (n)
¶
=
1
f
(1 n (n))
the SH arises and q = Q= If,
f   (n>Q) 
p¯ (n)
Q (n + p¯ (n))
A 0
Q 
p¯ (n)
f (n + p¯ (n))
=
1
f
μ
1
n
n +p (n)
¶
=
1
f
(1 n (n))
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a SVH arises and, from (S=5=2=e) > q is constant for any marginal increases in
Q= Therefore the (bounded) amount of information is given by the number
of senders applying in the SVH for which the threshold level is  = 0> that
is, q such that
f =
p¯ (n)
q (n + p¯ (n))
q =
p¯ (n)
f (n + p¯ (n))
=
1
f
(1 n (n))
If, on the other hand, the Receiver cannot neglect applications, then (>Q> n)
is simply
 (>Q> n) =
½
1 if 1 = q
! (> q) if 1 ? q  Q
=
(
1 if  = Q31Q
1
n+(13)Q if 0   ?
Q31
Q
Thus, if
0 ? f ?
1
n +Q
Q ?
1
f
(1 nf)
the SH arises and q = Q= If, on the contrary,
1
n +Q
 f
Q 
1
f
(1 nf)
a SVH arises and q is constant for any marginal increases in Q= Therefore
the (bounded) amount of information is given by the number of senders
applying in the SVH for which the threshold level is  = 0> that is, q such
that
f =
1
n + q
q =
1
f
(1 nf)
¥
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
 (n) 
n
n + p¯ (n)
=
n
n + 1 + (2(n + 1))1@2
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Thus,
0 (n) =
2 + n + (2(n + 1))1@2
(2(n + 1))1@2
¡
1 + n + (2(n + 1))1@2
¢2 A 0
¥
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3. The eect of lack of communi-
cation and limited attention on or-
ganizational strategies1
1 Introduction
Since the analysis of this chapter is focused on collective decision-making,
by imperfect information processing I mean the processing limitation of the
decision-making network (i.e., lack of communication). Yet, in some sections
of the chapter I also investigate the eect of individual processing limitations
(i.e., lack of attention) on the collective decision.
Let us consider the following example. Suppose a car manufacturer has
to choose one from many potential prototype projects in order to launch a
new car model. The selection criteria must pay attention to both technical
(performance) and esthetical (design) considerations. Since the company
policy gives high priority to safety and quality standards, the selection pro-
cedure is organized as follows. First, a group of engineers from R&D depart-
ment tests the technical performance of each available project and, based
on the information gathered, selects, let us say, n best projects to be further
investigated. Then, a group of designers from the marketing department
compares those projects and, depending on how “good” they look, selects
the model that will be eventually launched in the market. They are two
types of complications that make the decision-making in this example very
di!cult. The first comes from the consideration that companies have limited
budgets and, consequently, the resources each department can allocate to
screen projects are limited. In our example, it is reasonable to assume that,
if the marketing department is left with too many projects, it will not be
able to rank them very accurately. Therefore, the actual number of projects
pre-selected by the R&D department may well aect the overall accuracy
of the selection procedure. The second complication arises from the fact
that communication is always imperfect. This is due to inevitable informa-
tion contamination, or to a high degree of specialization, which makes it
hard for people with dierent backgrounds to understand each other. In the
example, it is a necessity to combine both performance and design charac-
teristics into a single measure that requires information sharing between the
two departments. Hence, the overall quality of selection crucially depends
on information that is actually communicated between R&D and marketing
departments.
This example clearly shows that internal information-processing limita-
tions may prevent an otherwise perfect decision-maker from selecting the
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Vladimir Karamychev.
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best feasible alternative with certainty. Organizations of individuals have
constraints in both acquiring and communicating information. Quantita-
tively, more information means more alternatives and this requires more
resources to compare all alternatives. Qualitatively, more complex infor-
mation means that dierent expertises are needed to evaluate each alterna-
tive. In accordance with this dichotomy, I distinguish here two information-
processing limitations in. The first one manifests itself in a sample size
accuracy trade-o: the more alternatives are simultaneously processed, the
smaller is the accuracy with which each alternative is evaluated. I will refer
to this limitation as limited attention. The second limitation plays a role on
the information transmission level due to imperfect communication between
members of the same organization. Since a decision-maker can be thought
as an information—processing network, this limitation can be interpreted as
imperfect transmission from one node of the decision-maker’s internal struc-
ture to another. I will refer to this limitation as imperfect communication.
The aim of this chapter is to incorporate both these information-processing
limitations in a model of rational individuals. More precisely, I consider a
two-stage selection procedure with two selectors, who evaluate an exoge-
nous number of alternatives in order to select the best one. Since selectors
can be seen as two team members of the same organization (in the sense
of Marschak and Radner (1972)), the selection problem can be naturally
modeled as a two-stage game where two players have the same preferences
over the outcomes of the game.
The game is as follows. First, nature assigns the types to each alterna-
tive. For the sake of simplicity, alternatives are assumed to come into two
types: high or low. In stage 1, each alternative generates an imprecise binary
(high or low) signal about its quality. Having observed signals’ outcomes,
selector 1 selects a sub-sample of alternatives to be passed to the next stage.
In stage 2, each pre-selected alternative generates another imprecise binary
signal, and selector 2 selects one out of them. The payo of each selector is
the probability that a high quality alternative is selected in stage 2.
In terms of the model, the example is formalized as follows. Each project
can be of either high or low quality. Both R&D and marketing departments
are given criteria that they apply to projects. First, the R&D department
screens all the projects. It observes a high signal if a project meets the
requirement and a low signal if otherwise. Based on these observations,
the R&D department selects a sub-sample of projects and passes it to the
marketing department. Similarly, the latter applies its own criterion to each
alternative in the sub-sample and observes a high signal if a project meets
the requirement.
In general, each type of alternatives may generate either a high or a low
signal in every stage. However, I also consider two special cases of the model,
where results can be generalized to an arbitrary number of stages. In the first
case, I assume that a low-type alternative can never generate a high signal.
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This corresponds to a situation in which the screening requirements are set
so high that no low quality alternative can ever meet them. I call this case
high-standard filtering selection as only high types can pass screening filters
by generating high signals. The opposite case, is one where I assume that
a high type alternative never generates a low signal. This corresponds to
setting the screening requirements so low that every high quality alternative
meets them for sure. I call this case low-standard filtering selection as only
low types may fail to pass screening filters by generating low signals.
In my analysis I consider four cases. The first one is a benchmark case
where the two information-processing limitations are absent: attention is
unlimited and communication is perfect. This situation is captured by as-
suming that all information obtained at stage 1 (the signal outcomes that
each alternative generated in stage 1) is available at stage 2, and that the
accuracy of signals in stage 2 is constant. I refer to this case as perfect
information environment case. This benchmark scenario is reminiscent of a
perfect statistical environment where handling large samples is not costly
and all the information gathered from sequential experiments could be used.
In order to analyze the eect of each of the information-processing limi-
tations on the behavior of rational agents, I then depart from the benchmark
scenario by analyzing three other cases. In the first case, attention is unlim-
ited, but the assumption of perfect communication is relaxed by assuming
that no information gathered in stage 1 is available in stage 2. I refer to
this case as no-communication case. In the second scenario, on the contrary,
communication is kept perfect, but attention is assumed to be limited. I as-
sume there, that the signals’ accuracy in stage 2 is decreasing in the number
of alternatives to be evaluated, i.e., in the sample size in stage 2. I refer to
this case as limited attention case. Lastly, combining both types of imper-
fections I analyze a fourth scenario where there is no communication and
attention limited.
It turns out that in any scenario, regardless of the underlying informa-
tional assumptions, multiple Nash equilibria exist. That is why I treat the
problem of selecting the best alternative from a game-theoretic perspective
rather than from a purely statistical point of view. As the initial types of
alternatives chosen by nature is not observable, the game has only one sub-
game — the game itself — , and the subgame perfection does not reduce a
set of equilibria. On the other hand, the notion of weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium requires a specification of players’ beliefs in all stages and all
possible signals’ realizations that makes this equilibrium notion too cum-
bersome. Instead, I use the normal form trembling-hand perfect Bayesian
notion (PBE thereafter) and it turns out that such equilibrium always exists
and is unique for all generic values of the model’s primitives.
The results are as follows. The PBE in the perfect information environ-
ment case is such that independently of the signal outcomes in stage 1, all
alternatives are passed to stage 2. Selector 2 makes use of both signals of
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each alternative in order to select the best one. This equilibrium captures
a well-known concept in statistics: calculate likelihoods of all possible alter-
natives using all available information, and then select an alternative with
the largest likelihood value.
When I depart from the benchmark perfect information scenario, the
paradigm “more information is better” does not hold true any longer. Irre-
spective of the sources of imperfection, in some cases selector 1 is better o
by neglecting a part of potentially valuable information. The origin of this
phenomenon depends on information-processing limitations.
Assuming no communication, not surprisingly, reduces incentives of se-
lector 1 to select both high and low signals into a single pool as such mixing
makes it impossible for selector 2 to distinguish between them later on.
However, mixing does occur in equilibrium, although only a subset of the
low signals is selected. The PBE for the no communication case has the
following properties: all high signals in stage 1 are passed to stage 2, while
some low signals may not be selected. Thus, a lack of communication puts a
bound on the number of relatively bad alternatives to be passed to the next
selection round. This upper-bound of the number of low signals is decreas-
ing in the number of high signals observed, in the prior share of high type
alternatives in the population, and in the screening accuracy in stage 1.
When there is limited attention, it is the decrease in accuracy in stage
2 that prevents selector 1 from taking too many alternatives. The PBE in
this case has the following properties: either all high signals are selected
but some low signals are neglected, or some high signals are neglected and
no low signals are selected. Thus, limited attention puts a bound on the
total number of alternatives, either good or bad, to be passed to the next
selection round. Contrary to the no communication case, in the limited
attention case the screening accuracy in stage 1 has an ambiguous impact
on the upper-bound of the number of low signals while both the number of
high signals observed and the prior share of high type alternatives in the
population aect it negatively and monotonically.
In the fourth scenario, when both sources of informational imperfections
are present, the upper-bounds of the numbers of high and low signals are
even lower as both imperfections work hand-in-hand in the same direction.
Finally, in multi-stage filtering selection I obtain the following results.
In case of high-standard filtering selection neglecting information is never
optimal provided the number of alternatives is su!ciently large. The initial
set of alternatives passes through screening filters on every stage until at
least one high signal is generated and one of the corresponding alternatives
is selected. If, on the other hand, the standards are low, then only high
signals are passed to the next stage. In equilibrium, very few alternatives
will be selected in each stage. More precisely, only two high signals are
passed to the next stage provided the alternatives have passed a su!ciently
large number of filtering stages.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
existing related literature. Section 3 states the model. Section 4 analyzes
four dierent informational scenarios. Section 5 analyzes two special filter-
ing selection cases and section 5 concludes. Section 6 is the appendix and
contains all the proofs.
2 Related literature
Collective decision-making is usually modeled by viewing an organization
as an information-processing network where each node corresponds to an
agent belonging to the organization. To this respect this chapter stands
in the tradition of Marschak and Radner (1972) as selectors are modeled
as team members and therefore agency problems are ignored. The cur-
rent chapter shares some feature with at least two dierent approaches that
economic literature has taken in modeling economic organizations. First,
similarly to Radner (1993)2, the analysis focuses on a hierarchical structure
whose task is to select the best out of several available alternatives. In Rad-
ner (1993) imperfect information processing refers to the fact that, due to
limited attention, an agent can process (perfectly) only a limited number of
alternatives within a time unit. Consequently, the gaol is to characterize the
e!cient hierarchical structure, that is, the hierarchy which selects the best
alternative in the shortest possible time and by using the smallest possible
number of agents. Dierently I model limited attention by assuming trade
o between sample size and screening accuracy, and the goal of my analysis
is to characterize the eect that such information-processing limitation has
on the optimal selection strategy. Second, I share with Sah and Stiglitz
(1985, 1986), Koh (1992b) and Visser (2000) the idea that humans are falli-
ble screeners (i.e. they make decisions based on imprecise information) and
that they cannot communicate the information they posses. Dierently from
the above mentioned authors, the task of the organization is not that dis-
tinguishing good alternatives from bad alternatives, but is that of selecting
the best alternative from a given set.
Finally, in this chapter I share with Moscarini and Smith (2002) the
interpretation of the amount of information as the number of signal outcomes
drawn.
3 The model
There are two selectors and a population of Q alternatives, which come
into two types: high-type and low-type, denoted as K and K respectively.
The expected share of K within the population is denoted by . The
2Other authors have taken the same approach of Radner. See, for instance, Meagher
and Van Zandt (1998), Radner and Van Zandt (1992, 2001), and Van Zandt (1998, 1999).
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game lasts two stages. In stage 1 each alternative generates a binary signal
{1 5
©
{K1 > {O2
ª
, i.e., either a high signal or a low signal, which is correlated
with its true type with the following revealing probabilities:
Pr
¡
{K1 | K
¢
= tK1 5 (0> 1) > Pr
¡
{O1 | O
¢
= tO1 5 (0> 1)
Having observed a signal composition (K1> O1) > i.e. number K1 of high
signals and a number O1 of low signals, selector 1 selects a sub-sample of
alternatives (k1> o1) which consists of k1 5 [0>K1] high signals and o1 5 [0> O1]
low signals.
In stage 2, each pre-selected alternative again generates a binary signal
{2 5
©
{K1 > {O2
ª
in accordance with the revealing probabilities tK1 5 (0> 1)
and tO1 5 (0> 1). When communication is perfect, selector 2 makes his choice
based on two signals, {1 and {2, observed in both stages. The pair ({1> {2)
determines the overall likelihood value for each alternative. When there is
no communication, on the contrary, the signaling history is not available,
and selector 2 makes his choice based on signals {2 only. Having observed
realizations of signals in stage 2, selector 2 selects one alternative, which
becomes the outcome of the selection procedure. I assume that all signals
in stages 1 and 2 are statistically independent:
Assumption 1. Pr ({1> {2 | l) = Pr ({1 | l) Pr ({2 | l) > l = K>O=
For binary types and signals, the labeling of the types can always be
done in such a way, that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds: high
signal {Kw gives more chances of being generated by a high type alternative.
Formally, I assume that it is indeed the case.
Assumption 2.
Kw  Pr
¡
K | {Kw
¢
=
wtKw
wtKw + (1 w)
¡
1 tOw
¢ A
A
w
¡
1 tKw
¢
w
¡
1 tKw
¢
+ (1 w) tOw
= Pr
¡
K | {Ow
¢
 Ow
The information acquisition technology in the model is represented by
the revealing probabilities tKw and tOw . The screening accuracies in stage 1,
tK1 and tO1 are exogenously given. In contrast, the screening accuracies in
stage 2, tK2 and tO2 > are determined by the sample size Q2 = k1 + o1: If
attention is unlimited tK2 and tO2 are constant functions while for the case
of limited attention they are strictly decreasing in Q2=Since, when attention
is limited, the revealing probability functions t2(q) are strictly decreasing
and bounded, they can be written as t2 (q) =q
¯
+i (1@q) where q
¯
 0 and
i ({) is strictly increasing function such that i ({) = 0= Function i can
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be treated as a production function of information acquisition technology
and its argument 1@q represents the amount of resources allocated for each
alternative. We assume that t2(q) is a well-behaved function for all large
enough values of its argument, i.e., i({)is a well-behaved function at zero.
Assumption 3. q
¯
A 0 and i({)can be written as i({) = {j({) for
some A 0 and an arbitrary function j({)> which is dierentiable at { = 0
and satisfies g(0) A 0.
The pay-o of each player is the probability that a high type alternative
is eventually selected. An equilibrium strategy for selector 1 is the opti-
mal sample composition (kW1> oW1) = (kW1 (K1> O1) > oW1 (K1> O1)) for all possible
signal compositions (K1> O1). An equilibrium strategy for selector 2 is to se-
lect an alternative in accordance with his preference relation by comparing
likelihoods of each alternative.
4 Analysis
Due to the finiteness of the strategy space of the game, a Bayesian equilib-
rium always exists, possibly in mixed strategies. Moreover, a pure strategy
Bayesian equilibrium always exists as the players are team members and
their pay-o functions coincide. In what follows, I will consider Bayesian
equilibria in pure strategies only.
The model, regardless of the underlying informational assumptions, has
always multiple Nash equilibria. In order to see why this is the case, consider
the following strategy profile: selector 1 passes only one signal, preferably
high, to stage 2; selector 2 selects one alternative with the lowest likelihood
of being K type. Given the strategy of player 2, player 1 wants to end
the selection procedure in stage 1 by making the team’s pay-o independent
on the signal realization in stage 2. Thus, he optimally selects only one
alternative, and it must be one that generated a high signal , {K1 > if there
is one. Player 2, in turn, gets the same pay-o irrespective of his strategy,
thus there is no profitable deviation for him.
It is clearly seen that the equilibrium we just described is based on
playing weakly dominated strategies. That is why we impose an additional
refinement, namely that no weakly dominated strategies are a part of an
equilibrium. The set of strategies that are not weakly dominated can be
characterized as follows: selector 1 (2) selects a number of signals (one
signal) with the largest likelihood(s) of being K type.
We begin with the benchmark case, where the informational environ-
ment, apart from inaccurate screening, is perfect.
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4.1 Perfect communication and unlimited attention
Without informational imperfections, there are no costs of passing large
samples to stage 2. In addition, selector 2 observes all signals from stage 1.
Hence, he can rank all the previously selected alternatives in accordance with
its preference relation. Thus, selector 2 has a unique weakly undominated
strategy. Selector 1, in turn, selects all potentially valuable alternatives in
stage1. In addition, in a perfect equilibrium, he must not select any other
alternatives. This is the content of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 In perfect information environment case, the game has a
unique PBE such that:
a) kW1 (K1> O1) = K1> i.e., player 1 selects all high signals.
b) oW1 (K1> O1) =
;
?
=
O1 if
tK2
13tK2
tO2
13tO2
A t
K
1
13tK1
tO1
13tO1
0 if t
K
2
13tK2
tO2
13tO2
 t
K
1
13tK1
tO1
13tO1
i.e., player 1 selects all low signals if the screening accuracy in stage 2
is higher than in stage 1 and none of them otherwise.
c) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the following pref-
erence relation¡
{K1 > {K2
¢ Â ¡{O1 > {K2 ¢ Â ¡{K1 > {O2 ¢ Â ¡{O1 > {O2 ¢ if tK213tK2 tO213tO2 A tK113tK1 tO113tO1¡
{K1 > {K2
¢ Â ¡{K1 > {O2 ¢ Â ¡{O1 > {K2 ¢ Â ¡{O1 > {O2 ¢ if tK213tK2 tO213tO2  tK113tK1 tO113tO1
Proposition 3.1 is proven as a sub-case of Proposition 3.3 in the appendix.
It can be easily generalized to an arbitrary number of stages. Proposition
3.1 states one of the most general concepts in statistics that prescribes a cal-
culation of full likelihoods for all available alternatives, and then selection of
the maximum value. When the screening accuracy in stage 1 is higher than
in stage 2, i.e., when Pr
¡
K | {K1 > {O2
¢
A Pr
¡
K | {O1 > {K2
¢
, and, therefore,¡
{K1 > {O2
¢ Â ¡{O1 > {K2 ¢, only high signals are selected. If, on the contrary,
stage 2 signaling is more accurate, i.e., Pr
¡
K | {K1 > {O2
¢
 Pr
¡
K | {O1 > {K2
¢
,
selector 1 selects all the alternatives. It is important to note that the
weak dominance criterion does not yield a unique equilibrium. The equilib-
rium described in Proposition 3.1 is the only perfect equilibrium out of all
Bayesian equilibria in weakly undominated strategies3.
Having established the result in the benchmark case, I will see now how
informational imperfections aect the resulting equilibrium strategies. The
first imperfection I introduce is lack of communication.
3 If the accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage 2, then selecting all alternatives in
stage 1 is also an equilibrium.
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4.2 Lack of communication
If no information from stage 1 is available for selector 2, he still has a unique
strategy but now based only on the following preference relation over the
signals from stage 2:
¡
{K2
¢ Â ¡{O2 ¢ (1)
Selector 1 now faces the following task. Observing a signal composition
(K1> O1) he has to choose a sample composition (k1> o1) to be passed to
stage 2 in order to maximize the team’s pay-o. An equilibrium sample
composition is denoted by (kW1> oW1) Proposition 3.2 shows how the realization
of signals in stage 1 aects the optimal sample composition.
Proposition 3.2 In the no communication case there exists a generically
unique PBE such that:
a) kW1 (K1> O1) = K1, i.e., player 1 selects all high signals.
b) for all K1  1 there exist an upper-bound O¯1 (K1) 5 [0>4) and a
lower-bound L
¯ 1
(K1) 5 [0> O¯1 (K1)] such that:
lW1 (K1> O1)=
½
min
©
O1> O¯1 (K1)
ª
if O1  L¯1
(K1)
0 if if O1 ? L¯1
(K1)
i.e., if the number of low signals does not exceed L
¯ 1
(K1) none of them
are selected; otherwise all of them up to O¯1 (K1) are selected in stage 1.
c) O¯1 (K1) does not increase and strictly decreases whenever O¯1 (K1) A
0.
d) There exists a number K˜1  O1 (1)+ 1 such that oW1 (k>O1) =L¯ 1
(k) =
O¯1 (k) = 0 for all k  K˜1, i.e., if there are su!ciently many high signals,
none of low signals are selected in stage 1.
e) oW1 (k>O1) = O¯1 (K1) = L¯ 1
(K1) = 0 for all k  1 if
tK2
13tK2
tO2
13tO2

tK1
13tK1
tO1
13tO1
, i.e., if the screening accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage
2 none of low signals are selected in stage 1.
f) oW1 (0> O1) = O1> i.e., if there are no high signals available, all low
signals are selected. Formally, O¯1 (0) = +4> L¯ 1
(0) = 0
g) The total sample size in stage 1, kW1 + oW1 is not a strictly monotone
function of K1: it weakly decreases when oW1 A 0 and strictly increases when
oW1 = 0.
h) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the preference rela-
tion (1).
The statements of Proposition 3.2 can be understood as follows. First,
PBE is generically unique as the pay-o function of player 1 turns out to be
a regular analytical function of the model’s primitives and, therefore, takes
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generically dierent values for all dierent values of its arguments, which
number is finite. Then, selecting all high signals is always optimal due to
Assumption 2, part (a). Selecting one extra low signal has two eects on the
pay-o. The first eect, which is positive, is a sample size eect: selecting
more signals in stage 1 increases the probability of observing at least one
high signal in stage 2. The other eect, which is a mixing eect, is negative
due to the no communication assumption. Mixing high and low signals in
stage 1 in a single pool makes it impossible to distinguish between them
later on in stage 2 and, therefore, decreases the probability of selecting the
best alternative.
The sample size eect vanishes exponentially with the number of selected
low signals while the mixing eect decreases reciprocally to that number.
Hence, for a large number of low signals selected the latter dominates the
former and there is an upper bound O¯1 such that oW1  O¯1. If only a few
low signals are available, it might be possible that taking none of them is
optimal even if O¯1 A 0 as the mixing eect is absent in this case. Thus, the
existence of the lower bound L
¯1
is established, part (b).
When the number of high signals goes up, the sample size eect vanishes
faster then the mixing eect. Therefore, selector 1 has less incentives to
select low signals. As a result, the upper-bound O¯1 strictly decreases w.r.t.
K1 until it becomes zero, and stays at zero afterwards, part (c) and (d).
Selector 1 selects high and low signals only if the screening accuracy in stage
1 is lower than in stage 2. Otherwise none of low signal will be selected,
part (e).
When there are no high signals available, only the sample size eect plays
a role and, therefore, all low signals must be selected, part (f). Finally, the
total sample size in stage 1 cannot be a strictly monotone function as for
K1 = 0 and K1 = Q all signals will be selected, thus kW1 + oW1 = Q in these
two cases.
As we see, departing from the benchmark case by imposing no com-
munication, not surprisingly, leads to ine!ciency: in large heterogeneous
samples a part of potentially valuable alternatives that generated low sig-
nals, will be discarded. However, it is important to note that it is not the
amount of information (i.e., the number of alternatives) passed to the second
stage but rather its diversity (i.e., signals’ heterogeneity) that creates this
phenomenon.
Only a part of low signals will be selected in equilibrium and, therefore,
only a part of all available information will be used in the decision-making.
Due to the non-monotone behavior of the total sample size, Q2 = kW1 + oW1,
the value Q2 does not fully reveal the sample composition (how many high
and low signals have been selected in stage 1). Thus, in a multistage (W A
2) selection game, selector 2 faces a non-trivial task of updating sample
composition beliefs, which makes the model practically intractable for W A 2=
For exposition purposes, we have numerically calculated the function in
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the following example.
Example 1 Picture 1 shows the numerically calculated function O¯1 (K1) for
 = 0=5 and three values of tK1 = tO1 : 0.51, 0.65 and 0.78. Its monotone
property can be easily seen there, as well as the non-monotone behavior of the
maximum sample size O¯1 (K1)+K1. Picture 1 also shows how the accuracy
in stage 1 aects the sample composition. If the signaling stage 1 is almost
uninformative, picture (a), the sample size eect is very large and selector
1 aggressively mixes signals for a wide range of K1. If, on the contrary,
the accuracy in stage 1 is su!ciently high, picture (c), the mixing eect
dominates and selector 1 always neglects low signals. Another feature of the
equilibrium is that player 1 selects “very many” low signals only if the prior
is low, the accuracy in stage 1 is low and the number of high signals available
is also low.
Picture 2 shows regions of the prior  and the first stage accuracy tK1 =
tO1 where O = O¯1 (1) takes dierent values, for the case tK1 = tO1 = 0=9.
One may note that both the prior and the first stage accuracy monotonically
and negatively aect the upper-bound O¯1 (1). This monotone dependence of
O¯1 (K1) is confirmed by numerous numerical calculations, yet the analytical
proof remains to be found.
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The upper-bound 1L , denoted as L(H), and the maximum sample size in stage 1, denoted as L(H)+H, as functions 
of H1, denoted as H, for 9.022   
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Regions of the primitives where  11LL   takes particular values.  Here the space of variable primitives is 
  > @ > @1,5.01,0, 1 u qD  with 111 qqq LH   , and 9.022   LH qq .
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Summarizing, imperfect information transmission between selectors lim-
its the number of low signals selected in stage 1. The mixing eect gets
relatively stronger if: (i) the prior share of high type alternatives in the
population is larger; (ii) signaling in stage 1 is more informative; (iii) the
number of high signals in stage 1 is larger.
Having established the properties of the equilibrium in the case of no
memory, we turn to another imperfection of information processing, namely
to imperfect information acquisition. This is information overload case.
4.3 Limited attention
In the perfect information environment case, we have seen that the prefer-
ences of selector 2 are dierent for dierent values of the primitives of the
model. If the accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage 2, signal realization¡
{K1 > {O2
¢
is preferred to
¡
{O1 > {K2
¢
and the other way around. Under limited
attention, however, the accuracy in stage 2 is endogenously determined by
the sample size, i.e., by the number of alternatives selected in stage 1. On
the other hand, the sample size is the variable that is readily observable in
stage 2. Hence, selector 1, by selecting alternatives, implicitly selects one
of the two possible preference relations, and selector 2 has consistent pref-
erences in all states of the world, i.e., for all possible signal realization in
stage 2.
Thus, like in perfect information environment case, selector 2 has a
unique weakly undominated strategy, which is determined by its preference
relation, which, in turn, is determined by selector 1. It turns out that there
exists a generically unique PBE of the game, which is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3 In the limited attention case, there exists a generically
unique PBE such that:
a) There exists an upper-bound K¯1 5 [1>4) such that kW1 (K1> O1)  K¯1,
i.e., player 1 selects not more than K¯1 high signals.
b) For any K¯1  0 there exists an upper-bound O¯1 (K1) 5 [0>4) and
a finite set of lower-bounds
©
L
¯
n
1
ªN
n=1 > 1  N ? O¯1 (K1) > 0  L¯
1
1  L¯
n
1 
L
¯
n+1
1  O¯1 (K1) > such that:
oW1 (K1> O1) =
½
min
©
O1> O¯1 (K1)
ª
if O1  ON1 (K1)
L
¯
n
1 if O1 5 [L¯
n
1>L¯
n+1
1 )
i.e., if the number of low signals does not exceed L
¯
n+1
1 , only L¯
n
1 of them
are selected; otherwise all of them up to O¯1 (K1) are selected in stage 1.
c) kW1 (K1> O1) is a weakly increasing function of K1 and does not depend
on O1.
d) O¯1 (K1) = 0 whenever K1 A K¯1.
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e) oW1 (k>O1) = L¯
1
1 (k) = O¯1 (k) = 0 for all k  kW1 if t2 (kW1) ? t1, i.e.,
if selecting optimal number of high signals kW1 makes the screening accuracy
in stage 2 lower than in stage 1, none of low signals are selected in stage 1.
f) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the following pref-
erence relation:¡
{K1 > {K2
¢ Â ¡{O1 > {K2 ¢ Â ¡{K1 > {O2 ¢ Â ¡{O1 > {O2 ¢ > if t2 (K2 + O2) A t1¡
{K1 > {K2
¢ Â ¡{K1 > {O2 ¢ Â ¡{O1 > {K2 ¢ Â ¡{O1 > {O2 ¢ > if t2 (K2 + O2)  t1
The statements of Proposition 3.3 can be understood as follows. First,
like in Proposition 3.2, PBE is generically unique as the pay-o function of
player 1 turns out to be a regular analytical function of the model’s primi-
tives and, therefore, takes generically dierent values for all dierent values
of its arguments. Then, selecting one extra signal has two eects on the
pay-o. The first eect is the same sample size eect as in Proposition 3.2:
selecting more signals in stage 1 increases the probability of observing at
least one high signal in stage 2. The other eect, which is now a decreasing
accuracy eect, is negative due to the decrease in t2. The decreasing accu-
racy eect, in contrast to the mixing eect from Proposition 3.2, prevents
selecting too many signals of both types, thus, there are upper-bounds K¯1
and O¯1, parts (a) and (b). If only a few low signals are available, it might
be possible that taking none of them is optimal even if O¯1 A 0. Thus, the
existence of the lower bound L
¯ 1
is established.
High signals in stage 1 are always more favorable than low signals and,
therefore, kW1 (K1> O1) is a weakly increasing function of K1 and does not
depend on O1, part (c). Due to the same reason, none of low signals will be
selected if some high signals are neglected, part (d). Selector 1 selects low
signals in addition to high signals only if the screening accuracy in stage 2
is still higher than in stage 1. Otherwise none of low signal will be selected,
part (e).
Comparing Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.3 one may note that the
only dierence between no memory case and information overload case is
when signals in stage 1 are homogeneous: in information overload case the
number of alternatives to be selected is bounded whereas in no memory case
it is not. In order to show other dierences between the two cases, we pro-
vide numerically calculated functions O¯1 (K1) and kW1 (K1) in the following
example.
Example 2 In this example, we have selected a function t2 (q) = 0=89 +
0=01 · 2q for modeling the decreasing accuracy in order to make it comparable
with Example 1. In both cases, t2 (2) = 0=9 and the decrease in t2 here
seems to be negligible. It turns out, however, that even such small decrease
in stage 2 accuracy is enough to ensure that only a few alternatives are
passed to stage 2. Intuitively, even for relatively small numbers of selected
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alternatives, the decreasing accuracy eect, which vanishes at a polynomial
rate, dominates the sample size eect, which vanishes exponentially.
Picture 3 shows first that, as in no communication case, the upper-bound
O¯1 (K1) is a non-increasing function and is strictly decreasing function when
O¯1 (K1) A 0. Second, the maximum sample size in stage 1 is not a monotone
function.
Like in no communication case, the prior  monotonically aects the
sample composition: the higher the prior is, the less low signals are selected,
see Picture 4. In contrast, the accuracy in stage 1 aects the sample com-
position non-monotonically: the minimum number of low signals is selected,
either for very informative stage 1 signals, or for almost uninformative ones.
Contrary to the no communication case, under limited attention the decrease
in stage 2 accuracy prevents selector 1 from taking very many low signals
even if stage 1 signaling is almost uninformative.
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Regions of the primitives where  11LL   takes particular values.  Here the space of variable primitives is 
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As we have seen, both types of information processing imperfections
yield ine!ciency. The causes of the ine!ciency, however, are dierent. In
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no communication case, it is the purely statistical mixing eect that reduces
the incentives to mix heterogeneous signals into a single pool. In the limited
attention case, it is the decrease in accuracy that makes selection of large
samples too costly. Example 2 shows that even a tiny decrease in accu-
racy significantly aects the optimal behavior of the network. In order to
highlight the common features and the distinctions of these two eects, we
compare equilibrium properties obtained analytically in Proposition 3.2 and
Proposition 3.3, and obtained numerically in Example 1 and Example 2.
First, the mixing eect manifests itself only in heterogeneous samples.
That is why in no communication case no information is discarded if only
high or only low signals are observed. Furthermore, when the accuracy in
stage 1 vanishes, all alternatives will be selected. This is so because the
accuracy in stage 1 determines how heterogeneous high and low signals are.
When the signaling in stage 1 is very accurate, but still less accurate
than in stage 2, the sample size eect, which is the other determinant of
the optimal selection rule, vanishes. In this case, the limited attention pre-
vents selecting low signals in stage 1 whatsoever. Therefore, and this is the
second principal dierence between lack of communication and the limited
attention, the accuracy in stage 1 aects the number of low signals selected
non-monotonically in the no communication case whereas in the limited
attention case this dependence in monotone.
Apart from these two distinctions, all the other equilibrium features of
lack of communication and limited attention are very much alike due to the
similarities between the mixing eect and the decreasing accuracy eect.
Both eects become stronger relative to the sample size eect when the
number of high signals increases. That is why the number of low signals
selected weakly decreases with the number of observed high signals and
weakly increases with the number of observed low signals in both settings.
When the number of high signals is su!ciently large, none of low signals
will be selected.
Both eects become stronger also for large values of the prior. In other
words, the ine!ciency due to informational imperfections is the highest when
there are only few low types in the population. On the contrary, when the
initial share of high types is very low and, therefore, both high and low
signals in stage 1 came from low types almost surely, both eects vanish
and so does the ine!ciency. The last, but not least, common feature of
the lack of communication and the limited attention scenarios is that the
resulting sample size in stage 1 is a non-monotone function of the sample
composition. This becomes very important in a multi-stage generalization
of the model.
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4.4 Lack of communication and limited attention
We finish the analysis of the general 2-stage binary selection model by allow-
ing both sources of imperfections. Combining Proposition 3.2 and Proposi-
tion 3.3 we get the following result.
Proposition 3.4 In the no communication and lack of information case,
there exists a generically unique PBE such that:
a) There exists an upper-bound K¯1 5 [1>4) such that kW1 (K1> O1)  K¯1,
i.e., player 1 selects not more than K¯1 high signals.
b) For any K¯1  0 there exists an upper-bound O¯1 (K1) 5 [0>4) and
a finite set of lower-bounds
©
L
¯
n
1
ªN
n=1 > 1  N ? O¯1 (K1) > 0  L¯
1
1  L¯
n
1 
L
¯
n+1
1  O¯1 (K1) > such that:
lW1 (K1> O1)=
½
min
©
O1> O¯1 (K1)
ª
if O1  ON1 (K1)
L
¯
n
1 if O1 5 [L¯
n
1>L¯
n+1
1 )
i.e., if the number of low signals does not exceed L
¯
n+1
1 , only L¯
n
1 of them
are selected; otherwise all of them up to O¯1 (K1) are selected in stage 1.
c) O¯1 (K1) does not increase and strictly decreases whenever O¯1 (K1) A
0=
d) There exists a number K˜1  O¯1 (1)+1 such that oW1 (k>O1) = L¯ 1
(k) =
O¯1 (k) = 0 for all k A K˜1, i.e., if there are su!ciently many high signals,
none of low signals are selected in stage 1.
e) oW1 (k>O1) = L¯
1
1 (k) = O¯1 (k) = 0 for all k  kW1 if t2 (kW1) ? t1, i.e.,
if selecting optimal number of high signals kW1 makes the screening accuracy
in stage 2 lower than in stage 1, none of low signals are selected in stage 1.
f) The total sample size in stage 1 kW1 + oW1 is not a strictly monotone
function of K1: it weakly decreases when oW1 A 0 and strictly increases when
oW1 = 0=
g) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the following pref-
erence relation (1).
The proof of Proposition 3.4 can be obtained by adjusting the proof
of Proposition 3.2 to decreasing function t2 (q) and, therefore, is omitted.
Naturally, when both types of informational imperfections are present in the
model, the ine!ciency is the largest. The following Example 3 shows the
result of imposing simultaneously no communication and limited attention.
Example 3 This example diers from Example 2 only in the communica-
tion assumption. Picture 5 shows that, in the no communication with limited
attention case, the sample size in stage 2 is even smaller than in the limited
attention case. Next, Picture 6 shows that the regions of the prior  and
the first stage accuracy tK1 = tO1 where selector 1 selects many low signals
get smaller. One may see that there hardly can be found any criteria that
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would allow us to classify both types of imperfections based on exogenous
variables only. As we have already noticed, the major dierence between no
communication and limited attention is in the way they react to changes in
the screening accuracy of stage 1, compare Picture 2, Picture 4 and Picture
6.
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We have seen that, whatever informational imperfections are, some po-
tentially valuable information is discarded. Under no communication then
only low signals will be neglected due to the mixing eect. Under limited
attention, both types are aected due to the decreasing accuracy eect. The
resulting sample size in stage 2 turns out to be a non-monotone function of
the signal composition in stage 1. Under no communication, this makes
the model extremely di!cult for analytical analysis if there are more than
two selection stages. Indeed, Bayesian updates of the beliefs about signal-
ing history of each alternative selected in stage 1 requires accounting for a
bi-variate binomial distribution of signal realizations in stage 2, a 4-variate
distribution in stage 2 and, in general 2w 1-variate distribution in stage w=
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In the following section, we will show a way to organize stage-screening pro-
cedures such that the model becomes analytically tractable in a multistage
environment.
5 Filtering selection
In the previous section, I have analyzed the selection game for the case in
which both types of alternatives can produce either a high or a low signal.
It turns out that imposing stronger requirements on the types of signal out-
comes that each alternative can generate, allows me to generalize the model
to an arbitrary number of selection stages. In each stage w of selection,
player w observes signals of all qw previously selected alternatives in accor-
dance with revealing probabilities tKw = Pr
¡
{Kw | K
¢
> tOw = Pr
¡
{Ow | O
¢
,:
Kw high signals and Ow low signals, in total Kw + Ow = qw. He selects a
number kw of high signals and a number ow of low signals, and passes them
to the next stage. In the last stage W , selector W selects one alternative and
each player gets the same pay-o, which is equal to the probability that a
high type alternative is finally selected.
Assuming tOw = 1 implies that low type alternatives always generate
low signals and, thus, the selection strategy must select all high signals as
they have necessarily come from high types. Assuming tOw = 1 corresponds
to a situation in which the screening requirements are set so high that no
low quality alternative can ever meet them and therefore I refer to this
assumption as high-standard filtering. If, in contrast, tKw = 1 the selection
strategy must filter out all alternatives that have generated low signals as
they have necessarily come from low types. This assumption is reminiscent
of a situation in which the screening requirements are so low that every
high quality alternative meets them for sure and I therefore call this case
low-standard filtering selection.
5.1 High standard filtering
It is easily seen that, if at a certain stage w the selector w observes some
number of high signals, in a PBE he selects one high signal at random and
eectively ends the selection with the pay o of 1. If, on the other hand, he
observes only low signals, he can select only low signals but not high signals.
Thus, mixing of types does not occur in equilibrium, which has a great
impact on the solvability of the game with an arbitrary number of stages.
Indeed, without mixing eect, the extent available communication plays no
role as every player, having observed more than one alternative, infers that
all of them generated only low signals in the past. In this subsection I
therefore assume that the information-processing limitation takes the form
of limited attention only.
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It turns out that no information is discarded in a high standard filtering
selection procedure, provided the initial set of alternatives is large enough.
Proposition 3.5 There exists a threshold level of the population size Q¯
such that for all Q A Q¯ the filtering selection game with tOw = 1 has
a unique PBE {(kWw > oWw )}Ww=1such that for all w = 1> ==> W .
a) kWw = vljq (Kw), i.e., player w selects one high signal in stage w if there
is one, and the team gets the pay-o of 1;
b) oWw = (1 vljq (Kw))Ow and oWW = (1 vljq (Kw)), i.e., player w selects
no low signals if there is at least one high signal, and he selects all OW = Q
low signals otherwise.
The proof of Proposition 3.5 is in the appendix. When the sample size
asymptotically increases, the probability of observing a high signal in the
next stage approaches 1. Thus, if the initial set of alternatives is large
enough, every selector selects the whole population if no alternative has
passed the filter, i.e., only low signals have been generated.
5.2 Low standard filtering
Clearly, if there are high signals available, it is strictly dominated to take any
number of low signals in addition to the high signals. The only possibility
for selecting low signals is when no high signals are available. In this case,
selecting any numbers of alternatives is pay-o equivalent and generates
zero pay-o. Thus, the uniqueness property of PBE fails. In what follows I
assume that a player who observes only low signals is forced to select only
one alternative, eectively ending the selection. Like in the previous case,
mixing of types does not occur and therefore communication plays no role.
Thus, I will impose here only limited attention.
Contrary to the case in which tOw = 1, assuming tKw = 1 always puts a
bound on the number of high signal to be selected in a two-stage filtering
selection game.
Proposition 3.6 In the filtering selection game, with tK1 = tK2 = 1 there
exists a generically unique PBE such that:
a) There exists an upper-bound K¯1 5 [0>4)such that ,kW1 (K1> O1)  K¯1
i.e., player 1 selects not more than K¯1 high signals.
b) oWw = 1vljq (Kw), i.e., none of low signals is selected unless there are
no high signals available.
c) kW1 (K1> O1)is a weakly increasing function of K1 and does not depend
on O1.
d) Player 2 selects an alternative in accordance with the preference rela-
tion (1).
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The proof of Proposition 3.6 can be easily obtained from the proof of
Proposition 3.3 by taking tK1 = tK2 = 1 and, therefore, is omitted. More
interesting results, however, can be obtained when the initial prior  is close
enough to 1. The following proposition states the result.
Proposition 3.7 There exists a threshold level of the prior W ? 1 such
that for all  5 (W> 1) a W -stage filtering selection game with tKw = 1
has a unique PBE {(kWw > oWw )}Ww=1such that for all w = 1> ==> W .
a) kWw = min {2>Kw}, kWW = min {1>KW}, i.e., player w selects not more
than two high signals in stage t;
b) oWw = 1vljq (Kw), i.e., player w selects no low signals if there are high
signals available. Otherwise, he selects one low signal and the team gets the
pay-o of zero.
We have seen in section 4 that, in the general two-stage selection model,
the number of discarded alternatives increases when the prior gets larger.
Proposition 3.7 shows to what extent the decreasing accuracy eect (due to
limited memory), whatever small it is, limits the number of high signals se-
lected: the minimum possible number of alternatives for making a nontrivial
choice in later stages, namely two, will be selected. This result holds true
for any strictly decreasing function , even for those that violate Assumption
3. The reason is that the sample size eect vanishes when  approaches 1
and only decreasing accuracy eect is still working. The following corollary
is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.7.
Corollary 3.1 If the number of selection stages W in the filtering selection
game with tKw = 1 is su!ciently large, then, for any prior , starting
from a certain stage W W every selector selects at most 2 high signals,
i.e., kWw = min {2>Kw} for all w A W W=
Indeed, selecting only high signals in the beginning of the game assures
that at stage W W the prior share of high types W becomes su!ciently close
to 1 as
W =

+ (1 )
wQ
n=1
¡
1 tOn (qn)
¢
and limw<" w = 1. When  does not satisfy the conditions of Proposition
3.7, the number of selected high signals remains to be a relatively small in-
teger. For instance, for two-stage selection game, if the revealing probability
function tOw (q)satisfies the following condition for all q A q¯:
tO2 (q) t
O
2 (q+ 1) A (1 )
q31 ¡tO2 (q+ 1)¢q (2)
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then player 1 never selects more than q¯ high signals4. One can easily see
that condition (2) is satisfied for q  2 for any strictly decreasing function
tO2 (q) when  approaches 1, which is exploited in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.7. Condition (2) can also be generalized for an arbitrary number of
selection stages. Due to the exponential structure of the right-hand-side
of (2), the condition is satisfied for relatively small numbers. For exam-
ple, even for the tiny decrease in the accuracy generated by the function
tO2 (q) = 0=9 + 0=000001
1
qand for  = 0=5 the inequality is satisfied for all
q  27 and, therefore, not more than 27 alternatives are selected. The true
upper-bound in this case is equal to 25.
6 Conclusion
I have developed a hierarchical model of rational agents with internal in-
formational imperfections. Those imperfections are introduced by assuming
limits on information acquisition (limited attention) and information trans-
mission (lack of communication) that are usually considered separately in
the literature. In this framework, I am able to challenge the paradigm
«more information is better» as in my model neglecting valuable informa-
tion emerges as an endogenous behavior of rational agents. The forces and
mechanisms responsible for such optimal behavior are also investigated in
deep details. In case of limited attention it is the indirect cost of process-
ing large samples that prevents a rational agent from passing too many
alternatives to the next selection stages. In case of lack of communication
neglecting potentially valuable information is optimal only when the agent
observes heterogeneous signal realizations: mixing dierent signals in a sin-
gle pool to be passed to the next stage makes it impossible to distinguish
between them later on and, therefore, decreases the probability of selecting
the best alternative.
Results that are even more striking are obtained, when we turn our at-
tention to screening procedures that take a form of filtering. When selection
requirements at all stages are weak, meaning that good alternatives always
satisfy them and bad alternatives are gradually filtered out, a very large
amount of information must be neglected: relatively few alternatives are
su!cient in order to make an e!cient choice. The opposite case, when se-
lection requirements at each stage are highly demanding, meaning that bad
alternatives never satisfy them and even good alternatives may fail to do so,
is the only example where information is never discarded. For any values of
the prior and revealing probabilities, either a surely high type alternative is
selected, or the whole set of alternatives that did not meet the requirement
is passed to the next selection stage.
4See appendix for the proof.
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7 Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
First, we derive the team’s pay-o function x(k1> o1) provided selector 2
plays his unique weakly undominated strategy and the screening accuracy in
stage 1 is lower than in stage 2. x (·> ·) turns out to be a rational analytical
function of the model primitives, > tK1 > tO1 > tK2 > tO2 and, therefore, it takes
generically dierent values for dierent values of its arguments (k1> o1) 5
[0>K1] × [0> O1]. Hence, there exists a generically unique PBE. Then, we
show that x (·> ·) strictly increases with k1 and, therefore, kW1 (K1> O1) = K1
, i.e., statement (a) of the proposition. Next, we fix K1  1 and investigate
the shape of x (·> ·) as a function of discrete argument O1. It turns out that
x (·> ·) may generically have two local maxima: the interior maximum at
o1 A 0 and the corner maximum at o1 = 0=We define an upper-bound as the
value of o1 at which x (·> ·) attains its global maximum:
O¯1 (K1) = argmax
0$o1
x (K1> o1)
If the interior maximum does not exist we define O¯1 (K1) = 0 as in this case
x (·> ·) strictly decreases for all o1. Then, we define a lower-bound as the
smallest o1 that yields at least x(K1> 0):
O (K1) =
½
0> if x (K1> o1) ? x (K1> 0) for all o1 A 0
min
©
o1 | 0 ? o1  O¯1 (K1) > x (K1> o1)  x (K1> 0)
ª
> otherwise
It is easy to see that the optimal number of low signals oW1 that selector 1
has to select, which is defined as oW1 (K1> O1) = arg max
0$o1$O1
x (K1> o1), is zero
if O1 ? L¯ 1
and is equal to min
©
O1> O¯1 (K1)
ª
if O1  L¯ 1
, i.e., statement
(b) of the proposition. Lastly, we derive the properties (c), (d), (f) and (g)
of the functions O¯1 (K1) and L¯ 1
(K1). In order to prove part (e) we note
that if the screening accuracy in stage 1 is higher than in stage 2, none of
low signals are selected in stage 1 in the presence of high signals, that is
oW1 (k>O1) = O¯1 (k) =L¯ 1
(k) = 0. Part (h) is trivial. In what follows we use
the following notations:
!OO = 
O
1
¡
1 tK2
¢
+
¡
1 O1
¢
tO2
!KO = 
K
1
¡
1 tK2
¢
+
¡
1 K1
¢
tO2
KK =
K1 tK2
1 !KO
OK =
O1 tK2
1 !OO
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KO =
K1
¡
1 tK2
¢
!KO
OO =
O1
¡
1 tK2
¢
!OO
Suppose player 1 selects k1 high signals and o1 low signals . For any { and
| such that 0  {  k1 and 0  |  o1> there is a chance that exactly {
alternatives out of k1 and exactly | alternatives out of o1 will generate high
signals . The probability of this event is given by the following bi-variate
binomial distribution:
Pr ({> | | k1> o1) = Pr ({ | k1) Pr (| | k1)
=
μ
{
k1
¶
(1 !KO)
{ (!KO)
k13{
μ
|
o1
¶
(1 !OO)
| (!OO)
o13{
When this event occurs receiver 2 observes {+ | high signals. If {+ | A 0
the pay-o of the receivers is {{+|KK +
|
{+|OK . If, on the other hand,
{ = | = 0, the pay-o is k1k1+o1KK +
o1
k1+o1 OK . Thus, the team’s pay-o is:
x (k1> o1) =
{=k1
|=o1X
{=|=0
{+|A0
Pr ({> | | k1> o1)
μ
{
{+ |
KK +
|
{+ |
OK
¶
+
+Pr (0> 0 | k1> o1)
μ
k1
k1 + o1
KO +
o1
k1 + o1
OO
¶
= OK + (KK  OK)
{=k1
|=o1X
{=1
|=0
Pr ({> | | k1> o1) {{+ | +
+Pr (0> 0 | k1> o1)
μ
k1
k1 + o1
(KO  OO) (KO  OO)
¶
Converting the finite sum above into an integral yields:
x (k1> o1) = KO + (KK  OK)×
×
Z z=1
z=0
(!OO + (1 !OO)z)
o1 g (!KO + (1 !KO)z)
k1 gz +
+(!KO)
k1 (!OO)
o1
μ
k1
k1 + o1
(KO  OO) (OK  OO)
¶
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It is a routine to see that x (k1 + 1> o1) can be written as:
x (k1 + 1> o1) = (1 !KO)
{=k1
|=o1X
{=|=0
Pr ({> | | k1> o1)×
×
μ
{+ 1
{+ 1 + |
KK +
|
{+ 1 + |
OK
¶
+
+!KO
{=k1
|=o1X
{=|=0
{+|A0
Pr ({> | | k1> o1)
μ
{
{+ |
KK +
|
{+ |
OK
¶
+
+!KOPr (0> 0 | k1> o1)
μ
k1 + 1
k1 + 1 + o1
KO +
o1
k1 + 1 + o1
OO
¶
and, then, that kx (k1> o1)  x (k1 + 1> o1) x (k1> o1) A 0:
kx (k1> o1) = Pr (0> 0 | k1> o1) (1 !KO) (KK  KO) +
+Pr (0> 0 | k1> o1) o1 (KO  OO)k1 + 1 + o1
μ
(1 !KO) +
1
k1 + o1
¶
+
+(1 !KO) (KK  OK)×
×
{=k1
|=o1X
{=|A0
Pr ({> | | k1> o1) |
({+ 1 + |) ({+ |)
A 0
Thus, kW1 (K1> O1) = K1= Let us now fix any and k1  1 and define
G (k1> o1) 
ox (k1> o1)
k1 (!KO)
k1 (!OO)
o1 (KO  OO)

x (k1> o1 + 1) x (k1> o1)
k1 (!KO)
k1 (!OO)
o1 (KO  OO)
G (k1> o1) =
μ
KK  OK
KO  OO
¶
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
!KO
×
×
Z z=1
z=0
(1z)
μ
1 +
1 !OO
!OO
z
¶o1 μ
1 +
1 !KO
!KO
z
¶k131
gz +
+
!OO
k1 + 1 + o1

1
k1 + o1
+
μ
OK  OO
KO  OO
¶μ
1 !OO
k1
¶
64
and
H (k1> o1)  oG (k1> o1)  G (k1> o1 + 1)G (k1> o1)
H (k1> o1) =
μ
KK  OK
KO  OO
¶
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
2
!KO!OO
×
×
Z z=1
z=0
(1z)z
μ
1 +
1 !OO
!OO
z
¶o1 μ
1 +
1 !KO
!KO
z
¶k131
gz +
+
1
(k1 + 1 + o1) (k1 + 2 + o1)
μ
(1 !OO) +
2
k1 + o1
¶
It is easily seen that CH(k1>o1)Co1 ? 0 and limo1<"H (k1> o1) = 4= Thus there
are two cases.
a) H (k1> 0) ? 0= In this case H (k1> o1) ? H (k1> 0) ? 0 and, therefore,
G (k1> o1 + 1) ? G (k1> o1) and limo1<"G (k1> o1) = 4= Thus, G (k1> 0)
determines the behavior of x (k1> o1). If G (k1> 0) ? 0 then G (k1> o1) ? 0 and
x always decreases. This happens, e.g., for  = 0=5> tK1 = tO1 = 0=6> tK2 =
tO2 = 0=9> k1 = 6> See picture 7(a). If ,on the other hand, G (k1> 0) A 0 then,
first x increases to its interior maximum O¯1 (K1) and decreases afterwards.
This happens, e.g., for  = 0=1> tK1 = tO1 = 0=6> tK2 = tO2 = 0=9> k1 = 6> see
picture 7(b).
b)H (k1> 0) A 0= In this case there exists a number[ such thatH (k1>[) ?
0 ? H (k1>[  1), i.e. G (k1> o1) has a unique maximum at o1 = [. If
G (k1>[) ? 0 then G (k1> o1) ? 0 and x always decreases, as in picture 7(a).
If, on the other hand, G (k1>[) A 0 then x has a unique interior maxi-
mum at o1 A [ and decreases afterwards. In this case, if G (k1> 0) A 0> x
increases for all o1 ? [, as in Picture 7(b); if G (k1> 0) ? 0> x has a local
minimum for some o1 ? [= This happens, e.g., for  = 0=9> tK1 = tO1 = 0=78>
tK2 = tO2 = 0=9> k1 = 1> see picture 7(c).
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Picture 7. 
For all three types of shapes of x the definitions of the upper-bound and
the lower-bound are consistent, thus, statement (b) of the proposition is
proven.
In order to show that is a decreasing function we consider 3 cases.
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a) Suppose that for both k1 = K1 and k1 = K1 + 1> x (k1> o1) attains
its global maximum at the interior points o1 = O¯1 (K1) A 0 and o1 =
O¯1 (K1 + 1) A 0 respectively. We will show that O¯1 (K1 + 1)  O¯1 (K1) 1.
To this end we note that G (K1> o1) ? 0 for all o1  O¯1 (K1). Let us consider
a dierence I  G (K1 + 1> o1  1)G (K1> o1):
I =
μ
OK  OO
KO  OO
¶
1 !OO
K1 (K1 + 1)


μ
KK  OK
KO  OO
¶
(1 !KO) (1 !OO) (!OO  !KO)
(!KO)
2 !OO
×
×
Z z=1
z=0
(1 z)z
μ
1 +
1 !OO
!OO
z
¶o131μ
1 +
1 !KO
!KO
z
¶K131
gz
? 0
as !OO  !KO =
¡
K1  O1
¢ ¡
tK2 + tO2  1
¢
A 0. Thus, G (K1 + 1> o1) ? 0 for
all o1  O¯1 (K1) 1 and, therefore, O¯1 (K1 + 1)  O¯1 (K1) 1, i.e., O¯1 (K1)
strictly decreases.
b) Suppose that for k1 = K1 + 1 , x (k1> o1) attains its global maximum
at the corner o1 = O¯1 (K1 + 1) = 0. Then, trivially 0 = O¯1 (K1 + 1) 
O¯1 (K1)  0.
c) The only possibility left is to assume that, for k1 = K1> x (k1> o1)
attains its global maximum at the corner o1 = O¯1 (K1) = 0 while for
k1 = K1 + 1 = 0 it attains its global maximum at the interior point
o1 = O¯1 (K1 + 1) A 0. We will show that this can never be true. As
o1 = O¯1 (K1 + 1) is assumed to be an interior maximum, it must be that
G (K1 + 1> o1) ? 0 ? G (K1 + 1> o1  1), i.e., H (K1 + 1> o1  1) ? 0 for
o1 = O¯1 (K1 + 1). In addition as, at k1 = K1> o1 = O¯1 (K1) = 0 is assumed
to be a global maximum, it must be that:
J (K1> o1) 
x (K1> 0) x (K1> o1)
(!KO)
K131 (KO  OO)
=
KK  OK
KO  OO
(1 !KO)K1 ×
×
Z z=1
z=0
³
1 (!OO + (1 !OO)z)
o1
´μ
1 +
1 !KO
!KO
z
¶K131
gz +
+!KO
μμ
KO  OK
KO  OO
¶³
1 (!OO)
o1
´
+
o1
K1 + o1
(!OO)
o1
¶
A 0
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for all o1 A 0. But then
T 
(1 !OO)
o1!KO (!OO)
o1
kJ (K1> o1) =
1 !OO
o1!KO (!OO)
o1 (J (K1 + 1> o1) I (K1> o1))
= 
1 !OO
(K1 + o1) (K1 + 1 + o1)
+
μ
KK  OK
KO  OO
¶
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
o1!KO (!OO)
o1
×
×
Z z=1
z=0
3
C
³
1 (!OO + (1 !OO)z)
o1
´
×
×
³
1 + (K1 + 1) 13!KO!KO z
´³
1 + 13!KO!KO
z
´K131
4
D gz
A 
1 !OO
(K1 + o1) (K1 + 1 + o1)
+
μ
KK  OK
KO  OO
¶
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
2
!KO!OO
×
×
Z z=1
z=0
3
EC
(1 z)
³
1 + 13!OO!OO
z
´o131×
×
³
1 + K1(13!KO)z!KO+(13!KO)z
´³
1 + 13!KO!KO
z
´K1
4
FD gz
A
2!OO
(K1 + o1) (K1 + 1 + o1) (K1 + 2 + o1)
H (K1 + 1> o1  1) +
+
μ
KK  OK
KO  OO
¶
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
2
!KO!OO
×
×
Z z=1
z=0
3
EC
(1 z)
³
1 + 13!OO!OO
z
´o131×³
(1 z) + K1(13!KO)z!KO+(13!KO)z
´³
1 + 13!KO!KO
z
´K1
4
FD gz
A 0
as H (K1 + 1> o1  1) ? 0 at o1 = O¯1 (K1 + 1). Therefore, J (K1 + 1> o1) A 0
for all o1 A 0 as well. But this contradicts the assumption we made that
for, k1 = K1 + 1> x (k1> o1) attains its global maximum at the interior point
o1 = O¯1 (K1 + 1) A 0. All the three cases prove part (c) of the proposition.
Part (d) follows from
x (0> o1 + 1) x (0> o1) = (OK  OO) (!OO)
o1 (1 !OO) A 0
Parts (d) and (g) are direct consequences of part (c).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
First, we derive the team’s pay-o function x (k1> o1) provided selector
2 plays his unique weakly undominated strategy induced by t2 (kW1) A t1.
Then, we show that x strictly increases with respect to both arguments
provided the accuracy in stage 2 is constant. Thit proves Proposition 3.1
for the case t2 A t1. When t2 ? t1, the utility is given by the same
function x (k1> 0), as no low signals will be selected. This completely proves
Proposition 3.1.
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As in the proof of Proposition 3.2, x (k1> o1) turns out to be a rational
analytical function of the model primitives and, therefore, it takes generi-
cally dierent values for dierent values its arguments . Hence, there exists
a generically unique PBE. Next, we show that for any strictly decreasing
function t2(q), which satisfies Assumption 3, x (k1> o1) asymptotically de-
creases with respect to both arguments. This proves the existence of upper
bounds O¯1 and K¯1, parts (a) and (b). Then we define lower-bounds L¯
n
1 as
a convenient way of expressing oW1 (K1> O1) that ends the proof of part (b).
Parts (c) and (d) are proven by deriving properties of the upper-bounds. Fi-
nally, if t2 (kW1) ? t1, none of low signals are selected and the team’s pay-o
function x (k1> o1) becomes x (k1> 0), part (e). In what follows, we use the
following notations:
!OO (q) = 
O
1 (1 t2 (q)) +
¡
1 O1
¢
t2 (q)
!KO (q) = 
K
1 (1 t2 (q)) +
¡
1 K1
¢
t2 (q)
KK (q) =
K1 t2 (q)
1 !KO (q)
OK (q) =
O1 t2 (q)
1 !OO (q)
KO (q) =
K1 (1 t2 (q))
!KO (q)
OO (q) =
O1 (1 t2 (q))
!OO (q)
Having been written without the argument, the above variables are assumed
to be evaluated at t2 =q
¯
2, or, alternatively at q $ 4. Then, the team’s
pay-o in case t2 A t1 is:
x (k1> o1) =
³
1 (!KO)
k1
´
KK + (!KO)
k1
³
1 (!OO)
o1
´
OK +
+(!KO)
k1 (!OO)
o1 (OO + vljq (k1) (KO  OO))
= KK  (!KO)
k1 (KO  OK) + (!OO)
o1 ×
× ((OK  OO) vljq (k1) (KO  OO))
It is clearly seen that, for constant t2> Cx@Ck1 A 0 and Cx@Co1 A 0. Thus,
in this case, kW1 = K1 and oW1 = O1 which proves Proposition 3.1.
When t2(q) is a strictly decreasing function this is not the case any more.
In order to show that we use Assumption 3 that yields:
lim
q<"
(!KO (q))
q
t2 (q) t2 (q+ 1)
= lim
q<"
(!OO (q))
q
t2 (q) t2 (q+ 1)
= 0 (D=1)
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First, we show that when only high signals are available at stage 1, i.e., O1 =
0, x asymptotically decreases with k1. LetPX (q> 0) = x (q> 0)x (q+ 1> 0)
for q  1 denote the marginal disutility of having an extra high signal. Then,
using (A.1) yields
lim
q<"
PX(q> 0)
t2 (q) t2 (q+ 1)
= lim
q<"
KK (q) KK (q+ 1)
t2 (q) t2 (q+ 1)
=
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
1 !KO
A 0
Thus, forO1 = 0 there exists an upper bound K¯1 ?4 such that kW1 (K1> 0) 
K¯1. Then, it is easy to see that   x (k+ 1> q k 1) x (k> q k) A 0:
 = KK (q) (!KO (q))
k+1 ×
×
³
(KK (q) OK (q)) + (!OO (q))
q3k31 (OK (q) KO (q))
´

KK (q) + (!KO (q))
k ×
×
³
(KK (q) OK (q)) + (!OO (q))
q3k (OK (q) KO (q))
´
= (!KO (q))
k (1 !KO (q)) (KK (q) OK (q)) +
+ (!KO (q))
k (!OO (q))
q3k31 ¡K1  O1 ¢×
× (2t2 (q) 1) (OK (q) KO (q))
A 0
Thus, if kW1 ? K1, i.e., some high signals are neglected, then oW1 = 0, i.e.,
no low signals will be selected, part (d) of the proposition.
In case O1 A 0 and kW1 = K1  1, letPX (K1> qK1) = x (K1> qK1)
x (K1> qK1 + 1) denote the marginal disutility of having an extra low sig-
nal. Then we define:
I (K1)  limq<"
PX (K1> qK1)
t2 (q) t2 (q+ 1)
I (K1)  limq<"
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !KO)
2
³
1 (!KO)
K1
´
+
O1
¡
1 O1
¢
(1 !OO)
2 (!KO)
K1 +
+K1
¡
2K1  1
¢ ¡
K1  O1
¢
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
(!KO)
K131
We will show that I (K1) A 0. It is clear that I (K1) A 0 for any K1  1@2.
In order to show that I (K1) A 0 also for, K1 ? 1@2 we define
J (k) 
(I (k+ 1) I (k)) (1 !OO)
2 (1 !KO)¡
K1  O1
¢
(!KO)
k31
=
μ¡
1
¡
K1 + 
O
1
¢¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´2
 K1 
O
1
³
2q
¯ 2
 1
´¶
!KO 
 (!KO  k (1 !KO)) (1 !OO)
¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
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and consider 2 cases:
a) Let be¡
1
¡
K1 + 
O
1
¢¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´2
 K1 
O
1
³
2q
¯ 2
 1
´
+(1 !OO)
¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
First, J strictly increases as
J0 (k) = (1 !KO) (1 !OO)
¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
A 0
Thus, J (k)  J (0) where
J (0) = !KO
¡
1
¡
K1 + 
O
1
¢¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´2
 !KO
K
1 
O
1
³
2q
¯ 2
 1
´

!KO (1 !OO)
¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
 0
In this case J (k) A 0 for all k A 0. Thus, I (k+ 1) I (k) A 0. But then
for all K1 A 0:
I (K1) A I (0) =
O1
¡
1 O1
¢
(1 !OO)
2 (!KO)
k A 0
b) Let be¡
1
¡
K1 + 
O
1
¢¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´2
? K1 
O
1
³
2q
¯ 2
 1
´
+(1 !OO)
¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
In this case:
I (k) =
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !KO)
2  (!KO)
k
Ã
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !KO)
2 
O1
¡
1 O1
¢
(1 !OO)
2
!

 (!KO)
k k
¡
1 2K1
¢ ¡
K1  O1
¢
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)!KO
³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
I (k) =
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !KO)
2 
¡
K1  O1
¢
(!KO)
k31
(1 !KO)
2 (1 !OO)
2 ×
×
3
EC
μ¡
1
¡
K1 + O1
¢¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´2
 K1 O1
³
2q
¯ 2
 1
´¶
!KO+
+k
¡
1 2K1
¢
(1 !KO) (1 !OO)
³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
4
FD
A
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !KO)
2 
¡
K1  O1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
(1 !KO)
2 (1 !OO)!KO
×
× (!KO + k (1 !KO)) (!KO)k
I (k) A
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !OO)!KO
(1 !KO)
2 (1 !OO)!KO


¡
K1  O1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
(!KO + k (1 !KO)) (!KO)
k
(1 !KO)
2 (1 !OO)!KO
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Let be
T (k) = K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !OO)!KO 
¡
K1  
O
1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢×
×
³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
(!KO + k (1 !KO)) (!KO)
k
such that
I (k) A
T (k)
(1 !KO)
2 (1 !OO)!KO
Then
T0 (k) = 
¡
K1  
O
1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
×
× ((1 !KO) + (!KO + k (1 !KO)) ln (!KO)) (!KO)k
Using ln ({) ? { 1 for { ? 1 yields:
T0 (k) A 
¡
K1  
O
1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
×
× ((1 !KO) + (!KO + k (1 !KO)) (!KO  1)) (!KO)k
A
¡
K1  
O
1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢
(1 !KO)
2
³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
(k 1) (!KO)
k  0
Thus,
T (k) A T (1) = !KO
Ã
K1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !OO)

¡
K1  O1
¢ ¡
1 2K1
¢ ³
1 q
¯ 2
´
q
¯ 2
!
A !KO
¡
K1  
O
1
¢3C ¡1 2K1 ¢
μ³
1 q
¯ 2
´2
+ O1
³
2q
¯ 2
 1
´¶
+
+K1 (1 !OO)
4
D+
+!KO
O
1
¡
1 K1
¢
(1 !OO)
A 0
and, therefore, I (k) A 0.
Summarizing both cases yields that I (K1) A 0 for all K1 A 0 and,
therefore, PX (k> qK1) A 0. Thus, for any kW1 = K1  1 there exists an
upper bound O¯1 (K1) ?4 such that oW1  O¯1 (K1).
If there are no high signals available, i.e., kW1 = K1 = 0, the marginal
disutility of having an extra low signal PX (0> q) = x (0> q)  x (0> q+ 1),
for large q becomes:
I (0)  lim
q<"
PX (0> q)
q
¯ 2
(q) q
¯ 2
(q+ 1)
= lim
q<"
OK (q) OK (q+ 1)
t2 (q) t2 (q+ 1)
=
O1
¡
1 O1
¢
(1 !OO)
2 A 0
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That proves the existence of an upper bound O¯1 (0) ?4. The set of lower-
bounds is recursively defined as follows:
L
¯
1
1 =
½
0> if x (K1> o1) ? x (K1> 0) for all o1 A 0
min {o1 | 0 ? o1  L¯ 1 (K1) > x (K1> o1)  x (K1> 0)} > otherwise
L
¯
n+1
1 =
½
L
¯
n
1 if x (K1> o1) ? x
¡
K1>L¯
n
1
¢
for all o1 A L¯
n
1
min
©
o1 | L¯
n
1 ? o1  L¯ 1
(K1) > x (K1> o1)  x
¡
K1>L¯
n
1
¢ª
> otherwise
We stop this process at stage N when L
¯
N+1
1 = L¯
N
1 A L¯
N31
1 . It is easy to
see that the optimal number of low signals oW1 that selector 1 has to select,
which is defined as oW1 (K1> O1) = arg max
0$o1$O1
x (K1> o1), is equal to L¯
n
1 when
L
¯
n
1  L¯ 1
? L
¯
n+1
1 , and is equal to min
©
O1> O¯1 (K1)
ª
when O1  L¯
N
1 , that
ends the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
In what follows, we will use the following notations:
!Ow (w> qw) = 1 wt
O
w (q)
Ow (w> qw) =
w
¡
1 tOw (qw)
¢
!Ow (w> qw)
Here w stands for the prior at the beginning of stage w; Ow stands for the
posterior at the end of stage t provided a low signal is observed, such that
w = Ow31; qw stands for the sample size in the beginning of stage w, such
that qw+1 = Kw + 1 + Ow+1 = kw + ow= If player w observes some number of
high signals, the strategy kWw = 1 weakly dominates all the others. Thus,
kWw = vljq (Kw). The rest of the proof is based on induction assuming that
only low signals were available. The ex-ante pay-o function in the last
stage W is given by
x¯W (W > qW ) =
³
1
¡
!OW (W > qW )
¢qW ´+ ¡!OW (W > qW )¢qW OW
= 1 (1 W )
¡
1 W tOW (qW )
¢qW31
= 1 (1 W )
Ã
1 W
Ã
1
WY
n=W
¡
1 tOW (qW )
¢!!qW31
Suppose that in stage w the ex-ante pay-o function x¯w (w> qw) is
x¯w (w> qw) = 1 (1 w)
¡
1 wtOw (qw)
¢qw31
= 1 (1 w)
Ã
1 w
Ã
1
WY
n=w
¡
1 tOn (qw)
¢!!qw31
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The corresponding reduced form pay-o function xw31 (w31> ow31) in stage
w 1 is given by:
xw31 (w31> ow31) = 1
¡
1 Ow31
¢×
×
Ã
1 Ow31
Ã
1
WY
n=w
¡
1 tOn (ow31)
¢!!ow3131
= 1
1 w31
1 w31tOw31 (qw31)
×
×
3
C
1 w31(13t
O
w31(qw31))
13w31tOw31(qw31)
×
×
³
1
QW
n=w
¡
1 tOn (ow31)
¢´
4
D
ow3131
It is easily seen that xw31 (w31> ow31) ? 1 for all ow31 and limow31<" xw31 (w31> ow31) =
1. Thus, there exist a number Q¯w31 such that, for all qw31 A Q¯w31, arg max
ow31$qw31
xw31 =
qw31 . This implies that oWw31 = qw31. Taking into account that this happens
only when Kw31 = 0, this can be written as oWw31 = (1 vljq (Kw31))Ow31.
Then the ex-ante pay-o function in stage w 1 becomes:
x¯w31 (w31> qw31) =
³
1
¡
!Ow31 (w31> qw31)
¢qw31´
+
+
¡
!Ow31 (w31> qw31)
¢qw31 xw31 ¡w31> oWw31¢
= 1 (1 xw31 (w31> qW ))
¡
!Ow31 (w31> qw31)
¢qw31
= 1 (1 w31)×
×
Ã
1 w31
Ã
1
WY
n=w31
¡
1 tOn (qw31)
¢!!qw3131
Thus, for any w = 1> ===> W there exists Q¯w such that oWw (1 vljq (Kw))Ow for
all qw A Q¯w. Taking Q¯w = Q¯1 ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.7.
In what follows, we will use the following notations:
!Ow = (w> qw)  (1 w) t
O
w (qw)
Kw (w> qw) 
w
1 !Ow (w> qw)
First, as it is never optimal to mix high and low signals, w (w31> kw31) 
Kw31vljq (kw31). We solve the model using backward induction. First, we de-
rive the team’s ex-ante pay-o function x¯W (W > qW ) in the last stage, that de-
fines the reduced form pay-o function in stage W1, i.e., x¯W31 (W31> kW31) =
x¯W (W (W31> kW31) > kW31) for kW31 A 0. Maximizing the latter expres-
sion w.r.t. kW31 we show that there exists an WW31 such that k
W
W31 =
min (2>KW31) and oWW31 = 1 vljq (KW31) for all W31 5
¡
WW31> 1
¢
.
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Next, we derive the ex-ante pay-o function x¯W31 (W31> qW31) in stage
W 1.We generalize it to an arbitrary stage w, i.e., x¯w (w> qw) using induction
arguments, at the same time showing that there exists an Ww31 5 (0> 1)
such that the corresponding reduced form pay-o function in stage w  1
is maximized at kWw31 = min (2>KW31) and oWw31 = 1  vljq (Kw31) for all
w31 5
¡
Ww31> 1
¢
.
In stage W , when the sample size is qW A 0 and the prior is W , selector
W selects a high signal, if there are, and gets a pay-o KW (W > qW ), which
happens with probability 1 
¡
!OW (W > qW )
¢qW . With the remaining proba-
bility
¡
!OW (W > qW )
¢qW all signals in stage T are low and therefore, he selects
one of them and gets zero. Thus
x¯W (W > qW ) =
³
1
¡
!OW (W > qW )
¢qW´ KW
= W
1
¡
!OW (W > qW )
¢qW
1 !WO (W > qW )
and, therefore,
xW31 (W31> kW31) = KW31
1
¡
!OW
¢kW31
1 !OW
= KW31
kW3131X
n=0
¡
!OW
¢n
Suppose that KW31  2. Then, it is easy to see that xW31 (W31> 2) A
xW31 (W31> 1) = On the other hand,
.
W31  lim
W31<1
xW31 (W31> {) xW31 (W31> {+ 1)
1 W31
=
¡
1 tOW31
¢ ¡
tOW ({) t
O
W ({+ 1)
¢
A 0
Thus, there exists an WW31 5 (0> 1) such that k
W
W31 = min (2>KW31) for all
W31 5
¡
WW31> 1
¢
. IfKW31 = 0 player W1 has no better option than taking
one low signal and getting zero pay-o. Thus, oWW31 = 1 vljq (KW31) = The
ex-ante pay-o in period W  1 can now be written as
x¯W31 (W31> qW31) = xW31 (W31> 2)×
×
³
1
¡
!OW31
¢qW31  qW31 ¡1 !OW31¢ ¡!OW31¢qW3131´+
+xW31 (W31> 1)qW31
¡
1 !OW31
¢ ¡
!OW31
¢qW3131 +
+xW31 (W31> 0)
¡
!OW31
¢qW31
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that is,
x¯W31 (W31> qW31) = W31
qW3131X
n=0
¡
!OW31
¢n
+
+W31
(1 W31)
¡
1 tOW31 (qW31)
¢
1 !OW31
×
×
3
C
qW3131X
n=0
¡
!OW31
¢n  qW31 ¡!OW31¢qW3131
4
D tOW (2)
Suppose that at stage t the ex-ante pay-o function is given by
x¯w (w> qw) = w
qw31X
n=0
¡
!Ow
¢n
+ w
(1 w)
¡
1 tOw (qw)
¢
1 !Ow
×
×
Ãqw31X
n=0
¡
!Ow
¢n  qw ¡!Ow ¢qw31
!
w
where w 5 (0> 1). Suppose also that there exists an Ww 5 (0> 1)such that
kWw = min (2>Kw) and oWw = 1  vljq (Kw) for all . w 5 (Ww > 1) = The
corresponding reduced form pay-o function in stage w  1 is given by
xw31 (w31> kw31) = x¯w (w> kw31). Suppose that Kw31  2. Then, it is easy
to see that xw31 (w31> 2) A xw31 (w31> 1). On the other hand,
w31  lim
w31<1
xw31 (w31> {) xw31 (w31> {+ 1)
1 w31
=
¡
1 tOw31
¢ ¡
tOw ({) t
O
w ({+ 1)
¢
(1 w) A 0
Thus, there exists an an Ww31 A Ww such that, w31 5
¡
Ww31> 1
¢
> kWw31 =
min (2>Kw31) and oWw31 = 1  vljq (Kw31) for all W31 5
¡
WW31> 1
¢
. The
ex-ante pay-o in period w 1 can be written as
x¯w31 (w31> qw31) = xw31 (w31> 2)×
×
³
1
¡
!Ow31
¢qw31  qw31 ¡1 !Ow31¢ ¡!Ow31¢qw3131´+
+xw31 (w31> 1)qw31
¡
1 !Ow31
¢ ¡
!Ow31
¢qw3131
+
+xw31 (w31> 0)
¡
!Ow31
¢qw31
= w31
qw3131X
n=0
¡
!Ow31
¢n
+ w31
(1 w31)
¡
1 tOw31 (qw31)
¢
1 !Ow31
×
×
Ãqw3131X
n=0
¡
!Ow31
¢n  qw31 ¡!Ow31¢qw3131
!
w31
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where w31 =
¡
tOw (2) +
¡
1 tOw (2)
¢
w
¢
= 1 
WQ
n=w
¡
1 tOn (2)
¢
= Hence, by
induction, for any w = 1> = = = > W  1 there exists an Ww 5 (0> 1) such that for
all w 5 (Ww > 1) and for all   w: kW = min (2>K ) and oW = 1 vljq (K ).
Taking w = 1 with W = W1 ends the proof.
Derivation of (2).
For two-stage filtering selection with tKw = 1 the residual-form pay-o in
stage 1 is given by
x (> k1) = K1
k131X
n=0
¡¡
1 K1
¢
tO2 (k1)
¢n
The marginal disutility of having an extra high signal, PX (q) = x (>q)
x (> q+ 1) becomes:
PX (q) = x (> q) x (> q+ 1)
= K1
Ã Pq31
n=1
³¡
tO2 (q)
¢n  ¡tO2 (q+ 1)¢n´ ¡1 K1 ¢n

¡
1 K1
¢q ¡tO2 (q+ 1)¢q
!
A K1
¡
1 K1
¢ ³¡
tO2 (q) t
O
2 (q+ 1)
¢
 (1 )q31
¡
tO2 (q+ 1)
¢q´
Thus, if
¡
tO2 (q) tO2 (q+ 1)
¢
A (1 )q31
¡
tO2 (q+ 1)
¢q for all q  q¯> then
kW1  q¯=
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4. The optimal ordering of agents
in organizations1
1 Introduction
As for the previous chapter, the analysis focuses here on collective decision-
making. Dierently from chapter 3, the only processing limitation I account
for here is lack of communication.
Much economic literature has been devoted to analyze the structure
and performance of economic organizations. The main motivation behind
this branch of research is the consideration that individuals have limited
capability in processing information and, consequently, groups of individuals
may be able to perform better than any single individual. An economic
organization can be viewed as a decision making network in which each
node is its constituent agent. The structure of the organization specifies
who gathers information, and who communicates what to whom. The basic
feature of an organization is that of aggregating the decisions taken by each
one of its members separately. Therefore, it is the specific organizational
structure that determines the quality of the final decision undertaken by the
organization as a whole.
Since it is natural to assume that agents belonging to the same organi-
zation dier in ability (some individuals make, on average, more accurate
decisions than others) a legitimate question that arises is whether the order-
ing of heterogenous agents aects the performance of a specific organization.
Sah and Stiglitz (1986), and the subsequent literature which follows their
approach2, provide a negative answer to this question. The common feature
of this branch of the literature is that of analyzing the performance of dif-
ferent organizational structures in the context of project evaluation: several
projects, whose quality is unobservable, are assumed to come in streams, and
the organization evaluates them sequentially in order to distinguish those
that are worth implementing from those that are not. However, there exist
many examples in which organizations perform a dierent task. For in-
stance, the goal of many organizations is that of selecting the best out of an
arbitrary number of projects (alternatives hereafter) that are simultaneously
available. I call this problem, which is dierent form the one considered by
Sah and Stiglitz (1986), alternatives selection problem. Consider, for exam-
ple, the hiring decision of a firm. If the number of vacancies is unlimited
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Vladimir Karamychev.
2See for example, Hendrikse (1992), Ioannides (1987), Koh (1992a, b, 1993, 1994a, b)
and Visser (2000).
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then the firm faces an evaluation problem as it must distinguish those work-
ers whose marginal productivity is larger than the wage oered form those
with a productivity lower than such a wage. If, on the contrary, only one
vacancy is available, then the problem is typically a selection one as the
vacancy should be given to the most productive worker.
In the project evaluation framework the terminal payos are threefold:
the organization gains a profit if it accepts a good alternative, it incurs a
loss if it accepts a bad alternative, and gets a payo of zero if it rejects
the alternative. Consequently, the performance of a specific organization
is determined by the trade-o between the individuals’ errors of not ap-
proving good alternatives (Type-I errors) and the errors of approving bad
alternatives (Type-II errors). In the alternatives selection framework, on
the contrary, the terminal payos are twofold: if the selected alternative is
good the organizations gets a high payo (say, one), while, if the selected
alternative is bad, the payo is low (say, zero).
In this chapter I focus the attention on a hierarchy because it is the most
eective organizational structure to perform the task of selecting the best
out of several alternatives. A two-stage selection problem corresponds here
to a hierarchical structure where the first agent preselects a subsample of
alternatives to be passed to the second stage, and the second agent makes
the final selection by choosing one of the preselected alternatives.
A crucial aspect in any organization is the amount of information that
can be communicated between agents. It is plausible to think that commu-
nication, like decision making, is always imperfect3. In order to account for
this imperfection I consider two extreme cases, one in which there is perfect
communication between agents (denoted by SF), and one in which there
is no communication at all (QF) = In this model agents are assumed to be
fully rational and heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the
alternatives.
I show that, in contrast to the evaluation framework, in the selection
framework the performance of an organization is generally aected by the
ordering of its agents. I find that the performance of the hierarchy improves
when the more accurate agent screens first. Moreover, by letting the best
agent act first, the organization overcomes the imperfections due to the
lack of internal communication and becomes as e!cient as a hierarchy in
which the information flow is perfect. Not surprisingly, when communication
between agents is perfect, the order in which agents are placed does not
matter.
It is important to stress that I evaluate the performance of the organi-
zation by its gross expected profit, that is, I assume there is no direct cost
3For example, communication problems may arise due to the inevitable contamination
that occurs in the process of information transmission, or due to a high degree of labour
specialization.
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involved in processing information. It is indeed the gross expected profit
which, in the project implementation literature, turns out to be always un-
aected by the ordering of heterogenous agents. If one introduces variable
evaluation costs, then the ordering of agents matters also in the standard
implementation framework (see for example Koh (1992a)).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 I present the
selection problem, in section 3 I investigate the optimal ordering of agents,
in section 4 I provide a link between the evaluation approach introduced by
Sah and Stiglitz (1986) and the one I take here. Section 5 concludes the
chapter.
2 The alternatives selection problem
There is a population of Q alternatives. The quality of each alternative,
denoted by > can be high or low,  5 {K > O} = A high quality alternative
yields utility of 1, while a low quality alternative yields utility of 0= The share
of high-type alternatives in the population is denoted by = The organization
I consider is a hierarchy with two agents denoted by 1 and 2= Agent 1 screens
all Q alternatives and decides which ones to pass to agent 2. Agent 2 screens
the subsample preselected by agent 1 and eventually selects one alternative.
The expected quality of the alternative selected by agent 2 determines the
payo of the organization. Each agent in the model is interpreted to be
Bayesian, with each of them receiving an imperfect binary signal (high or
low) about the quality of each alternative. A signal observed in stage w is
denoted by {w 5 {kw> ow} > with w = 1> 2 and we assume that
Pr (kw | K) = Pr (ow | O) = tw 5 (1@2> 1) (1)
Assumption (1) implies that signals have the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty (MLRP), where tw is the revealing probability of a signal observed in
stage w= Notice that tw denotes also the screening accuracy of agent w= Finally,
I assume that all signals in stage 1 and 2 are statistically independent
Pr ({1> {2 | l) = Pr ({1 | l) Pr ({2 | l) > l = K>O (2)
I model the SF case by assuming that agent 2 observes not only the
signal outcomes produced in stage 2 but also those produced in stage 1. By
doing so, agent 2 makes his choice based on signals produced in both stages
and use the pair ({1> {2) to determine the overall likelihood value for each
alternative4. On the contrary I assume that, in QF case, agent 2 makes his
4One can think of agent 1 and agent 2 as two engineers each one evaluating a dif-
ferent feature of several projects. Given the common background, agent 2 can read and
understand the report made by agent 1 about each preselected project.
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choice based only on signals {25=
The strategies of the two agents are as follows. Agent 1, having observed
the signal outcomes of stage 1, passes a number of k1-alternatives and a
number of o1-alternatives to stage 2. Agent 2 observes the signal outcomes
of stage 2 (and of stage 1 in case of SF) and eventually selects the final
alternative. The selection rule of the hierarchy, is therefore defined by the
strategy profile V = {v1> v2} > where v1 and v2 are the strategies sequentially
implemented by each one of the two agents.
The exogenous parameters > t1 and t2 induce a distribution over the
(Q × 2) matrix of binary signal outcomes, X  [{mw]  [x1>x2], where m =
1> ==>Q is an arbitrary alternative, w = 1> 2 is the signalling stage, and x1
and x2 are the column vectors of signal realizations in stage 1 and stage
2 respectively. The specific matrix realization X and the strategy profile
V> determine the probability that each alternative m is eventually selected.
When alternative m is selected the terminal payo is Pr (m = K | {m1> {m2),
therefore, the expected payo of the organization is
x =
X
XM[
Pr (X) ·
QX
m=1
Pr (m is selected | X) · Pr (m = K | {m1> {m2) (3)
where X is the set of possible matrix realizations. The last probability in (3)
is a standard Bayesian update of the prior. The probability in the middle
of (3) is, on the other hand, a function of the strategy profile V and the
information environment. Then, in the SF case
Pr (m is selected | X) = Pr (m is selected in stage 1 | x1)×
×Pr (m is selected in stage 2 | x1>x2)
while in the QF case
Pr (m is selected | X) = Pr (m is selected in stage 1 | x1)×
×Pr (m is selected in stage 2 | x2)
Finally, I assume that agents are fully rational and that the distribution
of types and the structure of the organization are common knowledge.
3 The optimal ordering of agents
In this section I investigate whether the ordering of heterogenous agents
aects the performance of the organization. I model heterogeneity by as-
suming that one agent has a high screening accuracy, tK while the other has
5Think of agent 1 is an engineer and agent 2 as a salesman. The specialization of
labour makes it impossible for the salesman to understand the technical reports written
by the engineer.
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a low screening accuracy, tO ? tK = I denote by x
¡
tK > tO
¢
(x
¡
tO> tK
¢
) the
expected payo of the hierarchy when the agent with better accuracy acts
first (second).
I start from the benchmark SF case and, not surprisingly, I find that the
performance of the hierarchy is not aected by the ordering of its agents.
Proposition 4.1. xSF
¡
tK > tO
¢
= xSF
¡
tO> tK
¢
=
Proof. The perfect communication environment and the rationality of
agents ensure that passing all alternatives to the second stage is always op-
timal, and that the optimal selection rule V can be represented by a correct
preference relation over all possible signal pairs. If t1 = tK A tO = t2 the
preference relation is
(k1> k2) Â (k1> o2) Â (o1> k2) Â (o1> o2) (S1)
If, on the contrary t1 = tO ? tK = t2> the preference relation is
(k1> k2) Â (o1> k2) Â (k1> o2) Â (o1> o2) (S2)
Such preferences ensure that the hierarchy ranks correctly the rows (alter-
natives) of the signal realizations’ matrix, and eventually selects the one
with the higher overall likelihood of being of high type. Since Pr (X) =
Qm=1 Pr ({1m > {2m) > it follows form Bayes’ rule that the probability of observ-
ing the matrix [x1>x2] > conditional on t1 = tK and t2 = tO> equals the
probability of observing the matrix [x2>x1] > conditional on t1 = tO and
t2 = tK . That is, given an arbitrary matrix, inverting the order of tK and
tO induces an identical probability over the matrix in which the order of
the columns is also inverted. Such symmetry, together with the symmetry of
preferences S1 and S2> and the fact that the terminal payo Pr (K | {1> {2)
does not depend on the order in which tK and tO are placed, implies that,
indeed, xSF
¡
tK > tO
¢
= xSF
¡
tO> tK
¢
=
I now consider a hierarchy in which communication between agents is
not possible. I find that, here, the ordering of agents aects the perfor-
mance of the organization: by having the best screener in the first place the
hierarchy achieves a higher payo. Moreover, by letting the best agent act
first, the hierarchy overcomes the imperfections due to the lack of internal
communication and turns out to be as e!cient as a hierarchy in which the
information flow is perfect.
Proposition 4.2. xQF
¡
tO> tK
¢
? xQF
¡
tK > tO
¢
= xSF
¡
tK > tO
¢
=
Proof. If t1 = tK A tO = t2 the preference relation over all possible
signal pairs is
(k1> k2) Â (k1> o2) Â (o1> k2) Â (o1> o2) (S1)
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It is clear from (S1) that selecting only k1-alternatives is an optimal strategy
for agent 1. The reason is that, independently of the signal realizations of
stage 2, o1-alternatives will never produce an overall likelihood value larger
than that of k1-alternatives. Since it is optimal for agent 2 to select a k2-
alternative, the optimal strategy profile ensures indeed that the alternative
eventually selected is the one with the higher likelihood value. This proves
xQF
¡
tK > tO
¢
= xSF
¡
tK > tO
¢
= If, on the contrary, t1 = tO ? tK = t2> the
preference relation is
(k1> k2) Â (o1> k2) Â (k1> o2) Â (o1> o2) (S2)
Assume first that agent 1 passes only k1-alternatives. With positive prob-
ability all preselected alternatives produce signals o2 and at least one o1-
alternative produces a signal k2. When this event occurs the payo-dominant
pair (o1> k2) cannot be selected because it has been previously discarded by
agent 1. Assume now that some (possibly all) o1-alternatives are passed
in addition to k1-alternatives . There exists a positive probability that all
preselected alternatives generate identical signals in stage 2 making it im-
possible for agent 2 to select the payo-dominant alternative with probability
1. Thus, for any strategy adopted by agent 1, there is always a chance that
the alternative with the higher overall likelihood value is not selected. This
proves xQF
¡
tO> tK
¢
? xQF
¡
tK > tO
¢
=
The intuition behind proposition 4.2 is clear. If the more accurate
screener acts first, he does not need to pass to the second stage alternatives
that produced a low signal because, independently of the signal realizations
of stage 2, they will never produce a likelihood value larger than that of
alternatives that produced a high signal in stage 1. Therefore agent 2 knows
that he always receives a subsample of projects with identical {1-signal out-
comes. Consequently, he does not need any explicit information about the
signal outcomes of stage 1 in order to make the right choice: by selecting
an alternative that produced a high signal in stage 2, agent 2 automatically
selects the best (in expected terms) alternative.
Such argument can be generalized to an arbitrary number of stages,
though, a more stringent requirement over the relative dierences in agents’
accuracy is needed. If there are W selection stages, ordering the agents in
terms of decreasing accuracy t1=== ? tw ? === ? tW , solves the problems due
to imperfect communication only if, at any stage w> it is optimal for agent
w to pass only kw -alternatives. Such strategy is indeed optimal provided
that tw is such that Pr (K | kw> ow+1> ==> oW )  Pr (K | ow> kw+1> ==> kW ) > for any
w = 1> ==> W .
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4 Evaluation versus selection
I show here how the traditional project evaluation problem can be restated
in terms of a selection model. Consider the problem of deciding whether or
not to implement a project of unknown quality, . An organization facing
such a problem is actually undecided between two alternatives: alternative
1 stands for "implement the project" while alternative 2 stands for "do not
implement the project". Therefore an evaluation problem can be restated
as a selection problem between two alternatives, provided we impose the
following restrictions on signal outcomes
Pr (k1w | K) = Pr (o1w | O) = tw 5 (1@2> 1) > w = 1> 2 (4)
Pr (k1w | o2w) = Pr (k1w | o2w) = 1> w = 1> 2 (5)
Condition (4) means that, it the project is good (bad), then each screening
stage is more likely to suggest in favor of implementing (not implementing)
the project. Moreover, (5) means that signal outcomes across alternatives
are perfectly correlated: if the report of a screener is in favor of implementing
the project it is necessarily against not implementing it, and vice versa.
Notice that this new formulation is a more restricted6 model than the one
presented in section 1 as, here, I do not allow for the possibility that two
alternatives generate identical signals. This also means that 1  tw is the
probability that screener w is inclined to accept (reject) a bad (good) project
and the standard analysis of the trade o between Type-I and Type-II errors
can be applied.
5 Conclusion
In this section I stress in more details the dierences between the assump-
tions we use in the current chapter and those present in the existing litera-
ture. In most of the literature (see for example, Hendrikse (1992), Ioannides
(1987), Koh (1992a, b, 1993, 1994a, b) Sah and Stiglitz (1986)) it is assumed
that agents are not rational. They are characterized by a pair of probabili-
ties with which they accept good and bad alternatives. These probabilities
are determined exogenously and do not reflect the organizational structure,
nor the positions in which agents are placed. Visser (2000), instead, comes
close to my approach as he also assumes fully rational heterogeneous indi-
viduals that cannot communicate the information they posses. However,
in Visser (2000) the ordering of agents does not aect the expected pay-
o of the organization (proposition 3 and proposition 5 in his paper). The
intuition behind this result is the symmetry of the organizational decision
6 It is more restricted because we impose perfect correlation between signals of two
dierent alternatives: if one is high the other is necessarily low, and vice versa.
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problem and of the knowledge agents have about the structure and each
other’s rationality. The novel selection framework I use here is responsible
for the dierent results I obtain. Individual rationality itself is not su!cient
to preserve the symmetry of the organizational decision problem. For this
to be the case communication must be perfect, otherwise such symmetry
fails to hold. Our analysis also provides a solution to this problem as I show
that the lack of communication can be overcome by an appropriate ordering
of the agents.
Finally, one may argue that, in real life, there exist also examples in
which the more accurate screening stages are placed at higher hierarchical
levels. My findings seems to address that such practice is not optimal.
However, it is important to stress that I didn’t account for the direct costs
usually involved in any information-processing phase. As it is natural to
assume that the cost of processing information increases with the accuracy
with which information is processed, it might be the case that having higher
accuracy at higher stages is optimal for the simple reason that, at later
stages, less information is processed. Whenever such ordering is in place,
the contribution of our paper is that of identifying the indirect cost that
might emerge due to a lack of internal communication.
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5. Individual decision making and
imperfect information processing1
1 Introduction
After the last two chapters in which I have highlighted the impact of imper-
fect information processing for a group of individuals, I shift the attention
here to individual decision-making. The main interpretation of imperfect
information processing in this chapter is that of being a cognitive limitation
that prevents a decision-maker from choosing the best feasible alternative.
One of the fundamental results of Choice Theory is the equivalence be-
tween maximization of an objective function and the Weak Axiom of Re-
vealed Preferences (WARP). This paper develops a model in which the choice
function of a maximizing decision-maker violates WARP.
In accordance with Choice Theory, any choice function assigns a utility
maximizing alternative to any given set of alternatives. Choice Theory does
not specify how a decision-maker chooses a utility maximizing alternative.
Implicitly, it assumes that the decision-maker evaluates his objective func-
tion for each alternative, and then chooses an alternative with the largest
value. In other words, it assumes that the decision-maker uses a process
of eliminating all but one alternative, (which I call a selection procedure)
which yields a utility maximizing alternative with certainty.
However, sometimes this assumption is too demanding. For example,
evaluation of the expected utility function requires exact knowledge of prior
probabilities and correct beliefs about actions taken by others. Similarly,
evaluation of the indirect (reduced form) utility function is not possible
without knowledge of all potential consequences of each alternative on the
direct utility function. Such computational requirements can be far beyond
humans’ abilities due to cognitive limitations or the complexity of the envi-
ronment (Simon, 1955). In this chapter, I consider a decision-maker who is
unable to evaluate his objective function for all given alternatives.
Due to this inability, the decision-maker has to use another selection pro-
cedure, which does not require evaluations of his objective function. There
are many such selection procedures. However, none of these procedures can
guarantee that the chosen alternative maximizes the objective function. In
order to choose an alternative, the decision-maker I model here chooses a
selection procedure, and, second, he uses this procedure for choosing an
alternative.
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Vladimir Karamychev and Peran Van
Reeven.
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The value of the objective function (value hereafter) that this chosen
alternative yields is a random variable, and its distribution is determined by
the selection procedure. Hence, choosing a selection procedure is equivalent
to choosing this value distribution. Dierent criteria can be used in order
to compare value distributions. In the current chapter, I assume that the
decision-maker chooses the procedure that minimizes the type-II error, i.e.,
one minus the probability that the chosen alternative does not maximize
the objective function. In other words, I characterize each value distribu-
tion and, therefore, each selection procedure, by the probability of choosing
an alternative with the highest value. As a result, all alternatives come into
two types: alternatives with the highest value, which I call high-type alter-
natives, and all the other alternatives, which I call low-type alternatives.
I take the probability of selecting a high-type alternative as the objective
function of the decision-maker for choosing a selection procedure. When the
procedure is chosen, the choice function is fully determined by that proce-
dure.
My task is two-fold. First, I want to identify the selection procedure that
minimizes the type-II error. Second, I investigate the properties of the choice
function induced by this procedure. In order to do so, I analyze the Choice-
By-Elimination model of Tversky (1972), called CBE-model hereafter. In
this model, each alternative is represented by a vector of aspects. Aspects
can be considered as good-characteristics of Lancaster (1966) and provide
partial information about the type of each alternative in the spirit of Milgrom
(1981). If an alternative has a certain aspect then it is good news about
its value. If, on the other hand, an alternative does not have this aspect,
then it is bad news. The elimination process takes place in stages. Each
aspect corresponds to a stage in which the decision-maker decides which
alternatives he eliminates and which alternatives he selects and passes to
the next stage. Aspects are used sequentially and the selection procedure
continues until only one alternative remains.
I get the following results. First, there exists a unique selection proce-
dure which minimizes the type-II error. It eliminates an alternative at a
stage if and only if it is the only alternative without the aspect. In accor-
dance with its properties, I call this procedure ‘Single-Worst-Elimination’,
SWE hereafter. SWE dominates all other procedures irrespective of the
prior distribution of types in the initial set of alternatives, of the size of this
initial set, and of the informational accuracy of aspects. In two special lim-
iting cases, when informational accuracy is high, ‘Elimination-By-Aspects’
(Tversky, 1972), EBA hereafter, and ‘Satisficing’ (Simon, 1955), SAT here-
after, become optimal selection procedures. Second, the choices induced by
SWE are always transitive, but may violate WARP.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 states the model
which is then analyzed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the optimality of SAT
and EBA in special limiting cases of the model. Section 5 analyses the choice
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function induced by SWE. Section 6 discusses modeling assumptions and
concludes the paper. The appendix contains a proof of the first proposition.
2 The model
Consider a decision-maker who has choose a single alternative from a given
set X = {{1> ==> {Q}  A, where A is a grand set of alternatives. Each
alternative is either a high or low type so that A is a union of two disjoint
sets of high and low type alternatives, A = K ^Oand K _O = B.
For a decision-maker, an alternative is an infinite vector of binary aspects,
{l =
¡
d1l > ==> dwl> ===
¢
, where dl = {0> 1}. If dwl = 1, we say that alternative l has
aspect w whereas if dwl = 0, we say that alternative l does not have aspect w.
Aspects provide imprecise information about the true type of {l. In
particular, we assume that all aspects are equally informative, that a high
type alternative has an aspect w with a probability tK , and that a low type
alternative has that aspect with a probability tO:
tK  Pr
¡
dwl = 1 | {l 5 K
¢
A tO  Pr
¡
dwl = 1 | {l 5 O
¢
> w = 1> ===>4
A selection procedure takes place in stages. We denote the set of alter-
natives at the beginning of stage w by Xw  X, Xw 6= B. The decision-maker
uses one aspect in each selection stage and, hence, in stage w he observes a
set of aspects aw =
©
dwl | {l 5 Xw
ª
= B. Having observed this set of aspects
aw, the decision-maker selects a subset of alternatives Xw+1  Xw and passes
it to the next stage. All alternatives {l 5 Xw \Xw+1are eliminated in stage
w. Hence, any selection procedure V is characterized in stage w by the corre-
spondence Xw+1 = Xw+1
¡
aw
¢
 Sw (Xw), and is fully characterized by a set of
such correspondences for all stages w = 1> ===>4, so that we write V = {Sw}.
Starting from w = 1 and X1 = X, the decision-maker sequentially apply
correspondences Sw so that Xw+1 can be written as a superposition of Sw as
follows:
Xw+1 = (Sw  ===  S1) (X) = S(w) (X)
One important property of any selection procedure V is that Sw ({{n}) =
{{n} for all w and n, i.e., ifXw consists of a single alternative {n, V necessarily
passes this alternative to the next stage. This allows us to define a choice
function of an individual who follows a selection procedure V as follows:
F (X>V) = lim
w<"
S(w) (X)
i.e., F (X>V) is the alternative that a decision-maker, who follows a se-
lection procedure V, chooses from the set X. The limit here always exists
as X is finite and S(w+1) (X)  S(w) (X)  X for all X  A. For some se-
lection procedures, however, F (X>V) is not a singleton. For example, if the
selection procedure is such that S(w) (Xw) = Xw, then Xw = X for all w, and
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F (X>V) = X. We exclude such selection procedures from the analysis and
only consider procedures that choose a single alternative.
The chosen alternative can either be a high type or a low type alternative.
The decision-maker chooses a selection procedure VW, which maximizes the
probability that the chosen alternative is of high type:
VW = argmax
V
Pr (F (X>V)  K)
If it exists, we call this procedure ‘optimal selection procedure’. Our ob-
jective is to identify VW and explore properties of the induced choice function
F (X>VW).
3 Analysis
We denote by Qw the number of alternatives at the beginning of stage w, i.e.,
Qw = #[w, where # counts the number of elements in the set that follow.
The set of aspects aw that the decision-maker observes at stage w can be
written as follows:
aw =
©
dwl | {l 5 Xw> dwl = 1
ª
^
©
dwl | {l 5 Xw> dwl = 0
ª
The first term denotes alternatives that have the aspect, which we call
‘good’ alternatives. The second term denotes alternatives that do not have
the aspect, which we call ‘bad’ alternatives. Using the following notation
for the numbers of good and bad alternatives respectively,
Jw  #
©
dwl | {l 5 Xw> dwl = 1
ª
and Ew  #
©
dwl | {l 5 Xw> dwl = 0
ª
we write Qw = Jw +Ew.
The decision-maker does not distinguish between good alternatives. There-
fore, a selection procedure V in stage w, i.e., the correspondence Sw (Xw), only
specifies the number of good alternatives jw to be passed to the next stage;
it cannot specify which of those good alternatives are passed. Similarly,
jw depends only on the number of good alternatives observed, Jw, and on
the number of bad alternatives observed Ew; it cannot depend on which
alternatives are good and which alternatives are bad. By the very same
reason, Sw (Xw) specifies only the number of bad alternatives ew to be se-
lected, where ew is a function of Jw and Ew. Hence, a selection procedure V
is fully characterized by the pair of functions (j (w>J>E) > e (w>J>E)) with
j (w>J>E) + e (w>J>E)  1, 0  j (w>J>E)  J and 0  e (w>J>E)  E
so that jw = j (w>J>E) and ew = e (w>J>E). For brevity, we denote this
selection procedure as V (j> e). An optimal selection procedure, if it exists,
will be denoted by VW = V (jW> eW)
The following examples demonstrate how several known selection proce-
dures can be written in terms of (j> e)-functions.
88
Example 1 Satisficing (Simon, 1955). Let (j> e) = (1> 0) if J  1, and
(j> e) = (0> 1) if J = 0. This selection procedure randomly selects one of
the first alternatives in the set that has an aspect. We denote this selection
procedure by VVDW .
Example 2 Elimination-By-Aspects, EBA hereafter (Tversky, 1972). Let
(j> e) = (J> 0) if J  1, and (j> e) = (0> 1) if J = 0. This selection procedure
selects only alternatives that have an aspect. If no alternative has an aspect,
one of them is randomly selected. We denote this selection procedure by
VHED.
Example 3 Choice of a random alternative. Let (j> e) = (1> 0) if E = 0,
and (j> e) = (0> 1) if J = 0 and (j> e) = (J>E) if J A 0 and E A 0.
This selection procedure randomly selects one alternative independently on
the aspects that it has.
The probability that the finally chosen alternative is of high type, that
is Pr (F (X>V)  K) > depends on the selection procedure V, on the total
number alternatives in the set Q = #X, and on the number of high type
alternatives Q = #(X _K). Hence, it defines a function
X (V>Q>QK) = Pr (F (X>V) K)
,
which is the objective function of the decision-maker, who maximizes
X (V>Q>QK) over all feasible selection procedures. By feasibility we refer
to #F (X>V) = 1 for all for all X  A. In this notation, the problem of a
decision-maker is as follows:
VW = argmax
V
X (V>#X>#(X _K))
v=w : #F (X>V) = 1 for all X  A
In the following proposition, some properties of optimal selection proce-
dures are derived.
Proposition 5.1 For any tK 5 (0> 1), tO 5 (0> 1), Q = 1> ==>4, QK =
1> ===>Q  1> an optimal selection procedure V (jW> eW) must satisfy the
following properties:
a) jW (w>J>E) = J, i.e., all good alternatives are always selected;
b) Either eW (w>J>E) = 0 or eW (w>J>E) = E, i.e., either all bad alter-
natives or none of them are selected;
c) eW (w>J>E) = E for E  2, i.e., if there are at least two bad alterna-
tives, then all bad alternatives are selected.
d) The maximum XW (Q>QK) strictly increases in QK .
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The proof of Proposition 5.1 is in the appendix and is made by induction.
If Q = 1, the only feasible selection procedure is (j> e) = (J>E), which
is trivially optimal and satisfies the properties (a)-(c) of Proposition 5.1.
Moreover, the probability of choosing a high type alternative is formally
X (V> 1> QK) = QK , so that XW
¡
1> QK
¢
 QK strictly increases in QK=
Suppose that for some number N  1, procedure V (jW> eW) is optimal for
all Q  N, i.e., it satisfies the properties (a)-(d) of Proposition 5.1. Then,
suppose that at a selection stage w, the number of alternatives is . Qw = N+1=
Suppose also that the decision-maker observes Jw good alternatives and
Ew = QwJw bad alternatives, and selects jw and ew of them correspondingly
so that jw+ew  Qw1 = n. In this case, for any fixed prior distribution of the
number of high type alternatives, the posterior distribution in this stage and,
hence, the prior distribution of QKw+1 in stage w+1, is determined by (jw> ew).
Moreover, from stage w+1 on, the number of alternative does not exceed N
so that the procedure V (jW> eW) will be used, and the conditional on QKw+1
probability of choosing a high type alternative will be XW
¡
Qw+1> QKw+1
¢
. By
the induction assumption, XW
¡
Qw+1> QKw+1
¢
increases in QKw+1. Thus, if the
posterior distribution induced by (j0w> e0w) first-order stochastically dominates
the posterior distribution induced by (jw> ew) > then selecting (jw> ew) in stage
w is not optimal.
Using this first-order stochastic dominance criterion, we compare dier-
ent selection procedures without evaluating X (V>Q>QK). First, we show
that if jw ? Jw, i.e., not all good alternatives are selected, then selecting
(jw + 1> ew) , i.e., one good alternative more, and eliminating a single bad
alternative later is strictly better. This proves part (a) of Proposition 5.1.
Second, we show that if ew ? Ew, i.e., not all bad alternatives are selected,
then selecting (jWw > ew + 1), i.e., one bad alternative more, and eliminating a
single bad alternative later is weakly better. It is strictly better if ew  1.
This proves parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 5.1. Lastly, because the elimi-
nated alternative is a bad alternative, i.e., an alternative without an aspect,
and due to the single-crossing property tK A tO, the highest probability
of choosing a high type alternative increases in the number of high type
alternatives in the initial set. This proves part (d) of Proposition 5.1.
The following properties of CBE-model in general and of the optimal
selection procedure in particular are worth mentioning here. First, it is not
true that having more high type alternatives in the initial sample increases
chances of a decision-maker to choose one of them. The following example
demonstrates this point.
Example 4 Let us take Q = 3, tO = 0=5 and the selection procedure such
that (j> e) = (1> 0) if (Jw> Ew) = (1> 2), (j> e) = (0> 1) if (Jw> Ew) = (2> 1), and
(j> e) = (Jw> Ew) otherwise. In other words, a decision-maker who follows
selects either a unique good alternative or a unique bad alternative in each
selection stage, and selects all three alternatives otherwise. It is easy to get
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the following expressions for the objective function X
¡
V¯> 3> QK
¢
:
X
¡
V¯> 3> 0
¢
= 0
X
¡
V¯> 3> 1
¢
=
1
3
X
¡
V¯> 3> 2
¢
=
4tK (1 tK)
2 (tK)2  (1 tK)2
X
¡
V¯> 3> 3
¢
= 1
It follows that X
¡
V¯> 3> 2
¢
? X
¡
V¯> 3> 1
¢
if tK (1 tK) ? 0=1, so that the
decision-maker is better-o when the initial sample has one high type al-
ternative rather than two high type alternatives.
This example stresses the fact that it is not the function X (V>Q>QK)
to be monotonically increasing in QK , but its maximum across all possible
selected procedures, i.e., XW (Q>QK).
Second, it is not generally true that the decision-maker must select all
good alternatives at all stages. Let us go back to Example 4. Suppose
that tK is very close to one, and all three alternatives have the first aspect.
Then, if the decision-maker selects all three alternatives, he gets X
¡
V¯> 3> 2
¢
in stage two, i.e., almost zero. Obviously, selecting all good alternatives in
stage one is not optimal if the decision-maker follows V¯ later on. Hence, the
optimal number of good alternatives selected depends on which procedure
the decision-maker uses in later stages.
There are two selection procedures that satisfy the properties (a)-(c) of
Proposition 5.1. The first procedure is the ‘Always Pass’ procedure with
(j> e) = (J>E), i.e., all alternatives, whether they are good or bad, are
passed to the next selection stage. Obviously, this procedure is not feasible.
The other selection procedure is such that all alternatives must be selected
in each stage, unless only one alternative in the sample is bad. In this case,
all good alternatives must be selected, and the single bad alternative must
be eliminated. Formally:
(jW> eW) =
½
(J> 0) if J  0 and E = 1
(J>E) otherwise
In accordance with its properties, we call this selection procedure ‘Sin-
gle Worst Elimination’, abbreviated as SWE and denoted as VVZH. SWE
prescribes only to eliminate an alternative if it is the single worst (without
the aspect) alternative at a certain selection stage. Thus, we have proven
the following result.
Proposition 5.2. For any tK 5 (0> 1), tO 5 (0> 1), Q = 1> ==>4, SWE
is an optimal selection procedure. For QK = 1> ===>Q  1> SWE is a
unique optimal selection procedure.
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Let us compare SWE with SAT and EBA. In accordance with SAT, a
decision-maker selects one good alternative. SWE is a mirror image of SAT.
In accordance with SWE, a decision-maker eliminates one bad alternative.
Similar to SWE, EBA selects all good alternatives. The dierence is that
EBA eliminates all bad alternatives whereas SWE only eliminates a bad
alternative if it is a unique bad alternative at a stage. Hence, SWE uses
more selection stages than EBA, and, consequently, results in more accurate
choices than EBA.
The number of selection stages at which alternatives are eliminated al-
lows for another characterization of selection procedures. Each selection
procedure guarantees that the chosen alternative has at least a certain num-
ber of aspects. SWE maximizes this minimum number of aspects that the
chosen alternative has. SWE chooses an alternative with at least (Q  1)
aspects. All the other (Q  1) alternatives were eliminated in (Q  1) selec-
tion stages in which the chosen alternative had the corresponding aspects.
In contrast, SAT and EBA guarantee that the chosen alternative has far
fewer aspects. SAT chooses an alternative that has at least one aspect, be-
cause this alternative is the very first alternative with an aspect. EBA might
choose an alternative that does not have aspects at all, because it requires
that one alternative must be selected even if all alternatives in the first stage
do not have the first aspect.
However, SWE is not the only procedure that satisfies this ‘max-min’-
property. For example, a procedure which specifies that in each stage a
single alternative must be eliminated if, and only if, all alternatives have
the aspect, i.e., (j> e) = (J 1> 0) if E = 0 and J  2, and (j> e) = (J>E)
otherwise, also guarantees that the chosen alternative has at least (Q  1)
aspects. Since such a procedure chooses an alternative at random, it is
clearly not optimal. Hence, the ‘max min’-property is a necessary but not
a su!cient condition for the optimality of a selection procedure.
4 Optimality of SAT and EBA
In section 4, we have shown that SWE is a unique optimal selection pro-
cedure for 0 ? tO ? tK ? 1. In this section, we show that if low type
alternatives never have aspects, i.e., if tO = 0, then SAT is optimal. Alter-
natively, if high type alternatives always have aspects, i.e., if tK = 1, then
EBA is optimal.
The main implication of the assumptions tO = 0 or tK = 1 is that SWE is
not feasible any more. Indeed, if tO = 0 and the initial sample of alternatives
consists of more than two low type alternatives, then there will be at least
two bad alternatives in each selection stage. Hence, SWE does not result
in a choice of a single alternative and, therefore, is not feasible. The same
problem occurs if tK = 1 and there are at least two high type alternatives
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in the sample. At the same time, all other selection procedures are strictly
dominated and, therefore, not optimal by the very same reasoning as in the
proof of Proposition 5.1. Thus, with infinitely many aspects, an optimal
selection procedure does not exist.
In order to restore the existence of an optimal selection procedure, we
modify the model as follows. We assume that the number of aspects is finite
and equals to W . Then, if more than one alternative is selected in stage W ,
one of these alternatives will be chosen at random at stage W + 1.
If tO = 0, a low type alternative never has an aspect so that any good
alternative is definitely a high type alternative. Selecting any number of
good alternatives followed by any selection procedure afterwards is optimal.
If there are no good alternatives in the sample, it is optimal to select all
alternatives. Hence, if tO = 0, there are multiple optimal selection proce-
dures:
VVDW = (jW> eW) =
½
(j˜> 0) if J  1
(0> E) if J = 0
for any arbitrary j˜ = 1> ==> J˜ which may depend on w=
All these selection procedures are essentially SAT because they wait for
good alternatives and randomly select one of them.
If tK = 1, a high type alternative always has an aspect so that any
bad alternative is definitely a low type alternative. In the presence of one or
more good alternatives, removing all bad alternatives is optimal. If there are
no good alternatives, then all alternatives are of low type, and all selection
procedures are pay-o equivalent. Hence, if tK = 1, there are multiple
optimal selection procedures:
VHED = (jW> eW) =
(
(J> 0) if J  1³
0> e˜
´
if J = 0
for an arbitrary e˜ = 1> ==> E˜, which may depend on w.
All these selection procedures are essentially EBA because, if feasible,
they eliminate in every stage all bad alternatives.
5 Choice Function of SWE
In this section, we analyze the choice function and show that this choice
function violates WARP.
Proposition 5.3. The choice function F
¡
X> VVZH
¢
is transitive but does
not respect WARP.
Proof. Let be {1> {2> {3 5 A any three alternatives such that
F
¡{{1> {2} > VVZH¢ = {1 and F ¡{{2> {3} > VVZH¢ = {2
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We define w1 = min
©
w | dw1 = 1> dw2 = 0
ª
, i.e., w1 is the selection stage in which
SWE eliminates alternative {2 and keeps alternative {1 in making a choice
from the set {{1> {2} . Similarly, we define w2 = min
©
w | dw2 = 1> dw3 = 0
ª
.
By construction, w1 6= w2. If w1 ? w2, then all three alternatives have equal
aspects, i.e., dw1 = dw2 = dw3, for w = 1> ==> w1  1. By construction, d
w1
1 = 1
and dw12 = 0 and . Since F
¡{{2> {3} > VVZH¢ = {2 and {3 is eliminated at
stage w2 A w1, it must be that dw13 = d
w1
2 = 0. Hence, F
¡{{1> {3} > VVZH¢ =
{1 because {3 is the single worst alternative at stage w1. Alternatively, if
w2 ? w1, then all three alternatives have equal aspects, i.e., dw1 = dw2 =
dw3, for w = 1> ==> w2  1. By construction, d
w2
2 = 1 and d
w1
3 = 0. Since
F
¡{{1> {2} > VVZH¢ = {1 and {2 is eliminated at stage w1 A w2, it must
be that dw11 = d
w1
2 = 1. Hence, F
¡{{1> {3} > VVZH¢ = {1 because {3 is
the single worst alternative at stage w2. Hence, F
¡{{1> {2} > VVZH¢ = {1
and F
¡{{2> {3} > VVZH¢ = {2 necessarily imply F ¡{{1> {3} > VVZH¢ = {1
so that the choice function F
¡
X> VVZH
¢
is always transitive. In order to
show that may violate WARP, we provide the following example.
Example 5 Let the set of alterntives be X = {{1> {2> {3} and let the al-
ternatives have the following aspects: {1 = (1> 0> 0> ==), {2 = (0> 1> 1> ==) and
{3 = (0> 1> 0> ==). In accordance with SWE, F
¡{{1> {2} > VVZH¢ = {1 and
F
¡{{1> {1> {3} > VVZH¢ = {2, i.e., the WARP is violated.
Proposition 5.3 states the optimal choice of a selection procedure guar-
antees only the transitivity of the resulting choices (of alternatives), but
not the WARP. This seemingly irrational choice function arises because the
decision-maker chooses an alternative indirectly: first, he chooses a proce-
dure, and this choice satisfies WARP; then, the chosen procedure selects an
alternative for the decision-maker.
Contrary to SWE, selection procedures SAT and EBA lead to random
choice functions because jW (w0> J>E) ? J (in case of SAT) or eW (w0> J>E) ?
E (in case of EBA) at a certain stage w0. It can be shown that both SAT
and EBA lead to random choice functions that are monotone (see Tversky,
1972), i.e., the probability that a given alternative is chosen from a choice
set does not decrease if some other alternatives are removed from the set.
This monotonicity property is often used for stochastic choice functions as
a rationality criterion instead of WARP. Hence, in the limiting cases when
tK = 1 or tO = 0, the choice function of a maximizing decision-maker looks
rational. However, if 0 ? tO ? tK ? 1, i.e., when aspects do not fully reveal
the types, his choice function violates WARP.
94
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I build a procedural model of choice based on CBE-model.
The main ingredient of the model is the inability of a decision-maker to
evaluate his objective function. This assumption makes it impossible to
evaluate values of each alternative from the choice set and choose one with
the highest value. Instead, the decision-maker uses aspects, which provide
imperfect information about the value of the objective function that each
alternative yields.
The decision-maker maximizes the probability of choosing the best alter-
native if he follows a specific procedure, which we call ‘Single Worst Elimi-
nation’. In accordance with SWE, only the single worst alternative must be
eliminated in each selection stage. This procedure is optimal independently
of the size of a choice set, of the number of high type alternatives in it, and
the accuracy of aspects (provided this accuracy is not perfect). The choice
function induced by SWE is always transitive, but may violate the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preferences. When aspects become fully informative,
then either ‘Saticficing’ or ‘Elimination-By-Aspects’ becomes optimal.
The main assumption that drives these results is the inability to evaluate
an objective function for all alternatives. As a result, a decision-maker
uses a procedure to select an alternative. In order to select a procedure,
he constructs another, secondary objective function which is defined over
the set of available procedures. Since the choice of a procedure is also
a choice problem, the inability to evaluate an objective function must be
applied to the secondary objective function as well. I have shown that the
optimal selection procedure can be chosen without such evaluations. Hence,
no procedure is needed in order to choose an optimal procedure.
I also make some other assumptions. First, every aspect corresponds to
a single selection stage. This assumption is not essential and can be relaxed
with redefining aspects as follows. A set of all aspects of an alternative that
can be used in a certain selection stage defines a single generalized aspect of
the alternative. The inability to evaluate objective functions requires that
neither of these generalized aspects include all aspects. As a result of this
modification, a decision-maker observes one generalized aspect in each stage.
Second, the decision-maker minimizes the type-II error. This assump-
tion is equivalent to the assumption that alternatives are binary. In general,
each alternative from the choice set is characterized by its rank within the
set. Several secondary objective functions can be used. A decision-maker
can either minimize the expected rank of the chosen alternative, or mini-
mize the probability of choosing the lowest rank, or, as in the current model,
maximize the probability that the chosen alternative has the highest rank.
It can be shown that maximization of the expected objective function is
equivalent to maximization of the expectation of a certain strictly decreas-
ing function of the chosen rank. This function depends on the values of
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all alternatives from the choice set. Therefore, in order to accommodate
non-binary types, the optimal selection procedure must maximize the ex-
pectation of any strictly decreasing function of the rank. The first order
stochastic dominance criterion used in the current model, together with the
monotonicity of that function, seems to be a powerful tool in generalizing
the model in this direction.
Third, the number of aspects is infinite. This assumption assures that
SWE is feasible. For finite but a su!ciently large number of aspects, the
optimal selection procedure looks like SWE when there are still many stages
ahead. Only when the number of remaining stages is small, the decision-
maker has incentives to eliminate more than one bad alternative. In the last
stage, only one alternative has to be selected, preferably a good alternative.
Hence, SWE can be considered as being asymptotically optimal in the sense
that when the number of aspects increases, the optimal procedure uses SWE
in more initial stages of the selection.
Fourth, all aspects are equally informative. Without this assumption,
the optimal procedure will depend on aspects’ accuracies, and a decision-
maker will have to know them (or, their prior distribution at least). As
in the main assumption, I argue that this knowledge is unavailable to him
so that the assumption that aspects are equally informative is a neutral
ignorance assumption.
The model can be used in explaining dierent attitudes towards risk.
Let us consider an expected utility maximizer, who does not know the prior
distribution of states of the world. If we assume that he uses his Bernoulli
utility functions as aspects, then he has to sequentially eliminate alternatives
that yield low instantaneous utilities in each state of the world. In other
words, he puts larger weights on the lowest levels of his utility. Hence,
the model has an intrinsic aversion towards risk, which does not require
concavity of the Bernoulli utility function.
The model can also be useful in analyzing humans’ reference dependence.
In accordance with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), prefer-
ences of an individual are subject to a reference point that he uses. By using
dierent alternatives from his choice set as reference points, an individual
gets generally dierent subjective preferences. Each such preference relation
can be viewed as an aspect. A choice function of such a decision-maker will
be fully determined by the selection procedure that he follows.
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7 Appendix to chapter 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
The proof is done by induction. We assume (induction assumption) that
a selection procedure V (jW> eW) is optimal for all Q  N so that the prop-
erties (a)-(d) from the proposition hold. It is easy to see that for Qw = 1,
the only feasible selection procedure is (j> e) = (J>E), which is trivially
optimal and satisfies the properties (a)-(c) of Proposition 5.1. The prop-
erty (d) of Proposition 5.1 is also satisfied as X (V> 1>QK) = QK so that
XW (1>QK)  QK strictly increases in QK . Thus, the induction assumption
is satisfied for N = 1. Now, suppose that at a stage t of the selection:
a) the number of alternatives is Qw = N + 1;
b) the prior distribution of the number of high type alternatives QKw is
sw (}), i.e., sw (})  Pr
¡
QKw = }
¢
;
c) the numbers of good and bad alternatives are Jw and Ew = Qw  Jw
correspondingly;
d) the decision-maker selects jw good alternatives and ew bad alternatives
so that jw + ew  Qw  1 = N.
Under these assumptions, the posterior distribution of the number of
high type alternatives QKw+1 at stage (w+ 1) is:
sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢

QX
QKw =0
sw
¡
QKw
¢
Pr
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
where Pr
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw >Jw> jw> ew
¢
is the probability that exactly } high
type alternatives will be among the jw good and ew bad alternatives selected.
As jw+ew  N, the number of alternatives at all stages after stage w does not
exceed N and, by the induction assumption, V (eW> jW) is optimal. Hence,
after selecting jw good alternatives and ew bad alternatives in stage w, the
decision-maker follows V (eW> jW). The probability that a high type alter-
native will be finally selected depends on w, Qw, Jw, jw> and ew, and equals
to:
Xˆ (w>Qw>Jw> jw> ew) 
}=jw+ewX
}=0
sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
X (VW> jw + ew> })
= 1
}=jw+ew31X
}=0
Iw+1
¡
z | Qw>QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢×
× (X (VW> jw + ew> } + 1) X (VW> jw + ew> }))
where Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw >Jw> jw> ew
¢

P
}$z sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
is the corresponding cumulative distribution function. By the induction
assumption, X (===> } + 1)  X (===> }) A 0. Therefore, if the distribution
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Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> j0w> e0w
¢
first-order stochastically dominates the distribu-
tion Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw >Jw> jw> ew
¢
then Xˆ (w>Qw> Jw> j0w> e0w) A Xˆ (w>Qw> Jw> jw> ew).
In the rest of the proof, we use this first-order stochastic dominance
criterion in order to show that Xˆ (w>Qw> Jw> jW> eW) A Xˆ (w>Qw> Jw> j0> e0)for all
(j> e) 6= (jW (w>Jw> Ew) > eW (w>Jw> Ew)). We split this proof into five steps. In
step one, we derive explicit expression for Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
. In
steps two, three and four, we derive properties (a)-(c) of Proposition 5.1.
for any Jw and arbitrary prior distribution sw (}). In particular, in step two
we show that jW = Jw for ew = 0, whereas in step three we show that jW = Jw
also for ew A 0. Finally, in step four we show that first, it is either eW = 0 or
eW = Ew, and second, that eW = Ew for Ew  2. In step five, we prove part
(d) of Proposition 5.1., which ends the induction arguments. The following
notations are used throughout the proof:
 
tK (1 tO)
tO (1 tK)
= 1 +
tK  tO
tO (1 tK)
5 (1>4)
Tw 
FJwQw
FQ
K
w
Qw
P
| F
|
QKw
FJw3|Qw3QKw
|
where, here and after, F{| is the binomial coe!cient
¡|
{
¢
> all summation
indices implicitly take all integer values, and the binomial coe!cients are
assumed to be zero if they are not defined for given values of its entries.
Step one. In order to derive the distribution sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw>QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
,
let assume that in stage w exactly | out of Jw good alternatives are of high
type, and the remaining Jw| good alternatives are of low type. Selecting a
sample (jw> ew) yields the following probability of having exactly } high type
alternatives among the jw + ew alternatives selected
Pr
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew> |w
¢
=
P
q
Fq|F
}3q
QKw 3|
Fjw3qJw3|F
ew3}+q
Qw3QKw 3Jw+|
FjwJwF
ew
Qw3Jw
Now, | follows the distribution Pr
¡
|w = } | Qw> QKw >Jw
¢
> which is:
=
F|QKw
(tK)| (1 tK)Q
K
w 3| FJw3|Qw3QKw
(tO)Jw3| (1 tO)Qw3Q
K
w 3Jw+|
P
|
F|QKw
(tK)| (1 tK)Q
K
w 3| FJw3|Qw3QKw
(tO)Jw3| (1 tO)Qw3Q
K
w 3Jw+|
=
F|QKw
FJw3|Qw3QKw
|P
|
F|QKw
FJw3|Qw3QKw
|
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Then, taking expectations of the probability Pr
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew> |w
¢
with respect to |, yields the following expression for sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw>QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
:
X
|
Pr
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw >Jw> jw> ew> |w
¢×
×Pr ¡|w = | | Qw> QKw > Jw¢
=
P
|
P
q
F|QKw
FJw3|Qw3QKw
Fq|F
}3q
QKw 3|
Fjw3qJw3|F
ew3}+q
Qw3QKw 3Jw+|
|
FjwJwF
ew
Qw3Jw
P
|
F|QKw
FJw3|Qw3QKw
|
= Tw
X
q
FqjwF
}3q
ew
X
|
F|3qJw3jwF
QKw 3|3}+q
Qw3Jw3ew 
|
and for Iw+1
¡
z | Qw>QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
:
Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
= Tw
X
q
X
|
X
}$z
FqkwF
}3q
ew F
|3q
Jw3jwF
QKw 3|3}+q
Qw3Jw3ew 
|
Step two. (derivation of jW = Jw for ew = 0). Suppose that the decision-
maker does not select bad alternatives in stage w, i.e., ew = 0, and selects jw 
Jw1, i.e., not all, good alternatives. The corresponding type’s distribution
in stage w+1 is, by definition, Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> 0
¢
. However, he could
get a better distribution (here and after, in terms of the first-order stochastic
dominance) if he uses the following modified selection procedure V˜.
Let the decision-maker select (jw+1)good alternatives, i.e., one good al-
ternative more. This will induce the distribution sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw + 1> 0
¢
.
Then, let him wait until at a certain stage, w + p> there are exactly jw
good alternatives and exactly one bad alternative. In that stage, let the
decision-maker select only jw good alternatives. This modified selection pro-
cedure V˜ yields QKw+1 = QKw+p by construction and induces the distribution
sw+p+1
¡
QKw+p+1 = } | kw + 1> QKw+1> jw> jw> 0
¢
. Taking expectations of the lat-
ter probability with respect to QKw+1, which is distributed in accordance
with sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw >Jw> jw + 1> 0
¢
, yields the following distribution
I˜w+p+1 (z)of the number of high type alternatives QKw+p+1 among kw alter-
natives in stage w+p+ 1:
I˜w+p+1 (z) 
X
}$z
X

sw+p+1
¡
QKw+p+1 = } | jw + 1> > jw> jw> 0
¢×
×sw+1
¡
QKw+1 =  | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw + 1> 0
¢
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I˜w+p+1 (z) = Tw
X
}$z
}+1X
=}
F}F
jw3}
jw+13
}+13
+ (jw + 1 )
X
|
Fjw+1F
|3
Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|
Qw3Jw
|
= Tw
X
|
FQ
K
w 3|
Qw3Jw
|
3
EEC
P
}$z
(jw+13})F}jw+1F
|3}
Jw3jw31

}+(jw+13}) +
+
P
}$z
(}+1)F}+1jw+1F
|3}31
Jw3jw31
}+1+(jw3})
4
FFD
= Tw
X
|
FQ
K
w 3|
Qw3Jw
|
3
EC
P
}$z
F}jw+1F
|3}
Jw3jw31+
+
(z+1)Fz+1jw+1F
|3z31
Jw3jw31
z+1+(jw3z)
4
FD
It can be seen now that the distribution I˜w+p+1 (z) dominates Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> 0
¢
as
G0 (z) 
1
Tw
³
Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw >Jw> jw> 0
¢
 I˜w+p+1 (z)
´
=
X
|
FQ
K
w 3|
Qw3Jw
|
3
EC
P
}$z
F}jwF
|3}
Jw3jw 
P
}$z
F}jw+1F
|3}
Jw3jw31

(z+1)Fz+1jw+1F
|3z31
Jw3jw31
z+1+(jw3z)
4
FD
=
X
|
FQ
K
w 3|
Qw3Jw
|
Ã
FzjwF
|3z31
Jw3jw31 +
(z + 1)Fz+1jw+1F
|3z31
Jw3jw31
z + 1 + (jw  z)
!
=
(jw z)Fzjw ( 1)
z + 1 + (jw  z)
X
|
F|3z31Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|
Qw3Jw
| A 0
for all z  jw  1. Thus, if ew = 0, an optimal selection procedure requires
j (w>J>E) = J.
Step three. (derivation ofjW = Jw for ew A 0). Suppose next that
the decision-maker does select bad alternatives in stage w, i.e., ew A 0, and
also selects jw  Jw  1, i.e., not all, good alternatives. This induces the
distribution Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
in stage w + 1. However, he could
get a better distribution if he replaces one bad alternative with one good
alternative. Defining
Ge (z) 
1
Tw
¡
Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> jw> ew
¢
 Iw+1
¡
z | Qw>QKw > Jw> jw + 1> ew  1
¢¢
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yields:
Ge (z) =
X
q
X
|
|
X
}$z
Ã
FqjwF
}3q
ew F
|3q
Jw3jwF
QKw 3|3}+q
Qw3Jw3ew 
Fqjw+1F
}3q
ew31F
|3q
Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|3}+q
Qw3Jw3ew+1
!
=
X
q
X
|
|+1
X
}$z
Ã
FqjwF
}3q
ew31F
|3q
Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|3}+q31
Qw3Jw3ew 
FqjwF
}3q31
ew31 F
|3q
Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|3}+q
Qw3Jw3ew
!


X
q
X
|
|
X
}$z
Ã
FqjwF
}3q
ew31F
|3q
Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|3}+q31
Qw3Jw3ew 
FqjwF
}3q31
ew31 F
|3q
Jw3jw31F
QKw 3|3}+q
Qw3Jw3ew
!
= ( 1)
X
q
Fqjw
X
|
F|3qJw3jw31
| ×
×
3
C
X
}$z
F}3qew31F
QKw 3|3}+q31
Qw3Jw3ew 
X
}$z31
F}3qew31F
QKw 3|3}+q31
Qw3Jw3ew
4
D
= ( 1)
X
q
FqjwF
z3q
ew31
X
|
F|3qJw3jw31F
QKw 3|3z+q31
Qw3Jw3ew 
| A 0=
Thus, combining steps two and three, we have shown that an optimal selec-
tion procedure is such that jW (w>J>E) = J.
Step four. (derivation of eW). Suppose that the decision-maker, in ad-
dition to all good alternatives, also selects ew  QwJw1, i.e., not all, bad
alternatives. This induces the distribution Iw+1
¡
z | Qw>QKw > Jw> Jw> ew
¢
in
stage w+1= Let us consider the following deviation Vˆ from this selection proce-
dure. Let the decision-maker select ow+1 bad alternatives, i.e., one bad alter-
native more. This will induce the distribution sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw >Jw>Jw> ew + 1
¢
.
Then, let wait until, at a certain stage w+p> there are exactly Jw+ ew good
alternatives and exactly one bad alternative. In that stage, let the decision-
maker select only Jw + ew good alternatives. This modified selection pro-
cedure Vˆ yieldsQKw+1 = QKw+p by construction and induces the distribution
sw+p+1
¡
QKw+p = } | Jw + ew + 1> QKw+1> Jw + ew>Jw + ew> 0
¢
at stage w+p+ 1.
Taking expectations of the latter probability with respect toQKw+1distributed
in accordance with sw+1
¡
QKw+1 = } | Qw> QKw > Jw> Jw> ew + 1
¢
yields the follow-
ing distribution Iˆw+p+1 (z) of the number of high type alternatives QKw+p+1
among Jw + ew alternatives in stage w+p+ 1:
Iˆw+p+1 (z) 
X
}$z
X

sw+p+1
¡
QKw+p+1 = } | Jw + ew + 1> >Jw + ew> Jw + ew> 0
¢×
×sw+1
¡
QKw+1 =  | Qw> QKw > Jw> Jw> ew + 1
¢
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Iˆw+p+1 (z) = Tw
X
}$z
}+1X
=}
F}F
Jw+ew3}
Jw+ew+13
}+13
+ (Jw + ew + 1 )
X
|
F|JwF
3|
ew+1F
QKw 3
Qw3Jw3ew31
|
= Tw
X
|
F|Jw
|
X
}$z
(Jw + ew + 1 })F}jw+1F
|3}
Jw3jw31
} + (Jw + ew + 1 })
+
+Tw
X
|
F|Jw
|
X
}$z
(} + 1)F}+13|ew+1 F
QKw 3}31
Qw3Jw3ew31
} + 1 + (Jw + ew  })
= Tw
X
|
F|Jw
|
3
EC
P
}$z
F}3|ew+1F
QKw 3}
Qw3Jw3ew31+
+
(z+1)Fz+13|ew+1 F
QKw 3z31
Qw3Jw3ew31
z+1+(Jw+jw3z)
4
FD
In order to compare distributions and Iw+1
¡
z | Qw>QKw > Jw> Jw> ew
¢
and Iˆw+p+1 (z),
we define
Gj (z>Jw> ew) 
z + 1 + (Jw + ew  z)
TwF
QKw 3z31
Qw3Jw3ew31
³
Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Jw> Jw> ew
¢
 Iˆw+p+1 (z)
´
Then
Gj (z>Jw> ew) =
X
|
F|Jw
|
3
EC
z+1+(Jw+ew3z)
F
QKw 3z31
Qw3Jw3ew31
×
×P}$z ³F}3|ew FQKw 3}Qw3Jw3ew  F}3|ew+1FQKw 3}Qw3Jw3ew31
´
4
FD

X
|
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F|Jw
|
³
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z+13|
ew+1
´
=
X
|
(Jw + ew  z)F|JwF
z3|
ew 
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|
(z + 1)F|JwF
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|
=
X
|
³
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It is easily seen thatGj (z> 0> ew) = (ew  z)Fzew(z + 1)F
z+1
ew = ewF
z
ew31 ( 1) A
0 for all ew  z+1  1, and that Gj (z> 0> 0) = 0. In addition, Gj (z>Jw> ew)
can be written recursively as
Gj (z>Jw + 1> ew) = Gj (z>Jw> ew) + Gj (z  1> Jw> ew)
Therefore, Gj (z>Jw> 0) = 0 and Gj (z>Jw> ew) A 0 for all ew  1 by induc-
tion.
This implies that in stage w, any selection procedure (Jw> ew) with ew =
1> ==>Qw Jw  1 is strictly dominated by the selection procedure Vˆ. Hence,
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if some bad alternatives are eliminated, then all the other bad alterna-
tives must also be eliminated, or, stated dierently, if some bad alternatives
are selected, then all the other bad alternatives must also be selected. In
other words, all bad alternatives must be treated equivalently, i.e., either
eW (w>J>E) = 0 or eW (w>J>E) = E.
Suppose now, that Jw  Qw  2, i.e., at least two bad alternatives are
available. Then, selecting (Jw> 0) is not better than selecting (Jw> 1), whereas
selecting (Jw> 1) is strictly dominated by selecting (Jw> 2). Hence, selecting
only good alternatives is also strictly dominated by passing all alternatives
provided Jw  Qw  2, i.e., if eW (w>J>E) = E if E  2=
Step five (monotonicity of x
¡
VW> Q>QK
¢
). From steps 2, 3 and 4 it fol-
lows that it is only optimal to eliminate an alternative if it is a unique
bad alternative at a stage. Suppose that the decision-maker eliminates
such a unique bad alternative,that is, (jw> ew) = (Qw  1> 0) when (Jw> Ew) =
(Qw  1> 1). Evaluating Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Qw  1> Qw  1> 0
¢
yields:
Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Qw  1> Qw  1> 0
¢
=
Qw
P
}$z F
}
Qw31F
Qw3}
1 
}+13QKw
FQ
K
w
Qw
¡
QKw +
¡
Qw QKw
¢

¢
=
;
A?
A=
0 if z ? QKw  1
QKw
QKw +(Qw3QKw )
if z = QKw  1
1 if z A QKw  1
It is easy to see that so that Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw + 1> Qw  1> Qw  1> 0
¢

Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Qw  1> Qw  1> 0
¢
= Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw + 1> Qw  1>Qw  1> 0
¢
stochastically dominates the distribution Iw+1
¡
z | Qw> QKw > Qw  1> Qw  1> 0
¢
and, therefore, x
¡
VW> Q>QK + 1
¢
A x
¡
VW> Q>QK
¢
for all Q  Qw. This
ends the induction arguments and the proof of Proposition 1. ¥
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6. Conclusion
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970) ’information’ has become an
essential term in the economics vocabulary, and informational issues have
been playing a crucial role in the research agenda. The main argument of
most of the literature that followed Akerlof’s paper is that many economic
ine!ciencies (i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard) are due to a lack of
information. However, in recent years, it has become clear that the quantity
and the quality of the information at disposal of an economic agent is not
the only element to determine the quality of economic outcomes. Prior
to making decisions, economic agents must interpret the information they
possess and, therefore, the information processing phase is itself a key aspect
of decision making.
In the current thesis I have considered three specific information process-
ing limitations: limited attention, lack of communication and imperfect re-
call. The first typically refers to the fact that, quantitatively, more infor-
mation requires more resources (i.e., time and money) to understand and
correctly interpret information. The second limitation is due to the fact
that, qualitatively, complex information is not easily transmittable between
dierent agents. Finally, imperfect recall refers to a situation in which an
individual has to carry out several successive actions but faces memory limi-
tations. Accounting for such limitations has allowed me to shed light on the
eect that imperfect information processing has on the functioning of mar-
kets (chapter 2) collective decision making (chapters 3 and 4) and individual
decision making (chapter 5).
In chapter 2 I have investigated the equilibrium property of a monopsony
market in which many senders compete for a vacancy posted by one receiver
who has limited attention. I have found that, even when information is
a disposable good (e.g., information in excess can be disregarded) there
exists a negative relation between the amount of information (i.e., the total
amount of applications sent) and the average value of information processed.
This result is in line with theoretical and empirical findings suggesting the
existence of information overload: large amount information may lead to
undesired outcomes.
In chapter 3 I have analyzed the collective decision making of a hierar-
chical organization whose task is to select the best alternative from a feasible
set. Information processing refers here to the fact that, for each agent, the
evaluation of alternatives comes in the form of imprecise news about each al-
ternative’s quality. Interestingly enough, my findings suggest that the ways
in which limited attention and lack of communication shape the optimal se-
lection rule are very similar. Under both information processing limitations,
potentially valuable information is generally disregarded in equilibrium. In
case of limited attention it is generally optimal for the agent placed at lower
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hierachical level to disregard some news (both good and bad) as this prevents
to degrade excessively the screening accuracy of the agent that operates at
higher level. In case of lack of communication it is generally optimal for the
first agent to disregard some bad news as mixing good and bad news in a
single pool makes it impossible to distinguish between them later on and,
therefore, decreases the probability of selecting the best alternative.
In chapter 4 I use the same model used in chapter 3 but I limit my
attention only to lack of communication, and my analysis focuses here on
the optimal ordering of heterogenous agents within the organization. I have
found that, by letting the more accurate agent screen first, the organization
overcomes the imperfections due to lack of communication and is as e!cient
as a hierarchy in which information flows are perfect. It is important to stress
that I didn’t account for the direct costs usually involved in any information-
processing phase. As it is natural to assume that the cost of processing
information increases with the accuracy with which information is processed,
it might be the case that having higher accuracy at higher stages is optimal
for the simple reason that, at later stages, less information is processed.
Whenever such ordering is in place, the contribution of my analysis is that
of identifying the indirect cost that might emerge due to a lack of internal
communication.
In chapter 5 I analyze the property of the choice function of a decision-
maker who is unable to evaluate his objective function. I took a procedural
approach to decision-making by modeling choice as a selection procedure
of Choice by Elimination (CBE) (Tversky (1972a,1972b)). This approach
assumes that each alternative is viewed as a sequence of aspects that the
alternative may or may not posses, and the decision-maker’s inability to eval-
uate the objective function is then captured by the fact that the dierent
aspects of each alternative cannot be aggregated into a single performance
measure. Since in my model each aspect has the interpretation of being a
good news about the quality of the corresponding alternative, the choice
problem can be interpreted as one with imperfect recall: the decision-maker
sequentially observes informative signals about the quality of each alterna-
tives, but he does not remember the signals observed in previous stages.
My findings that the optimal selection procedure (namely, the ’Single Worst
Elimination’ (SWE) procedure) induces a choice function that violates the
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences has one important implication. Shall
we conclude, from the violation of the Weak Axiom, that the decision-maker
is not rational? The answer is no. Due to imperfect recall, the original deci-
sion problem of choosing between a set of alternatives looses its meaning as
it is necessarily rephrased as an auxiliary decision problem where the initial
set of alternatives is replaced by the set of available procedures that could
be implemented. Since a rational decision-maker always implements the op-
timal procedure, the choice function whose domain is the set of available
procedures never violates the Weak Axiom. In other words, as imperfect
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recall is assumed, the rationality of the D-M conveys in choosing the pro-
cedure which is most appropriate for his goal. Therefore the main massage
of chapter 5 is that seemingly irrational choices may still be consistent with
the concept of rationality.
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7. Samenvatting (summary inDutch)
Sinds het baanbrekende werk van Akerlof (1970) is de term ‘informatie’
uitgegroeid tot een essentieel begrip in het economische vocabulaire en is er
een hele reeks vervolgonderzoek naar het onderwerp gedaan. Het voornaam-
ste argument dat men tegenwoordig in de literatuur betreende Akerlof’s
paper tegenkomt is, dat economische ine!ciëntie (b.v. adverse selection en
moral hazard) te wijten zijn aan het gebrek aan informatie. Echter heeft
men recentelijk vastgesteld, dat de kwantiteit en kwaliteit van de informatie,
die een individu ter beschikking heeft, niet de enige indicatoren zijn om de
kwaliteit van een economisch product vast te kunnen stellen. Om een besluit
te kunnen nemen, vertolkt ieder individu de verzamelde informatie, waarom
gesteld kan worden, dat het proces van informatieverwerking zelf een sleutel
element voor het nemen van beslissingen is.
In deze scriptie heb ik tevens drie specifieke beperkingen van informatie
processen aan bod gebracht: beperkte attentie, tekort aan communicatie en
de beperkingen in het herinneringproces. De eerste beperking verwijst naar
het feit dat, kwantitatief meer informatie meer middelen, zoals tijd en geld,
opeist om de informatie te kunnen begrijpen en interpreteren. De tweede
beperking bespreekt de complicaties die optreden zodra kwalitatief com-
plexe informatie overgedragen wordt tussen twee of meerdere individuen.
Het slotargument beschrijft een situatie, waarin een individu enkele opeen-
volgende acties moet ondernemen waarbij hij op een beperking van het
herinneringsvermogen stoot. Door rekening te houden met de genoemde
beperkingen, was het mogelijk het eect te belichten, dat imperfecte verw-
erking van informatie op het functioneren van de markt (hoofdstuk2), het
collectieve nemen van beslissingen (hoofdstuk 3 en 4) en individuele nemen
van een besluit (hoofdstuk5), heeft.
In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik het evenwichtige eigendom van een monopsony
markt onderzocht, waarin tal van afzenders concurreren om een vacature
geplaatst door een ontvanger met beperkte attentie. Het gevonden resultaat
beschreef dat, ook al is informatie een beschikbaar goed, er een negatieve
relatie tussen de hoeveelheid informatie (b.v. het totale aantal beschikbare
sollicitaties) en de doorsnee waarde gehecht aan de verwerkte informatie
bestaat. Dit resultaat houdt verband met de theoretische en empirische
bevindingen betreende ‘information overload’, dat een groot aantal infor-
matie tot ongehoopte resultaten leidt.
In hoofdstuk 3 heb ik het proces van collectieve besluitneming van een
hiërarchische organisatie geanalyseerd, wiens taak het is het beste alternatief
uit een reeks te vinden. Informatie verwerking refereert in dit geval naar
het feit dat, de evaluatie van alternatieven voor elke speler in de vorm van
onprecies nieuws over de kwaliteit van elk alternatief verschijnt. Interes-
sant was dat, mijn bevindingen suggereren dat de manier waarop beperkte
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attentie en een gebrek aan communicatie de richtlijn voor een optimale se-
lectie vormen, soortgelijk zijn. In beide beperkingen van het verwerken van
informatie werd potentieel waardevolle informatie over het algemeen in een
equilibrium buiten beschouwing gelaten. In het geval van het gebrek aan
attentie is het over het algemeen het beste voor een speler op lager hiërar-
chisch niveau om, enkele informatie (goede en slechte) buiten beschouwing
te laten, om te voorkomen dat, de nauwkeurigheid in het verwerken van in-
formatie van een hoger geplaatste speler niet verlaagd word. In het geval van
een gebrek aan communicatie is het over het algemeen voor de eerste speler
het beste om slechte informatie buiten beschouwing te laten. Het samen-
voegen van goede en slechte informatie in een pool maakt het onmogelijk
op een later tijdstip een onderscheid tussen beiden te maken, waardoor de
waarschijnlijkheid het beste alternatief te vinden kleiner wordt.
In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik het zelfde model gebuikt als in hoofdstuk 3. Echter
heb ik me hier beperkt tot een tekort aan communicatie en mijn analyse
is gericht op een optimale ordening van heterogene spelers in een organ-
isatie. Mijn conclusie was, dat als men betrouwbaardere speler eerst laat
sorteren het probleem van een tekort aan communicatie binnen de organ-
isatie overkomen kan worden, waardoor het net zo e!ciënt werkt als binnen
een hiërarchische organisatie, waarin de stroming van informatie als perfect
beschreven kan worden. Belangrijk is tevens te betonen, dat ik geen reken-
ing met de directe kosten van een informatie verwerking proces gehouden
heb.
Hoofdstuk 5 is een analyse van de eigenschappen van een keuzefunctie
van een besluitnemend individu, die niet in staat is, de objectieve functie te
evalueren. In dit prospect heb ik voor een aanpak gekozen, die besluitneming
in een model weergeeft waarin keuze door middel van het uitsluitprincipe
bepaald wordt (CBE) (Tversky (1972a, 1972b)). Deze aanpak veronder-
steld, dat elk alternatief gezien wordt als een aaneenschakeling van aspecten
dat het alternatief wel of niet zou kunnen hebben. De besluitnemers on-
bekwaamheid de objectieve functie te evalueren is nu overgenomen door
het feit dat, verschillende aspecten van elk alternatief niet samengevoegd
kunnen worden tot een enkele indicator van functionering. Aangezien elk
aspect in mijn model geïnterpreteerd kan worden als zijnde goed nieuws over
de kwaliteit van een alternatief kan het probleem van de keuze geïnterpre-
teerd worden als een complicatie van imperfecte herinnering. Er is sprake
van imperfecte herinnering wanneer een besluitnemer achtereenvolgens in-
formatieve signalen over de kwaliteit van elk alternatief opvangt, maar echter
eerdere signalen niet meer kan herinneren. Mijn conclusie dat de optimale
selectie procedure (met name, de ‘Single Worst Elimination’ (SWE) proce-
dure) een keuzefunctie omvat die de ‘Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences’
veronachtzaamd, heeft een belangrijke kanttekening. Zou geconcludeerd
kunnen worden, dat volgens de veronachtzaming van de Weak Axiom de
besluitnemende speler niet rationeel is? Het antwoord is nee. Volgens de
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imperfecte herinnering verliest het originele probleem van besluitneming zijn
eigenlijke betekenis. Omdat een rationele besluitnemer altijd de optimale
procedure zal doorvoeren om het beste alternatief tussen een reeks te vinden,
zal de keuzefunctie de Weak Axiom nooit veronachtzamen. De essentie van
hoofdstuk 5 is tevens dat, schijnbaar irrationele keuzes ondanks het concept
van rationaliteit kunnen blijven bestaan.
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